Daily insights for city builders, delivered every morning at 6 AM ET. I’m Brandon Donnelly — a Toronto-based real estate developer and founder of Globizen. I’ve been writing here since 2013.
Like many cities these days, Boston has a program in place to incentivize the conversion of office buildings to residential. Here is generally how it works:
City to provide an average tax abatement of up to 75% of the fair market assessed residential value for up to 29 years.
City to fast track the development review process (only 1 community meeting). Zoning would be considered as-of-right.
Construction must start before October 2025.
Per the city’s inclusionary zoning policies, 17% of all newly created residential suites must be restricted to households making up to 60% of AMI (Area Median Income), and another 3% of the suites must be reserved for voucher holders.
Projects cannot be ground-up construction. Adaptive re-use only. Though additional height/FAR is a possibility.
Program is not intended to create micro-units (I’m not sure how firm this restriction is).
Any ground-floor retail and public uses must be maintained.
Transaction charge of 2% on any future gross sale of the property.
And here is one example project that is using the program. It is interesting to look at how different cities are approaching this vacancy problem.
Montreal has a bylaw that came into effect on April 1, 2021 and that requires developers to contribute to the city’s supply of social, affordable, and family housing. (All three of these have their own definition.)
Developers can meet this requirement in a number of different ways:
They can build the social, affordable, and/or family housing
They can contribute land or a building
Or they can pay cash-in-lieu
Usually, I think of inclusionary zoning as being the first of these three bullet points: a hard requirement to build a certain amount of non-market housing. That is not an absolute requirement here, and so I see this policy as being IZ lite.
Since the bylaw came into force, there have been approximately 150 new projects by private developers in Montreal, according to this CBC article. That has resulted in about 7,100 new market-rate homes. At the same time, it has resulted in exactly zero non-market homes.
From what I can tell from the article, every single developer has opted for option three: pay the cash-in-lieu instead of actually building the housing. Supposedly this has produced about $24.5 million in new fees, which sounds like a lot. But if you divide it by 7,100 homes, it isn’t all that much: just under $3,500 for each new home.
So what is clear is that this is the least expensive option. That’s why everybody is choosing it. If the fee was significantly higher and it was cheaper to just build the social/affordable/family housing, then every developer would just do that. This is how development pro formas work.
But at the end of the day, we are still taxing new housing and new home consumers for the purpose of trying to create a smidgen of more affordable housing. And this has never sat well with me, especially considering that there are plenty of other things that we could be doing to make new housing more affordable for everyone.
Jeremiah Shamess of Colliers made the claim this week that land values in some areas of the Toronto region are down 25%. He then shared a chart from Alan Leela showing how various factors have increased or decreased land values since 2020.
Broadly speaking, a revenue increase and/or more development density should increase land values; whereas something like inclusionary zoning, which is a cost to the project, should decrease land values. Indeed, this is one of the arguments in favor of inclusionary zoning: “Don’t worry about the additional cost to the project because landowners will simply pay for it through reduced land prices.”
In theory, all of this is correct.
Land is (or should be) the residual claimant in a development pro forma. Start with your revenue, subtract your costs, and then see what is left over for the land. (Though keep in mind that what is left over for the land could be $0 or even a negative number.)
But as I have argued before in the context of inclusionary zoning, I don’t think things always play out so neatly in the market. Put differently, if the cost impact of inclusionary zoning is something like $44 psf, I don’t think all landowners suddenly drop their prices accordingly — especially in a rising market where developers are competing fiercely for land.
They don’t care about your residual value model. Many or most will just hang on to their number and wait for someone to pay it.
So what I am saying with all of this is that, yeah, there are factors that put either downward or upward pressure on land values. But how it all actually plays out in the market tends to depend on the macro environment and what else is going on at the time. And right now we are at a point in the cycle where there is clearly downward pressure on land values.
The stated policy goal of inclusionary zoning is to to produce more affordable housing. We can debate who ultimately pays for this below-market housing, and we have many times before on the blog, but for the purposes of this post let’s just focus on its stated goal.
Given this ambition, it makes sense to carefully measure the number of affordable homes produced. And that is ordinarily what is done: “We implemented this new policy on this date, and since then we have produced X amount of new affordable housing.”
It is then likely that we will take X and form opinions on whether it was a successful policy or not. If X seems like a lot, then maybe we think it’s a good policy. And if X doesn’t seem like a lot, then maybe we think it was a bad policy, or perhaps just an ineffective one.
But what is largely impossible to measure with any real precision is the number of new market-rate homes that are now not being built as a result of a policy. Let’s call this number Y. It is, of course, possible to come up with an estimate by looking broadly at rents across the city, plugging in some development costs, and seeing what pencils. But this is a rough approximation.
It does not capture the countless times that a developer has looked at a possible housing site, only to come to the conclusion that it is not feasible to build. There is no official Y figure. And any amorphous estimates of Y are going to be easy to ignore by the general public anyway. Unbuilt homes? Opportunity costs? What?
I am saying (okay repeating) all of this because I continue to feel like most people believe that development will just happen no matter what is thrown at it. There is a housing shortage, right? So developers should just do what they do best and build today. Surely they could if they were genuinely nice people and really wanted to. Hmm.
What many people seem to ignore (or not know) is that development, and in turn new housing supply, operates under this very simple decision tree:
Find development site
Underwrite said site
If math works, seek capital/investors and then build
If math does not work, do not build
If math works, but capital doesn’t like it, also do not build (most can’t in this scenario)
Repeat
Just because you aren’t seeing or noticing something, it does not mean that it doesn’t exist and that it’s not happening behind the scenes.
Let’s assume that you’re Mayor of your city and that, for whatever reason, you have no need to pander to voters. You’re a benevolent dictator. You can do whatever you think is best overall for the city and it will just happen. What would you do? This is more or less the question I asked on Twitter this morning, and I think it’s only fair that I answer my own question. So here is a non-exhaustive list of items that came to mind while thinking of Toronto:
Substantially increase the pay of public sector workers throughout the city and bonus them based on measurable outcomes. Forget things like time limits on development applications; instead align incentives. For example, if we’re trying to get more shovels in the ground on affordable housing, incentivize people based on building permits issued. I’ll never forget what Roger Martin told me while I was at Rotman. When he became Dean of the school, Rotman was a whatever business school that wasn’t faring all that competitively in the rankings. One of the problems he discovered was that the school’s professors were getting paid far less than those at Wharton, Harvard, Stanford, and so on. So if you were a star, why would you ever want to teach at Rotman? He immediately matched the salaries of those top-tier schools and then, not surprisingly, the top-tier talent arrived. You get what you pay for.
Immediately price roads and congestion, and direct, to the fullest extent possible, the funds toward transit and cycling infrastructure. At the same time, the planning and building of transit would be depoliticized. There would be a reccurring funding stream and a plan that we’re continually building out. Minimize protracted debates. Never stop building. There’s a lot of talk this mayor election about solving traffic congestion. I have yet to see a plan that will actually work. Accurately pricing congestion likely won’t be popular, but I can guarantee you that it will be highly effective.
Ensure that property taxes are sustainably covering the costs of operating the city and then, at a minimum, peg all future increases to CPI.
Make any new housing development less than 12 storeys as-of-right. That would mean, no rezoning process and no site plan approval; just straight to building permit.
Empower the private sector to build affordable housing through incentives and subsidies. Affordable housing isn’t feasible to build on its own, which is why nobody is doing it. Inclusionary zoning also won’t get us there. Make developers want to build it and they’ll do it.
Liberalize licensing and cut red tape to empower small entrepreneurs across the city in various industries. A perfect example in my mind is street food. Toronto is the most diverse city in the world with some of the best restaurants, and yet the only thing you can buy on the street is a stupid hot dog. If we empowered small entrepreneurs to setup shop on our streets, we would easily have the best street food scene in the world. And I am positive that there are countless other latent opportunities in this city that are being held back by dumb and archaic rules.
Focus on art, design, culture, and innovation as central pillars of Toronto’s brand. Miami is a good example of what this approach — along with favourable taxes and nice weather — can do for a city. I’ve said this before, but here’s just one example: Toronto is in many ways the birthplace of the cryptocurrency Ethereum. Why is nobody talking about this? Why are we not celebrating and leveraging this? It’s a missed opportunity. Broadly speaking though, I think just having and doing three things can be effective in promoting new ideas for these pillars: have reasonably affordable housing, be a city that young people want to live in, and remain open and tolerant to immigrants.
Stop thinking of the night-time economy as a nuisance and instead think of it as a powerful economic development tool. I recently responded to this “night economy survey” that the City of Toronto released and the obvious bias is that nighttime things are seen as a terrible nuisance. In other words, “tell us how do we make all of this less annoying for grouchy voters.” My response was to extend last call to 4am and to start thinking of it as an opportunity to draw in young people, tourists, and whoever else. This complements my previous point.
This is, again, a completely non-exhaustive list. But if I had to summarize the overall ambition, it would be to make Toronto a truly exceptional and remarkable city. We should never be happy with mediocrity.
In the wake of Bill 23, there has been a lot of discussion and concern around development charges and parkland dedication revenues. At a high level, the concern is that the proposed changes will reduce the amount of money that cities are able to collect from developers, and that this will exacerbate any existing funding shortfalls and possibly force municipalities to do things like raise property taxes. In the case of Toronto, the estimated figure is about $230 million of lost revenue per year.
For all intents and purposes, this is objectively true. Bill 23 includes changes that will reduce the amount of revenue that cities are able to collect when new stuff is being built. Here is one such example:
New sections 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 provide, respectively, for exemptions from development charges for the creation of affordable residential units and attainable residential units, for non-profit housing developments and for inclusionary zoning residential units.
This makes for great headline fodder: “Bill 23 is bad, it is going to reduce city revenues by $X million, your property taxes may need to go up, so you should be deeply upset about this.” Hmm. We should talk about this. I’m not going to suggest that Bill 23 is entirely perfect. But I do think it is important to consider two important facts when it comes to things like development charges.
Firstly, the above exemption (to use just one example) is specifically related to affordable and attainable housing. It is not a reduction in DCs for the sake of reducing DCs. It is an attempt to recognize that we need more affordable/attainable housing and so maybe we should do things that make it easier and less costly to build it. And this brings me back to a point that I frequently make on this blog, which is that we can talk all we want about the need for more affordable housing, but at the end of the day it comes back to this: Who is going to pay for it? There is no such thing as a free lunch.
The common rebuttal to exemptions like this is that developers will always profit maximize and price their housing at the most the market will bear. In other words, there is no evidence that developers will pass on any cost savings to the end consumer. But this is not entirely true. For developers, pricing a project is typically a cost-plus exercise: how much is this going to cost to build and what do I need in revenue in order to hit my required returns?
When costs go down, it reduces what you need to make a project feasible. This in turn reduces developer risk, because there is always a very real question of absorption. The more you push pricing, the more you slow market absorption. So you might actually be better off selling for less, more quickly. An example of this line of thinking is when condominium developers choose to sell 100% of their inventory upfront as opposed to holding some back with the expectation that prices will increase in the future. Doing this means that you value certainty over profit maximization.
Development charges are fees collected from developers at the time a building permit to help pay for the cost of infrastructure required to provide municipal services to new development, such as roads, transit, water and sewer infrastructure, community centres and fire and police facilities.
Put differently, development charges are based on the idea that growth should pay for growth. When you build something new you create additional servicing demands, and so developers should pay for whatever incremental needs their projects are creating. This is, of course, fair. However, it is not the intent that growth pays for existing services. i.e. Ones that would be required regardless of whether there was the presence of development.
So in theory, if new development were to shut off entirely and if development charge revenue were to go to $0, there shouldn’t be any issues funding the existing services. And in theory, nobody should be complaining about this lost revenue, because there is actually no need for this additional revenue. There is no growth to fund and all existing services are being adequately funded by the residents who are already there and using them.
Of course, not all city services are self sustaining. Public transit, for instance, typically requires subsidies. Ridership fares aren’t enough to pay for operations, and this shortfall got understandably a lot worse during the pandemic. But is this a growth-related problem or is it an existing-resident problem? I mean, technically the problem is notenough riders. So isn’t that kind of the opposite of growth related? More people would be a benefit right now.
In any event, the point I am raising today is that there is a right way and a wrong way to complain about lost development charge revenue. The wrong way is thinking, “ah, this lost revenue is going to impact my quality of life and the existing city services that I enjoy. I may have to pay higher property taxes.” The relevant points for this particular discussion should not be that there’s an operating budget shortfall or that existing taxpayers maybe can’t afford to pay.
The more valid way to complain would be to say, “hey, these reduced development charges are going to make it difficult to fund the growth-related upgrades needed to support new and more housing in my community. And we need more housing!” Because if the concern is not actually this second one, then the headlines are a great big red herring. We have a larger financial problem on our hands that we are not speaking about.
This Twitter thread by Richard Wittstock of Domus Homes (developer out in Vancouver) is a timely follow-on to yesterday’s post about housing supply, land-use regulations, and specific policies such as inclusionary zoning. What Richard clearly describes in his thread is the economic impact of a Community Amenity Contribution (CAC) that requires developers to provide 20% social housing.
Quick dev't economics thread: Just looked at a beautiful Broadway Plan site. It's a strata wind-up in Mount Pleasant. For owners to vote in favour of wind-up, they'd need to receive a premium over their individual suite values. Otherwise it won't get redeveloped.
The thread will walk you through all of the specific numbers, but I think there are three important takeaways:
Everything has a cost. It is entirely disingenuous for anyone to refer to inclusionary zoning or other similar policies as a mechanism for “no-cost” affordable housing. Even if you believe it is the right public policy approach, there is still a cost. Social housing doesn’t just appear out of thin air.
In Richard’s thread, the remaining market rate condominiums end up needing to be sold for $1,750 psf in order for the entire project to pencil. This is a significant number. But in this case, it is a result of these homes needing to shoulder the cost of the social housing. It is basically saying “housing is too expensive, so let’s make it more expensive so that we can use some of the incremental proceeds to finance less expensive housing.”
If the math doesn’t work, developers will not build new housing.
P.S. Thank you Volodya Gusak for pointing out Richard’s thread to me.
Bullpen Consulting just released its latest land insights reports for the Greater Toronto Area. For the period of Q2-2022, Ben Myers and the team identified 46 high-density residential land transactions with an average price of $95 per buildable square foot. This is down from $112 pbsf in Q1.
In the core of the city (former City of Toronto), the average price for Q2-2022 was $135 pbsf. In North York it was $103 pbsf. And in Scarborough it was $50 pbsf. Overall land prices are down about 15% from last quarter (though it’s important to note that quarterly transactions can represent a relatively small sample size).
We have spoken before about how land prices tend to be fairly sticky in the face of changing cost structures. But what we are seeing right now is a bit of a perfect storm:
Hard costs have seen double digit increases (with some inputs increasing by 30-40%)
Inclusionary zoning is on the horizon and will add another additional cost to new housing
And rising interest rates are both increasing project costs (higher interest charges) and slowing the macro economy
All of this is naturally causing developers to be more cautious when it comes buying new land. And we are seeing that in the above pricing. But at the same time, this dip in pricing is not going to be enough to absorb all of the additional costs that new housing projects now face in today’s market.
If you’d like to download a full copy of Bullpen’s report, click here.
Okay, so maybe this isn’t an entirely definitive guide. But the intent is to make this post a kind of working post. As new ideas emerge (from my end or from your ends), I will endeavor to update it, so that maybe one day it will become a bit more definitive. I also think it’s important to keep it a little crazy. Because housing affordability is clearly a tough problem to solve, so unless we start thinking differently and acting boldly, we may not get there.
Here goes.
Encourage new housing at all scales (low, mid, high)
“Upzone” all major streets and transit station areas
Allow multi-unit dwellings in low-rise neighborhoods and ensure that any applicable codes and/or policies are not creating unnecessary obstacles to building at this scale
Work to make the largest possible housing scale permissible on an as-of-right basis — that is, remove the rezoning process wherever possible and allow builders to go right to a building permit (a lengthy rezoning process can cost millions)
Avoid the use of inclusionary zoning policies that do not provide an equal offset or subsidy (such as a density bonus)
Ensure that any development charges and levies are commensurate with the burdens created by new housing and that existing property owners are funding their fair share through property taxes
Identify the areas that are NOT seeing new housing and then create incentives to make development feasible
Search for underutilized land and other opportunities to add new housing — no land parcel should be considered too small
Incentivize small-scale prototypes as a way to test out new ideas and foster innovation — specifically with respect to climate change and construction productivity
Eliminate all parking minimums – no ifs, ands, or buts
Depoliticize the planning process as much as possible — local politicians are not generally incentivized to encourage new housing
Eliminate the ability for individuals to block or significantly delay new housing
Ensure that there are enough staff to expeditiously review and process development and building permit applications — if builders are hiring “expediters” in the hopes of moving these things along, it means something is broken
Put in place strict response and issuance timelines for building permits
Bonus city staff (and anyone else who touches housing supply) based on the number of housing units approved and permitted each year
Design smaller and more urban-friendly garbage trucks so that less space is lost in every new housing development
A blog reader responded to yesterday’s post about rent controls (and inclusionary zoning) with an excellent point: If you’re against rent controls, then you must also be against artificially low property taxes for homeowners. And I would agree with this.
One of the points I was trying to make yesterday was that if you’re in a situation where your revenue is capped but your operating expenses are free to grow based on the market, then you are likely heading down an unsustainable financial path.
This is true if the revenue is in the form of rent and this is true if the revenue is in the form of property taxes. A good example of this is California’s Proposition 13, which is the principal thing that keeps property taxes artificially low over on that coast.
Similar to what I argued yesterday with rent controls, it too creates a misallocation of housing. If you’re sitting on historic and artificially low property taxes, then you are now highly incentivized to stay put where you are. Why would you move only to have your taxes mark to market?
So this line of thinking cuts both ways, whether we’re talking about renters or homeowners.
