I'm trying to understand the new deal that was negotiated for the opening of the Gordie Howe International Bridge (scheduled for July 27, 2026) between Windsor and Detroit. The headlines read: "Tolls won't be split with the US until the $6.4 billion of debt is repaid. Net revenues will be split with the US for 15 years."

As I understand it, the nuance is that the gross toll revenue won't be split, but the net proceeds — after expenses like debt service, I hope — will be, for 15 years. This is different from the original deal, which had Canada keeping 100% of everything until it had paid off its $6.4 billion debt balance. Importantly, Canada also had complete authority over toll governance.

This is objectively a worse deal for Canada and we were bullied into it at the last minute with a classic geopolitical re-trade. But how much worse is it?

The public messaging is that net profits will likely be close to zero, and maybe even negative, in the early years of operations. So it's not inconceivable that no payments will be made to the US's local economic development fund until later years. If this is the case, the impact on Canada's net present value might be negligible. I haven't seen any of the math, but it's possible this was a small price to pay to get the bridge open.

From what I can glean, the most damaging aspects of this re-trade are the following: first, Canada lost sole authority to set its own tolls and govern the bridge — a bridge that we paid for in full! And second, it demonstrates that, at the present time, the US cannot be trusted to honour its agreements.

Re-trading, of course, happens all the time in politics and business, and the real estate industry is no different. But I would say that there's a difference between a bad-faith re-trade and a legitimate risk adjustment. Sometimes new information is discovered or the market changes in the middle of a deal, and one party needs a deal adjustment to be able to proceed.

At the same time, there are also bad-faith re-trades where one party simply wants to apply any leverage it may have, be a bully, and capitalize on deal fatigue. "Ugh, let's just get this open!" This is a short-sighted practice because it immediately destroys trust and damages your reputation. It may leave you better off on this one deal, but it makes the next ones that much harder.

Cover photo by Brad Switzer

During development downturns, at least two things tend to be true.

One, land on the periphery tends to get hit first and recover last. It's a kind of "last in, first out" principle. During a market expansion, core areas become expensive first, and then demand "spills over" to the periphery in search of opportunity.

These areas are, therefore, last (or later) to appreciate and first to fall when the market turns. This also means that they're last to rebound when the market recovers because, generally speaking, demand will start in the core and then move outward.

And two, execution becomes critical. If you don't get your product offering right and execute well, you can't rely on the tide of the market to carry you. We're seeing exactly this today.

It is, as we talk about on this blog, extremely difficult to make new projects work in the current market environment, and so few developers are launching and breaking ground, and many projects are getting cancelled.

But it's worth pointing out that there are still some projects moving forward, and that's because they got their product offering right and they executed well. And maybe they leveraged public grants or incentives to help tip the scales of feasibility.

Cover photo by Ali Köse

This has happened to us on more than a few occasions this year. Development sites that we offered on years ago have come back around to us at significantly lower prices. The obvious first thought is, "Shit, good thing we didn't buy!" At the same time, there's a reason we didn't. Typically, it's because we were trying to make the deal work with a delayed close upon construction commencement, a VTB, or some other form of structure. We didn't budge on what we needed, and so we didn't get to a deal.

When a deal does come back around, it's interesting to revisit our original pro forma assumptions to see how we did and how our thinking may have evolved. In today's market, it's not uncommon for our base rental rates to be even lower than what we were assuming a few years ago. Are we now at the bottom? Only time will tell.

The paradox of today's market is that land prices are the lowest they have been since I started in development, but it's exceptionally difficult to make new projects work. Of course, as soon as it becomes easier to make projects work, land prices will once again reflect that. So if you are looking for opportunities, today's market is about finding ways to capitalize on cheaper land while protecting for the risks inherent in the current market.

In other words, you need to be a contrarian. And as we know, if you're a contrarian and you're right, there's a huge upside. But if you're a contrarian and you get it wrong, well, then at least you went for it! The ideal scenario is that you simply get the timing right, but that involves luck. The things you can directly control are looking at a lot of opportunities, being disciplined in your underwriting, manufacturing structures that reduce risk, and generally being creative.

Cover photo by Teuku Fadhil