In the olden days here in Toronto, approved development land used to sell for a premium compared to unapproved land. This was true because approved land meant you could start construction much sooner. And since time has value, this was worth something.
Today, this is far less valuable to developers (if at all) because, in most cases, the market does not support new construction. So, the land may be approved, but what does one do with it?
Rather than speed, I would say that the most valuable feature right now is the ability to be patient. Developers need to be able to stay solvent long enough for the market to return. But this does not mean that there isn't a cost to permitting, approvals, and lengthy pre-construction periods.
Here is a recent paper (that I discovered via Thesis Driven) by economists Evan Soltas (Princeton) and Jonathan Gruber (MIT) that asks: "How Costly Is Permitting in Housing Development?" What they discovered in the Los Angeles market is the following:
Developers have been willing to pay roughly 50% more for pre-approved development land (averaging about $48 per square foot).
The permitting process in Los Angeles accounts for about 40% of the time required to develop and construct a new housing project.
Approximately one-third of the gap between home prices and construction costs can be explained by permitting costs and delays.
This last point is an interesting one to focus on because it tells you how much regulatory fat there is in the system. In a perfectly free and efficient market, the market price of a home should, in theory, be roughly equal to the cost of the land, construction costs, and the developer's margin.
When you have a massive gap between the cost of the physical materials and labour required to build the home and the price of the home, it means that there are other costs being shouldered. The paper refers to some of these as "pure wait" (time) and "capitalized hassle" (dealing with bullshit).
This is an important way to think about the efficiency of housing markets, because minimizing the gap is a clear way to make housing more affordable.
Cover photo by Josh Miller on Unsplash
One of the reasons why we are seeing more multiplexes in Toronto (smaller infill buildings with less than seven homes) is that the city has waived development charges and parkland dedication fees on this scale of new housing.
This has helped enormously; without these changes, we'd be seeing far fewer of these housing projects being built.
But here's the odd thing about this exemption: if you build even one more home in the same building, the project is now subject to development charges on all of the homes (minus any credits you might receive for existing homes on the site).
Adding a seventh unit shouldn't suddenly trigger hundreds of thousands of dollars in fees for the first six. This makes zero sense:
It creates a disincentive to build incrementally more homes on sites that can accommodate them.
It creates a bias toward multiplexes (also known as "houseplexes") and away from apartments. The housing type shouldn't matter. We're talking about homes.
It perpetuates the "missing middle" problem. Build small or build big enough to shoulder the additional costs and regulatory burden.
If we're waiving DCs on sixplexes, why not at least waive them for the first six homes on every site? Better yet, waive them on even more homes. This is just one specific example of the hurdles I was talking about yesterday.
Note: My understanding is that the City of Toronto is currently looking to remove this DC cliff and implement a universal first-six-free rule.
High Art Capital recently announced the launch of a new fund called the Greater Toronto Area (GTA) Rental and Affordable Housing Initiative. It has been anchored by a $300 million mezzanine debt commitment (and a "nominal equity investment") from the Building Ontario Fund (BOF) and is expected to be capitalized in total with a minimum of $1.3 billion.
The objective is to acquire approximately 2,200 rental homes in blocks within newly completed, unsold condominiums across the GTA and convert them into long-term rental housing. Included within this will be approximately 550 affordable rental homes that are expected to be title-protected at rents set at the lower of 25% below local market rent or 30% of median gross household income.
This is interesting, but it's certainly not the first example of investors buying, or wanting to buy, excess condominium inventory. However, it may become the largest in Toronto and, as far as I know, it's the only one to partner with the public sector (BOF is a provincial Crown agency).
The way it is intended to work is as follows:
Condominium developers are sitting on unsold inventory and maybe on inventory they took back after purchasers defaulted (and which may be subject to legal action). What High Art will do is say to developers, "Hey, if you give me a really awesome deal, I'll take 50 of those condominium units off your hands." And if the developer is desperate enough, they will say, "Sure, that sounds good. Let's do a deal and then go for a nice closing dinner."
But at what price?
As we've talked about many times before on the blog, developer pricing is typically based on a cost-plus model. We take our costs, add a margin, and there's the final sticker price. The reason prices haven't fallen as much as one might expect on unsold units is because they're hitting the "cost floor"; developers don't want to lose money, unless they are given no other option.
But for this rental fund model to work at reasonable costs of debt, I suspect that, in many/most cases, deals will need to be struck below a developer's cost basis. So, it'll be very interesting to watch how this fund deploys capital and who the winners and losers are in this market.
Regardless, I think it is good that we are seeing this sort of activity. The faster we deal with the pain, the faster we'll get to the other side.
Cover photo by Patrick Boucher on Unsplash