High Art Capital recently announced the launch of a new fund called the Greater Toronto Area (GTA) Rental and Affordable Housing Initiative. It has been anchored by a $300 million mezzanine debt commitment (and a "nominal equity investment") from the Building Ontario Fund (BOF) and is expected to be capitalized in total with a minimum of $1.3 billion.
The objective is to acquire approximately 2,200 rental homes in blocks within newly completed, unsold condominiums across the GTA and convert them into long-term rental housing. Included within this will be approximately 550 affordable rental homes that are expected to be title-protected at rents set at the lower of 25% below local market rent or 30% of median gross household income.
This is interesting, but it's certainly not the first example of investors buying, or wanting to buy, excess condominium inventory. However, it may become the largest in Toronto and, as far as I know, it's the only one to partner with the public sector (BOF is a provincial Crown agency).
The way it is intended to work is as follows:
Condominium developers are sitting on unsold inventory and maybe on inventory they took back after purchasers defaulted (and which may be subject to legal action). What High Art will do is say to developers, "Hey, if you give me a really awesome deal, I'll take 50 of those condominium units off your hands." And if the developer is desperate enough, they will say, "Sure, that sounds good. Let's do a deal and then go for a nice closing dinner."
But at what price?
As we've talked about many times before on the blog, developer pricing is typically based on a cost-plus model. We take our costs, add a margin, and there's the final sticker price. The reason prices haven't fallen as much as one might expect on unsold units is because they're hitting the "cost floor"; developers don't want to lose money, unless they are given no other option.
But for this rental fund model to work at reasonable costs of debt, I suspect that, in many/most cases, deals will need to be struck below a developer's cost basis. So, it'll be very interesting to watch how this fund deploys capital and who the winners and losers are in this market.
Regardless, I think it is good that we are seeing this sort of activity. The faster we deal with the pain, the faster we'll get to the other side.
Cover photo by Patrick Boucher on Unsplash
After this post, I promise to stop continually plugging the work and writing of Aziz Sunderji — at least for a few days. Over the weekend, I wrote about his recent post on happiness in America. Today, his latest post is about what happens to home prices after a particular grocery store opens. And for this, he looked at 32,000 store openings dating back to the mid-1970s and then compared them to ZIP-code-level home price data.
Here's what he found:
Read through planning documents across North America and you're bound to find language that refers to low-rise residential neighbourhoods as "physically stable areas" where the "existing neighbourhood character" is paramount. But to be more precise, what this kind of language is actually saying is not that these neighbourhoods need to be broadly stable; it is saying that they just need to look more or less stable.
Here in Toronto, for example, it has been widely documented that many of our low-rise neighbourhoods are losing people. Household sizes are getting smaller, and houses that used to be subdivided are being returned to single-family use. A similar thing is happening in other cities like New York:
High Art Capital recently announced the launch of a new fund called the Greater Toronto Area (GTA) Rental and Affordable Housing Initiative. It has been anchored by a $300 million mezzanine debt commitment (and a "nominal equity investment") from the Building Ontario Fund (BOF) and is expected to be capitalized in total with a minimum of $1.3 billion.
The objective is to acquire approximately 2,200 rental homes in blocks within newly completed, unsold condominiums across the GTA and convert them into long-term rental housing. Included within this will be approximately 550 affordable rental homes that are expected to be title-protected at rents set at the lower of 25% below local market rent or 30% of median gross household income.
This is interesting, but it's certainly not the first example of investors buying, or wanting to buy, excess condominium inventory. However, it may become the largest in Toronto and, as far as I know, it's the only one to partner with the public sector (BOF is a provincial Crown agency).
The way it is intended to work is as follows:
Condominium developers are sitting on unsold inventory and maybe on inventory they took back after purchasers defaulted (and which may be subject to legal action). What High Art will do is say to developers, "Hey, if you give me a really awesome deal, I'll take 50 of those condominium units off your hands." And if the developer is desperate enough, they will say, "Sure, that sounds good. Let's do a deal and then go for a nice closing dinner."
But at what price?
As we've talked about many times before on the blog, developer pricing is typically based on a cost-plus model. We take our costs, add a margin, and there's the final sticker price. The reason prices haven't fallen as much as one might expect on unsold units is because they're hitting the "cost floor"; developers don't want to lose money, unless they are given no other option.
But for this rental fund model to work at reasonable costs of debt, I suspect that, in many/most cases, deals will need to be struck below a developer's cost basis. So, it'll be very interesting to watch how this fund deploys capital and who the winners and losers are in this market.
Regardless, I think it is good that we are seeing this sort of activity. The faster we deal with the pain, the faster we'll get to the other side.
Cover photo by Patrick Boucher on Unsplash
After this post, I promise to stop continually plugging the work and writing of Aziz Sunderji — at least for a few days. Over the weekend, I wrote about his recent post on happiness in America. Today, his latest post is about what happens to home prices after a particular grocery store opens. And for this, he looked at 32,000 store openings dating back to the mid-1970s and then compared them to ZIP-code-level home price data.
Here's what he found:
Read through planning documents across North America and you're bound to find language that refers to low-rise residential neighbourhoods as "physically stable areas" where the "existing neighbourhood character" is paramount. But to be more precise, what this kind of language is actually saying is not that these neighbourhoods need to be broadly stable; it is saying that they just need to look more or less stable.
Here in Toronto, for example, it has been widely documented that many of our low-rise neighbourhoods are losing people. Household sizes are getting smaller, and houses that used to be subdivided are being returned to single-family use. A similar thing is happening in other cities like New York:
The average Walmart neighbourhood in this study has a median household income of $49,000, a college degree attainment rate of 23%, and a median home price of $144,000. And when a new Walmart opens, home prices have tended to underperform the national average by about 4% in the three years that follow.
On the flip side, the average Trader Joe's neighbourhood has a median household income of $82,000, a college degree attainment rate of 52%, and a median home value of $425,000.
Importantly, though, Trader Joe's isn't just picking neighbourhoods with obviously favourable demographics (retail is a lagging indicator — it generally comes once the demand is already there). It seems to be picking neighbourhoods that, in the words of Aziz, have "room to keep running." In the three years that follow a new Trader Joe's opening, homes in those ZIP codes have tended to outperform the national average by 6%!
One of the fascinating things about this finding is that it seems to perfectly support the company's target market. It has been said that Joe Coulombe (founder of the company) used to describe his target customer as "overeducated and underpaid." In other words, he actively targeted university graduates.
But being underpaid only lasts so long. We know that educational attainment is typically the single best predictor of household income. So, if you target this group, chances are that they'll eventually become fairly paid or maybe even overpaid. And when this happens, I guess it shows up in area home prices.
Cover photo by Karolina Bobek on Unsplash
Chart from Home Economics
Bloomberg News recently reported that since 2004, at least 9,300 homes have been lost as a result of multi-family buildings getting "rolled up" into single-family homes. More recently, the city has even seen an increase in people combining two or more buildings into large urban mansions.
And while the total number of homes removed is relatively small for New York as a whole, it can be quite impactful to individual neighbourhoods. In the West Village, where there's a high concentration of rowhomes and townhouses, Bloomberg estimates that one out of every six small apartment buildings has been rolled up into a single-family home since 2004!
From a built form standpoint, you could say these are "physically stable" areas that are obediently adhering to their existing neighbourhood character. But under the hood and behind their street walls, they are clearly changing.
It is one of the great ironies of city building. People often fear new development because they worry it might disrupt the character of a neighbourhood. But preventing development does not guarantee stasis. In fact, we know that not building new housing actually increases the pressures felt on a city's existing housing stock, as people compete for a more fixed amount of supply.
The wealthy can always outbid the less wealthy on housing. So if you don't provide any new options, the wealthy will just buy up the existing stuff and turn it into what they want. Alternatively, you can build more housing and create a "moving chain" that frees up more existing housing for people of lower incomes.
Cover photo by Chanan Greenblatt on Unsplash
Map from Bloomberg
The average Walmart neighbourhood in this study has a median household income of $49,000, a college degree attainment rate of 23%, and a median home price of $144,000. And when a new Walmart opens, home prices have tended to underperform the national average by about 4% in the three years that follow.
On the flip side, the average Trader Joe's neighbourhood has a median household income of $82,000, a college degree attainment rate of 52%, and a median home value of $425,000.
Importantly, though, Trader Joe's isn't just picking neighbourhoods with obviously favourable demographics (retail is a lagging indicator — it generally comes once the demand is already there). It seems to be picking neighbourhoods that, in the words of Aziz, have "room to keep running." In the three years that follow a new Trader Joe's opening, homes in those ZIP codes have tended to outperform the national average by 6%!
One of the fascinating things about this finding is that it seems to perfectly support the company's target market. It has been said that Joe Coulombe (founder of the company) used to describe his target customer as "overeducated and underpaid." In other words, he actively targeted university graduates.
But being underpaid only lasts so long. We know that educational attainment is typically the single best predictor of household income. So, if you target this group, chances are that they'll eventually become fairly paid or maybe even overpaid. And when this happens, I guess it shows up in area home prices.
Cover photo by Karolina Bobek on Unsplash
Chart from Home Economics
Bloomberg News recently reported that since 2004, at least 9,300 homes have been lost as a result of multi-family buildings getting "rolled up" into single-family homes. More recently, the city has even seen an increase in people combining two or more buildings into large urban mansions.
And while the total number of homes removed is relatively small for New York as a whole, it can be quite impactful to individual neighbourhoods. In the West Village, where there's a high concentration of rowhomes and townhouses, Bloomberg estimates that one out of every six small apartment buildings has been rolled up into a single-family home since 2004!
From a built form standpoint, you could say these are "physically stable" areas that are obediently adhering to their existing neighbourhood character. But under the hood and behind their street walls, they are clearly changing.
It is one of the great ironies of city building. People often fear new development because they worry it might disrupt the character of a neighbourhood. But preventing development does not guarantee stasis. In fact, we know that not building new housing actually increases the pressures felt on a city's existing housing stock, as people compete for a more fixed amount of supply.
The wealthy can always outbid the less wealthy on housing. So if you don't provide any new options, the wealthy will just buy up the existing stuff and turn it into what they want. Alternatively, you can build more housing and create a "moving chain" that frees up more existing housing for people of lower incomes.
Cover photo by Chanan Greenblatt on Unsplash
Map from Bloomberg
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