Before 2022, being a land developer was a perfectly reasonable business to be in. In fact, it was a lucrative business to be in. What this business entailed was buying development land, getting it rezoned for some higher-and-better use (which here in Toronto usually takes a few years), and then selling it to another developer who would then build the thing that you got approved (or something close to it).
This kind of business practice is sometimes looked down upon by the general public, presumably because it feels like a speculative endeavor that doesn't actually result in anything physical. But another way to look at it is that it's just dividing up the same required work across multiple firms. Projects can take a long time and sometimes investors want their money back.
It is also good practice to look at this option even if you aren't a land developer, per se. One way you do this is by plugging in the market value of your land in your pro forma (not book cost). This way you can tell if your development margin is coming from your land uplift or from the build out. If most of your margin is coming from the former, then it may not be worth taking on the risk of construction.
In any event, the problem with this business is that it no longer works. (At least not in Toronto.) Land prices are moving in the opposite direction. Without a clear understanding of potential revenues (such as condo sales), it's very difficult to value development land. And if you can't accurately value land, then it's pretty challenging to run a business predicated on selling it.
What this means is that the development margin, if any, has shifted away from land toward the full build out (or whatever else your strategy may be). It's not enough to just entitle land. There's lots of entitled land out there right now. That is not the constraint. The constraint is figuring out how to actually make sites feasible. And to do that, you have to roll up your sleeves and really work each project and each asset.
Those who know how to do that will be the ones who come out ahead in the next cycle.
As we have talked about many times before, the best answer to this question is that it's worth whatever money is left in your pro forma once you've accounted for everything else. This is what is called the "residual claimant" in a development model. And it means you start with your revenue, you deduct all project costs, including whatever profit you and your investors need to make in order to take on the risk of the development, and then whatever is left can go to pay for the land.
Development land, as we often talk about on this blog, should be the residual claimant in a pro forma. Meaning, start with your revenue, subtract your costs and required margin, and then see how much money is leftover to pay for the land. This is, in theory, how you should value land.
It's also the most disciplined way to go about your underwriting. In fact, it can be beneficial to not know the asking price or broker guidance for a new site until you've completed this exercise. That way you won't bias yourself.
However, in practice, it can be difficult to do all of this. In a rising market, you might find that there's always some other developer who is willing to be more aggressive on their assumptions, which means they will be willing to pay more for the same piece of land.
And so if you want to be in the game, you might find yourself doing the exact opposite: starting with the land price and then trying to figure out how to make the rest of your model work. We've all been there.
During this stage of the cycle, you get punished for being conservative and disciplined -- you don't win sites. But when the market turns, discipline and conservatism get rewarded handsomely. You then become thankful for the deals you didn't do. And I'm sure that many prudent risk managers are feeling this way right now.
It is very challenging to underwrite new sites today. Many of the assumptions that go into a pro forma are unclear and unknowable. And so the spread between what developer's models are telling them to pay and what landowners want to sell for is often significant. That is why everyone is trying to find "creative deal structures" that can be used to close this gap.
At some point, though, the gap will actually close; things will once again feel clear and knowable. I have absolutely no idea when that will happen, but I do know that when it does, it will then be too late from a maximum opportunity standpoint.
Because that's how risk works. Once the uncertainty is gone, it's no longer a risk. And if it's no longer a risk, then you're not going to be paid for bearing it.
Before 2022, being a land developer was a perfectly reasonable business to be in. In fact, it was a lucrative business to be in. What this business entailed was buying development land, getting it rezoned for some higher-and-better use (which here in Toronto usually takes a few years), and then selling it to another developer who would then build the thing that you got approved (or something close to it).
This kind of business practice is sometimes looked down upon by the general public, presumably because it feels like a speculative endeavor that doesn't actually result in anything physical. But another way to look at it is that it's just dividing up the same required work across multiple firms. Projects can take a long time and sometimes investors want their money back.
It is also good practice to look at this option even if you aren't a land developer, per se. One way you do this is by plugging in the market value of your land in your pro forma (not book cost). This way you can tell if your development margin is coming from your land uplift or from the build out. If most of your margin is coming from the former, then it may not be worth taking on the risk of construction.
In any event, the problem with this business is that it no longer works. (At least not in Toronto.) Land prices are moving in the opposite direction. Without a clear understanding of potential revenues (such as condo sales), it's very difficult to value development land. And if you can't accurately value land, then it's pretty challenging to run a business predicated on selling it.
What this means is that the development margin, if any, has shifted away from land toward the full build out (or whatever else your strategy may be). It's not enough to just entitle land. There's lots of entitled land out there right now. That is not the constraint. The constraint is figuring out how to actually make sites feasible. And to do that, you have to roll up your sleeves and really work each project and each asset.
Those who know how to do that will be the ones who come out ahead in the next cycle.
As we have talked about many times before, the best answer to this question is that it's worth whatever money is left in your pro forma once you've accounted for everything else. This is what is called the "residual claimant" in a development model. And it means you start with your revenue, you deduct all project costs, including whatever profit you and your investors need to make in order to take on the risk of the development, and then whatever is left can go to pay for the land.
Development land, as we often talk about on this blog, should be the residual claimant in a pro forma. Meaning, start with your revenue, subtract your costs and required margin, and then see how much money is leftover to pay for the land. This is, in theory, how you should value land.
It's also the most disciplined way to go about your underwriting. In fact, it can be beneficial to not know the asking price or broker guidance for a new site until you've completed this exercise. That way you won't bias yourself.
However, in practice, it can be difficult to do all of this. In a rising market, you might find that there's always some other developer who is willing to be more aggressive on their assumptions, which means they will be willing to pay more for the same piece of land.
And so if you want to be in the game, you might find yourself doing the exact opposite: starting with the land price and then trying to figure out how to make the rest of your model work. We've all been there.
During this stage of the cycle, you get punished for being conservative and disciplined -- you don't win sites. But when the market turns, discipline and conservatism get rewarded handsomely. You then become thankful for the deals you didn't do. And I'm sure that many prudent risk managers are feeling this way right now.
It is very challenging to underwrite new sites today. Many of the assumptions that go into a pro forma are unclear and unknowable. And so the spread between what developer's models are telling them to pay and what landowners want to sell for is often significant. That is why everyone is trying to find "creative deal structures" that can be used to close this gap.
At some point, though, the gap will actually close; things will once again feel clear and knowable. I have absolutely no idea when that will happen, but I do know that when it does, it will then be too late from a maximum opportunity standpoint.
Because that's how risk works. Once the uncertainty is gone, it's no longer a risk. And if it's no longer a risk, then you're not going to be paid for bearing it.
Given that determining the value of land starts with revenue, one way to do a very crude gut check is to look at the relationship between land cost and revenue. This is sometimes called a land-to-revenue ratio. And historically, for new condominiums in Toronto, you wanted a ratio that was no greater than 10%. Meaning, if the most you could sell condominiums for was $1,000 psf, then the most you could afford to pay for land was $100 per buildable square foot.
However, this is, again, a very crude rule of thumb. I would say that it's only really interesting to look at this after the fact. Because in reality, things never work this cleanly. For one thing, there is always a cost floor. Don't, for example, think you can buy land in Toronto for $80 pbsf and sell condominiums for $800 psf, because this will not be enough to cover all of your costs. You will lose money.
Secondly, there are countless variables that have a huge impact on the value of development land. Things like a high required parking ratio, development charges and other city fees, inclusionary zoning, and so on. All of these items are real costs in a development model, and so they will need to be paid for somehow.
Typically this happens by way of higher revenues (in a rising market), a lower land cost (in a sinking market), or some combination of the two. But in all of these cases, it means your land-to-revenue ratio must come down to maintain project feasibility. This is why suburban development sites typically have a lower ratio -- too much loss-leading parking, among other things.
Of course, there are also instances where the correct answer could be a land-to-revenue ratio approaching zero, or even a negative number. In this latter case, it means your projected revenues aren't enough to cover all of your other costs, excluding land. For anyone to build, they will require some form of subsidy. And this is basically the case with every affordable housing project. They don't pencil on their own. (For a concrete example of this, look to the US and their Low-Income Housing Tax Credits.)
So once again, the moral of this story is that the best way to think about the value of development land is to think of it as "whatever money is left in the pro forma once you've accounted for everything else." Because sometimes there will be money there, and sometimes there won't be.
Photo by Jannes Glas on Unsplash
Given that determining the value of land starts with revenue, one way to do a very crude gut check is to look at the relationship between land cost and revenue. This is sometimes called a land-to-revenue ratio. And historically, for new condominiums in Toronto, you wanted a ratio that was no greater than 10%. Meaning, if the most you could sell condominiums for was $1,000 psf, then the most you could afford to pay for land was $100 per buildable square foot.
However, this is, again, a very crude rule of thumb. I would say that it's only really interesting to look at this after the fact. Because in reality, things never work this cleanly. For one thing, there is always a cost floor. Don't, for example, think you can buy land in Toronto for $80 pbsf and sell condominiums for $800 psf, because this will not be enough to cover all of your costs. You will lose money.
Secondly, there are countless variables that have a huge impact on the value of development land. Things like a high required parking ratio, development charges and other city fees, inclusionary zoning, and so on. All of these items are real costs in a development model, and so they will need to be paid for somehow.
Typically this happens by way of higher revenues (in a rising market), a lower land cost (in a sinking market), or some combination of the two. But in all of these cases, it means your land-to-revenue ratio must come down to maintain project feasibility. This is why suburban development sites typically have a lower ratio -- too much loss-leading parking, among other things.
Of course, there are also instances where the correct answer could be a land-to-revenue ratio approaching zero, or even a negative number. In this latter case, it means your projected revenues aren't enough to cover all of your other costs, excluding land. For anyone to build, they will require some form of subsidy. And this is basically the case with every affordable housing project. They don't pencil on their own. (For a concrete example of this, look to the US and their Low-Income Housing Tax Credits.)
So once again, the moral of this story is that the best way to think about the value of development land is to think of it as "whatever money is left in the pro forma once you've accounted for everything else." Because sometimes there will be money there, and sometimes there won't be.
Photo by Jannes Glas on Unsplash
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