
Ten years ago when I was working on development pro formas (here in Toronto), we used to assume that we would launch condominium pre-sales, and then start working drawings once we hit somewhere around 50% sold. And for our hard costs, we would carry a modest inflation rate of say 2-3% per year.
The thinking at the time was that construction documents are expensive, let's not spend the money until we know that we have a good amount of sales under our belt. In Toronto, you can also use purchaser deposits toward project costs, so this is an equity efficient way of managing your cash flow.
But then this go-to-market strategy started becoming too risky, probably around 2017-2018. Sales were happening faster and costs started increasing a lot faster, and so now everyone wanted to minimize the lag between their pre-sales (your revenue) and when they procured construction (your costs).
So as an ideal and totally risk-averse approach, the objective was to be ready to start construction and to know what your hard costs would be before you even started selling condominiums. It didn't matter that you were going to spend a bunch of money on technical drawings, because it was still going to be many multiples less than your cost escalation exposure if you didn't do it. There was also a high degree of confidence that you would get the pre-sales once you did launch.
This is how things mostly worked during the pandemic. But strategies once again changed in the second half of 2022. Pre-sales slowed and people started wondering, "wait a minute, could hard costs actually come down?" The answer turned out to be yes and, this year, most people in the industry expect them to come down even further.
This is a good example of how quickly and dramatically things can change in development. In 2021, it was "we need lock in construction costs immediately or we might get hit with a 40% increase on glass." Now it is, "let's wait as long as possible because we're in a deflationary cost environment and I'm sure it'll be cheaper later."
To some extent, you can look to leading indicators like architecture billings and home pre-sales to determine what the future might look like. But it's far from perfect. I don't know anyone that accurately predicted what we just went through over the last number of years.
So as a developer, you just have to do your best to stay ahead of what's coming and manage your downside risk as best you can. In all cases, you're going to need to be creative and nimble. Because clearly a lot can change in the span of even a single development project.
Generally speaking, the value of a piece of land depends on what you can do with it. If the highest-and-best use is agriculture, then it might be worth $X. But if the highest-and-best use is a supertall skyscraper, then it's going to be worth a lot more than $X.
This is why the land component is typically thought of as the residual claimant in a development pro forma. Start with what you can build, forecast your revenues and expenses, and then see what is left over and can be attributed to the land. This is, at least in theory, how the mechanics should work.
An interesting thought exercise, though, is to consider how different developers might value the exact same piece of land.
One obvious scenario is that a developer could just get their forecasts wrong. For instance, maybe they understate their costs, which then leads them to believe that they can pay more for the land. In this case, an error makes them the highest bidder.
In a rising market, there will also be developers who believe that they can almost certainly collect higher revenues in the future. In this case, the most bullish developer often becomes the highest bidder for land. And as long as the market continues to rise, they might not be wrong.
But things change in a slower or flat market.
Now the market isn't there to save you if you happen to overpay for land. It's a less forgiving environment. But it's also a market where you really benefit from conservative underwriting and solid execution. Now it's these groups who are the high bidders.
And I know that some/many developers prefer it this way.
It is very disappointing to hear that Paul Calandra -- Ontario's new Minister of Municipal Affairs and Housing -- is talking about "use-it-or-lose-it" zoning policies and that mayors are coming out in support of it. This is a terrible idea.
On the surface, it may seem like this would force/incentivize developers to build more housing sooner. But what it fails to recognize is this: just because a developer wants to build, it doesn't mean that they are able to build.
This current market environment is a perfect example. It is likely that the Greater Toronto Area will see dozens of new condominium launches this fall. These are developers who will be spending millions of at-risk dollars to bring their projects to the market in the hopes of pre-selling homes and then obtaining construction financing.
However, it is highly probable that not all of these projects will actually start construction in the short-term. And if/when that happens, it will not be because these developers are just squatting on entitled land; it will be because they can't get financing. In other words, the market isn't there.
This will not be a good day for anybody. So I fail to see how it makes sense to penalize developers who happen to find themselves in this unfortunate situation. It's as if our only solution to the current housing crisis is to make it more expensive to build new housing.
For another post that I wrote on this topic, click here.

Ten years ago when I was working on development pro formas (here in Toronto), we used to assume that we would launch condominium pre-sales, and then start working drawings once we hit somewhere around 50% sold. And for our hard costs, we would carry a modest inflation rate of say 2-3% per year.
The thinking at the time was that construction documents are expensive, let's not spend the money until we know that we have a good amount of sales under our belt. In Toronto, you can also use purchaser deposits toward project costs, so this is an equity efficient way of managing your cash flow.
But then this go-to-market strategy started becoming too risky, probably around 2017-2018. Sales were happening faster and costs started increasing a lot faster, and so now everyone wanted to minimize the lag between their pre-sales (your revenue) and when they procured construction (your costs).
So as an ideal and totally risk-averse approach, the objective was to be ready to start construction and to know what your hard costs would be before you even started selling condominiums. It didn't matter that you were going to spend a bunch of money on technical drawings, because it was still going to be many multiples less than your cost escalation exposure if you didn't do it. There was also a high degree of confidence that you would get the pre-sales once you did launch.
This is how things mostly worked during the pandemic. But strategies once again changed in the second half of 2022. Pre-sales slowed and people started wondering, "wait a minute, could hard costs actually come down?" The answer turned out to be yes and, this year, most people in the industry expect them to come down even further.
This is a good example of how quickly and dramatically things can change in development. In 2021, it was "we need lock in construction costs immediately or we might get hit with a 40% increase on glass." Now it is, "let's wait as long as possible because we're in a deflationary cost environment and I'm sure it'll be cheaper later."
To some extent, you can look to leading indicators like architecture billings and home pre-sales to determine what the future might look like. But it's far from perfect. I don't know anyone that accurately predicted what we just went through over the last number of years.
So as a developer, you just have to do your best to stay ahead of what's coming and manage your downside risk as best you can. In all cases, you're going to need to be creative and nimble. Because clearly a lot can change in the span of even a single development project.
Generally speaking, the value of a piece of land depends on what you can do with it. If the highest-and-best use is agriculture, then it might be worth $X. But if the highest-and-best use is a supertall skyscraper, then it's going to be worth a lot more than $X.
This is why the land component is typically thought of as the residual claimant in a development pro forma. Start with what you can build, forecast your revenues and expenses, and then see what is left over and can be attributed to the land. This is, at least in theory, how the mechanics should work.
An interesting thought exercise, though, is to consider how different developers might value the exact same piece of land.
One obvious scenario is that a developer could just get their forecasts wrong. For instance, maybe they understate their costs, which then leads them to believe that they can pay more for the land. In this case, an error makes them the highest bidder.
In a rising market, there will also be developers who believe that they can almost certainly collect higher revenues in the future. In this case, the most bullish developer often becomes the highest bidder for land. And as long as the market continues to rise, they might not be wrong.
But things change in a slower or flat market.
Now the market isn't there to save you if you happen to overpay for land. It's a less forgiving environment. But it's also a market where you really benefit from conservative underwriting and solid execution. Now it's these groups who are the high bidders.
And I know that some/many developers prefer it this way.
It is very disappointing to hear that Paul Calandra -- Ontario's new Minister of Municipal Affairs and Housing -- is talking about "use-it-or-lose-it" zoning policies and that mayors are coming out in support of it. This is a terrible idea.
On the surface, it may seem like this would force/incentivize developers to build more housing sooner. But what it fails to recognize is this: just because a developer wants to build, it doesn't mean that they are able to build.
This current market environment is a perfect example. It is likely that the Greater Toronto Area will see dozens of new condominium launches this fall. These are developers who will be spending millions of at-risk dollars to bring their projects to the market in the hopes of pre-selling homes and then obtaining construction financing.
However, it is highly probable that not all of these projects will actually start construction in the short-term. And if/when that happens, it will not be because these developers are just squatting on entitled land; it will be because they can't get financing. In other words, the market isn't there.
This will not be a good day for anybody. So I fail to see how it makes sense to penalize developers who happen to find themselves in this unfortunate situation. It's as if our only solution to the current housing crisis is to make it more expensive to build new housing.
For another post that I wrote on this topic, click here.
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