Brandon Donnelly

Daily insights for city builders, delivered every morning at 6 AM ET. I’m Brandon Donnelly — a Toronto-based real estate developer and founder of Globizen. I’ve been writing here since 2013.

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Tag: opendoor

  • Who owns single-family houses in the US

    Here is a chart from a recent Bloomberg article summarizing who owns single-family houses in the US.

    As of Q1-2024, about 69% were owner-occupied, about 26.6% were owned by small landlords (1-9 homes), and the rest were owned by what many are now calling “corporate landlords.”

    The point of this graph was to show that, despite getting a lot of political attention, corporate landlords still own very little. Let’s call it sub 4%, excluding iBuying companies like OpenDoor. So how much of a problem is this, really?

    Smaller landlords control much more of the US market. And at the end of the day, a house owned by a small landlord versus a corporate landlord doesn’t change the supply-demand balance of a market. It still represents an available home.

    The first and more important problem to solve is overall housing supply. Because that does change the supply-demand balance of a market. And once again, there’s no shortage of data to support the finding that increased supply tends to moderate rental growth.

    For the record, I also dislike using the term home to refer to single-family houses. Home is not a housing type. It is simply a place where people live permanently. So whenever I see a title like “US homes,” I get confused, because I don’t actually know what they’re referring to.

    If you read the article, it would appear they’re only talking about single-family houses. But implying that these are the only kind of home feels to me like an anachronism.

  • Thoughts on Opendoor Exclusives

    My most recent post about Opendoor, the so-called iBuying company, is about how it wants to become the “transaction layer for homes.” What that means is they would like to start facilitating third-party transactions between buyers and sellers, and move away (either partially or completely) from actually owning homes for a period of time.

    The company is still trying to sell homes that it purchased in Q2-2022, which, as we all know, was a very different kind of housing market. So by doing this, Opendoor would be both reducing the market risk that it takes on and making its business model less capital intensive.

    Knowing this, I actually think that “iBuyer” is the wrong moniker for their business. As I see it, the long-term objective is not to just be an iBuyer of homes. The objective is to ultimately facilitate transactions in a capital efficient kind of way. The point of iBuying is/was to seed their two-sided marketplace with sellers.

    As we have discussed before, two-sided marketplaces usually always have a chicken-and-egg problem. No sellers equals no buyers, and vice versa. So you have to figure out a clever way to attract one side. Of course, now that Opendoor has sellers, the company can start to aggregate the demand side (i.e. buyers). And that is exactly what it is doing with Opendoor Exclusives.

    Exclusives works like this:

    • The inventory consists of “off-market” homes that have yet to be listed on MLS
    • The homes are discounted about 2-4%
    • They are available for 14 days
    • You can’t negotiate the price — it’s first come, first served
    • If your appraisal comes in lower, Opendoor will price match
    • And finally, Opendoor will not pay any buyer commissions (which is reflected in the above discount)

    As I understand it, if the home doesn’t sell, it then gets listed on MLS and all of the normal terms and practices would apply. But before that happens, the key objective is to facilitate a quick transaction in one of two ways.

    The first way is for the seller to request an offer from Opendoor’s network of buyers. In this scenario, Opendoor never needs to own the home or perform any improvements (which is usually what it does when it iBuys). It is an intermediary earning some sort of take.

    The second way is for Opendoor to do its usual thing and make an instant offer to buy the home. But here’s the thing. With enough buyers on its platform and by creating a sense of urgency (hey, here’s a lower price!), presumably the idea is that it may never need to close on a number of these homes. It just needs to find another buyer within 14 days.

    If it works, this could be an interesting business.

  • Opendoor wants to be a transaction layer for homes

    We have spoken a lot over the years about Opendoor. And for a period of time, iBuying seemed like a very good idea. Zillow go into it. Redfin got into it. Everybody was iBuying. But then this year everybody started losing money, mostly due to algorithms that could not contend with falling prices.

    It turns out that being a market maker for homes can be a tough business because there is a lag between when you buy the home and when you hope to sell it. And so right now, few people want to be an iBuyer. Zillow no longer does it. Redfin no longer does it. And Opendoor’s stock is, at the time of writing this post, down 87.19% YTD.

    It is pretty easy to be pessimistic on this space, and that pessimism may be warranted. Though it may not be. My thinking has always been as follows. The process of buying and selling a home will eventually move online. The industry is ripe for change and there is no debating that. The real question is: how the hell do you do it? Everybody, including me in my late 20s, has tried.

    Two-sided marketplaces are tricky, because you always run into a chicken-and-egg problem. If you don’t have buyers, no seller is going to bother with your real estate marketplace. And if you don’t have sellers (i.e. homes), no buyer is going to bother with your real estate marketplace. So generally speaking, the way to build a marketplace is to start with one side, somehow get them on and using the platform, and then open it up to the other side.

    And this is exactly what iBuying hopes to do. Today it is largely a tool for sellers. It is a tool that says, “I will give you instant liquidity for your home so you don’t have to worry or care about who might actually buy it.” This is, of course, convenient for sellers, which is why people have been using it; but it is capital intensive and, as we have seen this year, it transfers some risk to the iBuyer.

    In the world of Opendoor, they call this a first-party (1P) transaction. It is them buying directly from sellers. But the larger vision is for Opendoor to become more of a transaction layer and instead just facilitate third-party (3P) transactions. This is currently being done through Opendoor Exclusives and the objective here is to match buyers and sellers directly, so that Opendoor can avoid taking on the risk of actually owning homes for a period of time.

    Will this work? I don’t really know. But I do think it is exciting and I do think it is the way to think about what Opendoor is ultimately trying to do with their business.

    Reminder: I am long $OPEN

  • Market making for houses

    Matt Levine’s latest Money Stuff column does a good job explaining why a lot of smart people are trying to figure out a market-making model for homes (see companies such as Opendoor):

    People want to apply the market-making model to homes. This makes sense. Buying or selling a home is a long slow uncertain annoying process. The value of immediacy is high, especially for a seller. If you decide to sell your house and go to a website and spend 10 minutes filling out a form and then someone wires you cash for the value of your house, that is much much much better than hiring a broker and listing the house and holding open houses and so forth. You’d be willing to pay a market maker a lot for that immediacy. (By selling your house to the market maker at a discount.) And if the market maker is good at acquiring houses, then it will have a lot of inventory, which will make it a good seller of houses. If you want to buy a house, you will naturally go to the market maker’s website, because it’s where the houses are.

    Levine also explains why a market-making model is that much more difficult for homes compared to things like stocks. In a slowing/slumping housing market, it’s pretty easy to lose money as a market maker. (That is, unless you can somehow accurately predict that a slump is coming.)

    Last month, Opendoor lost money on 42% of its home transactions. This is a result of them buying homes from people when prices were X and then selling these homes many months later when prices were less than X.

    However, I’m not so sure that this has to be an existential problem. Opendoor’s primary value proposition is instant liquidity for homeowners. And this value proposition is at its strongest when the market is in fact slumping. Because the alternative — selling with a broker — is less attractive.

    So the current environment may eventually turn out to be a boon for Opendoor. Of course, we won’t know for a number of months.

    Full disclosure: I am long $OPEN. And yes, it is painful right now.

  • Opendoor is creating too many rentals

    Steven Levy over at Wired recently wrote a short piece comparing Opendoor’s iBuying approach to what Zillow was doing when it was in the space. (Thank you Robert Wright for forwarding me the article.)

    As we have talked about before, the fundamental problem with Zillow’s model is that it couldn’t accurately predict where home prices were going. It was losing too much money and so they shut down that side of their business.

    The article talks about Opendoor’s approach and how they’ve spent the last 8 years refining a valuation model/approach that is now apparently pretty accurate. That’s positive. But here’s another excerpt that I found particularly interesting:

    There’s one controversial aspect of the business model that Wong didn’t bring up. It appears that when companies like Zillow and Opendoor can’t easily sell a home, the fallback is what’s called an “institutional sale.” All iBuyers sell a small but not insignificant percentage to institutional investors with aspirations of being “mega-landlords.” While the marketing materials of the iBuyers emphasize clean sunny rooms and frictionless transactions, that segment of the market involves hedge funds like KKR and Blackstone snapping up properties for rental, limiting the inventory available for families seeking homes. Even the Biden administration has weighed in on the evils of this trend: “Large investor purchases of single-family homes and conversion into rental properties speeds the transition of neighborhoods from homeownership to rental and drives up home prices for lower cost homes, making it harder for aspiring first-time and first-generation home buyers, among others, to buy a home,” said a recent White House dispatch.

    It’s interesting for two reasons.

    First, these highly tuned valuation models are now being used to scale the acquisition of single family homes. No specific figures are given, but Levy speculates that some iBuyers could be feeding up to 20% of their homes to institutional buyers. Economies of scale are a challenge with this asset class. Here technology is helping.

    Second, I don’t like the tone toward renters in the above White House dispatch: “[It] speeds the transition of neighborhoods from homeownership to rental.” This line in particular implies that renting is perceived as being suboptimal to homeownership and that “speeding”’ towards the former is something that should be avoided for reasons of social good.

    Even the words that are used here suggest biases. A single-family home is called, well, a home. But a rented one is a rental property. I reckon that a home is a home regardless of whether it’s low-rise, high-rise, rented, or owned.

  • All-in-one real estate transactions

    Opendoor just published its 2021 year in review.

    In it are a few interesting figures about the housing market in the US. According to a recent survey that the company did, the average first-time buyer made 10 offers before successfully securing a home last year. The percentage of all-cash offers is also up to 25% from 15% a year ago. What is clear is that demand is currently outstripping supply. Based on these figures, housing supply in the US is at the lowest it has been since the early 1980s.

    But of course, the real point of the year in review was to talk about all of the great things that Opendoor has been doing to digitize the real estate industry. Perhaps the most interesting is its focus on creating “all-in-one real estate transactions.” What this aims to do is consolidate the now separate processes of selling a home, buying a new home, and obtaining financing, into one digital workflow. Whether or not Opendoor is the one to do it, I believe that this is the future.

    And what we have learned from other industries (that have successfully digitized) is that when you make something super easy, people end up doing a lot more of it.

    Full disclosure: I’m still long $OPEN.

  • The Zillow postmortem

    The postmortems surrounding Zillow’s exit from the algorithmic home-flipping business are starting to surface. Here’s an article from the WSJ and here’s Matt Levine’s take on it. The latter piece is very Levine-like and is called, “Zillow tried to make less money.”

    The obvious story is that Zillow’s algorithms were not valuing homes correctly. But the story is more nuanced than this. In Q1 of this year, Zillow’s home flipping business was actually more profitable than it had initially expected. And that’s because its algorithms were consistently undervaluing homes. So when it did transact, it was doing so at favorable / low cost bases.

    The problem was that the company was not transacting enough and there was a fear of losing ground to competitors like Opendoor. Apparently only about 10% of people who requested an offer from Zillow actually ended up accepting it. Margins were good, but volumes were too low.

    So what Zillow did was tweak its algorithm to be more aggressive (see above chart from the WSJ). But this created the opposite problem: low/negative margins, higher volumes.

    Once again, it shows you some of the challenges with bringing real estate online. The supply of homes is largely heterogenous and there are a lot of qualitative factors that play into what someone is willing to pay.

  • Market making vs. home trading

    Matt Levine’s latest column is a good follow-up to yesterday’s post about Zillow exiting the algorithmic home-buying business. In it, he talks about the differences between being a market maker and being a trader of homes. Part of his argument is that if you’re a pure market maker then, in theory, you don’t really care about where home values are going. Because either way, you’re just earning a spread.

    Here’s an excerpt:

    A market maker is someone who buys and sells an asset in order to profit from the spread, not someone who accurately forecasts the price of an asset six months from now. End users want to buy or sell stocks or bonds or houses, they want to do it quickly at a predictable price, so they go to a market maker who will provide that service. The market maker buys from sellers and sells from buyers and does its best to match them up; ideally it buys an asset from a seller and resells it to a buyer within a fairly short time. It collects a “spread” from the buyer and seller: It buys from the buyer at a bit less than the fair market price, and sells to the seller at a bit more than the fair market price, because it is providing them a valuable service, the service of “immediacy” or “liquidity,” the service of always being available to buy or sell. 

    The problem with real estate is that you’re not able to buy and sell with the same kind of rapidity:

    But in the house business you can’t generally buy a house in the morning and sell it in the afternoon. You sign a contract to buy a house in the morning, then you do an inspection and title search and stuff, then a few weeks later you close on the house and deliver the money, then you spruce up the house a bit, then you wait for a buyer to come in — which takes, not seconds as it does in the stock market, but days or weeks or months — then you show the house to the buyer, then you sign a contract to sell it, then they do an inspection and title search and stuff, then you wait around for them to get a mortgage, then a few months later you close on the sale.

    This is an important distinction. And so he argues that what we’re actually talking about is the business of trading homes, which means that you have to have a view (and hopefully some conviction) on where home prices are going to go in the future. Sometimes you will be wrong. But that’s okay, as long as you’re right more often than you’re wrong.

  • Zillow exits algorithmic home-flipping business

    Things are happening in the algorithmic home-flipping business right now.

    A few weeks ago I wrote about Zillow pausing this part of its business. It was then later revealed that the company was set to take a loss on many/most of the homes that it had purchased through this “iBuying” division. In October, it listed some 250 homes in Phoenix and on average they were priced about 6.2% below what they had bought them for.

    So it is perhaps no surprise that today the company announced that it will be the exiting the business of buying high and selling low. Turns out this isn’t good for business.

    But does this mean that the model doesn’t work or that Zillow simply didn’t have its algorithms tuned correctly? Following the news, competitor Opendoor took to Twitter to reassure everyone that the digitization of real estate is still well underway:

    Opendoor also announced today that it will be expanding technical hiring into Canada — starting first with Toronto. The plan is to hire upwards of 100 people over the next several years. Presumably this is about access to talent, but presumably it also means that Opendoor is looking toward one day expanding into Canada.

    Stay tuned.

    Disclosure: I continue to be long $OPEN.

  • Zillow pauses algorithmic homebuying business

    Zillow just announced that it has paused its (algorithmic) US homebuying business for the remainder of this year. The company acquired some 3,800 homes in Q2 of this year and, apparently, it now has a backlog of repairs and sales to work through. As a reminder, this business model, which is sometimes referred to as iBuying, is based on using algorithms to quickly value and buy homes (mostly online). The homes are then renovated and flipped for a profit. The problem, as most of you know, is that this pandemic has, among other things, disrupted construction supply chains and made it difficult to hire people. That has hurt the renovation component of this model.

    Today’s news was bad for Zillow’s stock, but good for Opendoor’s stock, which is their main competitor. Opendoor subsequently came out and announced that they remain open for business. (Disclosure: I am long $OPEN). But this announcement is perhaps a good reminder that buying and selling real estate remains a different animal than, say, buying and selling stocks. And so there are some perfectly understandable reasons for why real estate hasn’t been disrupted by the internet in the same way that other industries have. Matt Levine does a great job explaining this in his recent column, “Sorry, Zillow’s Computer Can’t Buy Your House Right Now.”

    Here’s an excerpt:

    “I’ll pay you $350,000 for your house as long as a human can go out there, look around, and make sure that price isn’t wildly off” is an interesting model but it’s not quite the same as “push this button to sell your house for $350,000.” And “I’ll pay $350,000 for a house and then send out a crew to replace the carpets” is not quite the same as “I’ll pay $350,000 for a house and flip it 20 minutes later for $355,000, collecting a small spread for providing liquidity.” Computerization has come into the housing market, but it hasn’t taken it over yet.

    One of the challenges is that the supply of homes is heterogeneous, even in a suburban community or in a multi-family building where you might have the same set of floor plans that repeat. Because maybe the home has been renovated and fit out entirely in gold. Or maybe it’s the opposite and it has been poorly maintained. There are variables to contend with that have historically necessitated more rather than less human involvement. Homes are also something that don’t trade all that frequently, which is less than optimal when it comes to online marketplaces.

    But what if buying and selling a home was dramatically cheaper and easier to do? How often would people actually do it? Presumably more often. I agree with Matt that “computerization” hasn’t taken over the real estate industry just yet. But algorithmic homebuying still appears to be one of the more promising approaches.