Conventional wisdom suggests that if you're going to invest $10 million into an illiquid real estate investment that will not bear delicious fruit for 7 to 10 years, you may want to be compensated for the illiquid nature of your commitment. In other words, there's an "illiquidity premium." Flexibility is worth something. If you can get the same return and have the flexibility to get your money back when you want it, isn't that better? I don't know; maybe that's not always the case. Here's an excerpt from a clever article written by Cliff Asness, founder of AQR Capital Management, where he argues the reverse:
If people get that PE [private equity] is truly volatile but you just don’t see it, what’s all the excitement about? Well, big time multi-year illiquidity and its oft-accompanying pricing opacity may actually be a feature not a bug! Liquid, accurately priced investments let you know precisely how volatile they are and they smack you in the face with it. What if many investors actually realize that this accurate and timely information will make them worse investors as they’ll use that liquidity to panic and redeem at the worst times? What if illiquid, very infrequently and inaccurately priced investments made them better investors as essentially it allows them to ignore such investments given low measured volatility and very modest paper drawdowns?
Perhaps another way to think about illiquid private investments is that they kind of force you to think more like Warren Buffett. He has so many great lines to this effect: "If you aren't willing to own a stock for 10 years, don't even think about owning it for 10 minutes." And: "The stock market is a device for transferring money from the impatient to the patient." He has also written over the years about how a tolerance for short-term volatility can improve long-term prospects. So, behaving in this way, it would seem, is generally good for making money.
The problem — and this is really Cliff's more precise argument — is that the majority of people simply aren't good at being like Warren Buffett. We're impatient and emotional. That's why he's so remarkable. His approach certainly sounds simple, but it's clearly not so easy. Illiquidity can help with this. It removes the fraught thinking part and might actually protect you from your own thoughts and emotions.
Cover photo by Maxim Hopman on Unsplash

Read through planning documents across North America and you're bound to find language that refers to low-rise residential neighbourhoods as "physically stable areas" where the "existing neighbourhood character" is paramount. But to be more precise, what this kind of language is actually saying is not that these neighbourhoods need to be broadly stable; it is saying that they just need to look more or less stable.
Here in Toronto, for example, it has been widely documented that many of our low-rise neighbourhoods are losing people. Household sizes are getting smaller, and houses that used to be subdivided are being returned to single-family use. A similar thing is happening in other cities like New York:

Conventional wisdom suggests that if you're going to invest $10 million into an illiquid real estate investment that will not bear delicious fruit for 7 to 10 years, you may want to be compensated for the illiquid nature of your commitment. In other words, there's an "illiquidity premium." Flexibility is worth something. If you can get the same return and have the flexibility to get your money back when you want it, isn't that better? I don't know; maybe that's not always the case. Here's an excerpt from a clever article written by Cliff Asness, founder of AQR Capital Management, where he argues the reverse:
If people get that PE [private equity] is truly volatile but you just don’t see it, what’s all the excitement about? Well, big time multi-year illiquidity and its oft-accompanying pricing opacity may actually be a feature not a bug! Liquid, accurately priced investments let you know precisely how volatile they are and they smack you in the face with it. What if many investors actually realize that this accurate and timely information will make them worse investors as they’ll use that liquidity to panic and redeem at the worst times? What if illiquid, very infrequently and inaccurately priced investments made them better investors as essentially it allows them to ignore such investments given low measured volatility and very modest paper drawdowns?
Perhaps another way to think about illiquid private investments is that they kind of force you to think more like Warren Buffett. He has so many great lines to this effect: "If you aren't willing to own a stock for 10 years, don't even think about owning it for 10 minutes." And: "The stock market is a device for transferring money from the impatient to the patient." He has also written over the years about how a tolerance for short-term volatility can improve long-term prospects. So, behaving in this way, it would seem, is generally good for making money.
The problem — and this is really Cliff's more precise argument — is that the majority of people simply aren't good at being like Warren Buffett. We're impatient and emotional. That's why he's so remarkable. His approach certainly sounds simple, but it's clearly not so easy. Illiquidity can help with this. It removes the fraught thinking part and might actually protect you from your own thoughts and emotions.
Cover photo by Maxim Hopman on Unsplash

Read through planning documents across North America and you're bound to find language that refers to low-rise residential neighbourhoods as "physically stable areas" where the "existing neighbourhood character" is paramount. But to be more precise, what this kind of language is actually saying is not that these neighbourhoods need to be broadly stable; it is saying that they just need to look more or less stable.
Here in Toronto, for example, it has been widely documented that many of our low-rise neighbourhoods are losing people. Household sizes are getting smaller, and houses that used to be subdivided are being returned to single-family use. A similar thing is happening in other cities like New York:

Bloomberg News recently reported that since 2004, at least 9,300 homes have been lost as a result of multi-family buildings getting "rolled up" into single-family homes. More recently, the city has even seen an increase in people combining two or more buildings into large urban mansions.
And while the total number of homes removed is relatively small for New York as a whole, it can be quite impactful to individual neighbourhoods. In the West Village, where there's a high concentration of rowhomes and townhouses, Bloomberg estimates that one out of every six small apartment buildings has been rolled up into a single-family home since 2004!
From a built form standpoint, you could say these are "physically stable" areas that are obediently adhering to their existing neighbourhood character. But under the hood and behind their street walls, they are clearly changing.
It is one of the great ironies of city building. People often fear new development because they worry it might disrupt the character of a neighbourhood. But preventing development does not guarantee stasis. In fact, we know that not building new housing actually increases the pressures felt on a city's existing housing stock, as people compete for a more fixed amount of supply.
The wealthy can always outbid the less wealthy on housing. So if you don't provide any new options, the wealthy will just buy up the existing stuff and turn it into what they want. Alternatively, you can build more housing and create a "moving chain" that frees up more existing housing for people of lower incomes.
Cover photo by Chanan Greenblatt on Unsplash
Map from Bloomberg
Deflation is bad for economies.
That is why the typical standard for most central banks is a target inflation rate of 2%. This leaves a factor of safety in case you miss your target. Because if you target 0% and end up with a negative number, then you're in trouble. A negative number is significantly worse than moderate inflation. The principal problem with deflation is that consumers start expecting goods and services to be cheaper next month and stop buying non-essential items, creating a vicious cycle with prices.
I think we are seeing this same psychology play out with real estate in Canada (though not in every local market). According to the above charts from the BIS, real residential property prices across Canada were down just over 5% year-over-year in Q3-2025. And since Q4-2019, they were cumulatively down 5.45% (but up ~45% since 2010 after the Great Financial Crisis). Right now, many buyers are waiting on the sidelines, just in case things get cheaper.
But I expect things to stabilize and feel better toward the end of 2026 and into 2027. And once that happens, a different buyer psychology will come to the fore.
Cover photo by Anthony Maw on Unsplash
Charts from BIS
Bloomberg News recently reported that since 2004, at least 9,300 homes have been lost as a result of multi-family buildings getting "rolled up" into single-family homes. More recently, the city has even seen an increase in people combining two or more buildings into large urban mansions.
And while the total number of homes removed is relatively small for New York as a whole, it can be quite impactful to individual neighbourhoods. In the West Village, where there's a high concentration of rowhomes and townhouses, Bloomberg estimates that one out of every six small apartment buildings has been rolled up into a single-family home since 2004!
From a built form standpoint, you could say these are "physically stable" areas that are obediently adhering to their existing neighbourhood character. But under the hood and behind their street walls, they are clearly changing.
It is one of the great ironies of city building. People often fear new development because they worry it might disrupt the character of a neighbourhood. But preventing development does not guarantee stasis. In fact, we know that not building new housing actually increases the pressures felt on a city's existing housing stock, as people compete for a more fixed amount of supply.
The wealthy can always outbid the less wealthy on housing. So if you don't provide any new options, the wealthy will just buy up the existing stuff and turn it into what they want. Alternatively, you can build more housing and create a "moving chain" that frees up more existing housing for people of lower incomes.
Cover photo by Chanan Greenblatt on Unsplash
Map from Bloomberg
Deflation is bad for economies.
That is why the typical standard for most central banks is a target inflation rate of 2%. This leaves a factor of safety in case you miss your target. Because if you target 0% and end up with a negative number, then you're in trouble. A negative number is significantly worse than moderate inflation. The principal problem with deflation is that consumers start expecting goods and services to be cheaper next month and stop buying non-essential items, creating a vicious cycle with prices.
I think we are seeing this same psychology play out with real estate in Canada (though not in every local market). According to the above charts from the BIS, real residential property prices across Canada were down just over 5% year-over-year in Q3-2025. And since Q4-2019, they were cumulatively down 5.45% (but up ~45% since 2010 after the Great Financial Crisis). Right now, many buyers are waiting on the sidelines, just in case things get cheaper.
But I expect things to stabilize and feel better toward the end of 2026 and into 2027. And once that happens, a different buyer psychology will come to the fore.
Cover photo by Anthony Maw on Unsplash
Charts from BIS
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