At a high level there are two components to the value of a house. There's the value of the land and there's the value of all the improvements. That is, the bricks, wood, and other stuff that form the actual house. When a media outlet runs a sensational headline about some shack in Toronto selling for, oh I don't know, a million dollars, what it actually means is that the land in this particular area was just valued by somebody at this number. In fact, if the property is very clearly a "knock down" the improvements sitting on the land become a liability/cost rather than anything of value. Because whoever buys the land will almost certainly need to remove the improvements before they can build whatever it is they want to build.
This distinction between land and improvements is a valuable one for many reasons. Here's one example. In cases where the improvements aren't some shack, you may be faced with a scenario where a property can be valued in two different ways. You can value it based on the development potential of the underlying land or you can value it based on the income (either in-place or potential) that the improvements are generating, or could be generating with some hard work on your part. If the development value is greater than the value of the improvements, then there will be pressure to redevelop. Conversely, if the opposite is true, it is likely that not much will happen other than maybe capital expenditures applied to the existing building(s).
Of course, you could also run into a scenario where there's little development potential and there's zero ability to invest in the existing improvements, either because the market rents are too low in the area or because they're capped and/or controlled in some way. In this scenario, it's likely that not much will happen other than the normal and expected depreciation of the improvements. Maybe one day the development/investment math will work. But in the interim, you probably won't be seeing any of those sensational media headlines.
Photo by Andre Gaulin on Unsplash
Condo developers are merchant builders. They build a project and then move on. Because of this, there's a belief that there's little incentive to build for durability, in comparison to say purpose-built rental buildings where the developer might continue to own over an extended period of time. While it is true that putting on an operations hat will make you hyper-focused on everything from garbage collection to how you're going to manage all of your suite keys, there are a few things to consider in this debate.
One, as developers we certainly think and care a lot about our brand and our reputation, both with our customers and with Tarion (warranty program). We ask ourselves: "What will our customers think if we do this?" Irrespective of the tenure we're building, we want our projects to be carefully considered. And in the case of condominium projects, we would like our customers to feel excited and comfortable about buying in one of our future projects. That's the goal. This is no different than any other product that you might buy that doesn't come along with some sort of ongoing subscription.
Two, there's often a spread between condominium and rental values. For example, let's consider a brand new 550 square foot condominium in a central neighborhood of Toronto and let's say it would cost you $1,300 psf to buy it today. (Obviously it could be more or it could be less depending on the area and the building.) Now let's start with a rent and back into a value, using some basic assumptions.
Unit Size (SF) | 550 |
Monthly Rent | $2,400 |
Rent PSF - Monthly | $4.36 |
Rent PSF - Annual | $52.36 |
NOI Margin | 72% |
NOI | $37.70 |
Exit Cap | 3.75% |
Value PSF | $1,005 |
Here I'm assuming that same suite would rent for $2,400 per month. I'm converting that to an annual PSF rent. And then I'm assuming that if you were managing a whole building of these kinds of units, your operating costs might be somewhere around 28%. Crude back-of-the-napkin math to get to a Net Operating Income (psf). Finally, I'm capping this NOI at 3.75%. We can debate my assumptions and if this were in a development pro forma you might "trend" the rents. But I find this comparison helpful. Here we are getting to a value of around $1,005 per square foot. Less than our $1,300 psf above.
The point is that the margins are tighter, which helps to explain why for a long time we saw very few purpose-built rentals being constructed in this city. So even though you might argue that the incentives are in place to build for durability, you do have to weigh that against the realities of what you can actually afford to build. Development is filled with all sorts of these tradeoffs. But if you and/or your investors really want a consistent yield, this strategy can work just fine. Personally, I'm a fan of the long-term approach.
Three, rent control policies can have an impact both on the feasibility of new projects and on people's ability to actually perform maintenance. If you have a scenario where your operating costs -- everything from taxes to utilities -- are rising faster than your allowable rent increases, then you're in a bad situation and you have zero incentive or financial ability to actually invest in the building, despite being a long-term owner.
Finally, there is nothing stopping a purpose-built rental developer from also being a merchant builder. i.e. Selling the entire rental building once it is done and it has been stabilized. So you could argue that we're right back at my first point. Whether you're selling to individual condominium owners or the entire building to one entity, you as the developer have to sit back and ask yourself: "What will our customer(s) think if we do this?"
Building on yesterday's post about inclusionary zoning, below is a telling diagram from the Urban Land Institute showing which areas of Portland can support new development and which areas cannot. To create this map, ULI looked at achievable rents in each US census block to determine, quite simply, where rents will cover the cost of new development (all types of construction).
At a high level there are two components to the value of a house. There's the value of the land and there's the value of all the improvements. That is, the bricks, wood, and other stuff that form the actual house. When a media outlet runs a sensational headline about some shack in Toronto selling for, oh I don't know, a million dollars, what it actually means is that the land in this particular area was just valued by somebody at this number. In fact, if the property is very clearly a "knock down" the improvements sitting on the land become a liability/cost rather than anything of value. Because whoever buys the land will almost certainly need to remove the improvements before they can build whatever it is they want to build.
This distinction between land and improvements is a valuable one for many reasons. Here's one example. In cases where the improvements aren't some shack, you may be faced with a scenario where a property can be valued in two different ways. You can value it based on the development potential of the underlying land or you can value it based on the income (either in-place or potential) that the improvements are generating, or could be generating with some hard work on your part. If the development value is greater than the value of the improvements, then there will be pressure to redevelop. Conversely, if the opposite is true, it is likely that not much will happen other than maybe capital expenditures applied to the existing building(s).
Of course, you could also run into a scenario where there's little development potential and there's zero ability to invest in the existing improvements, either because the market rents are too low in the area or because they're capped and/or controlled in some way. In this scenario, it's likely that not much will happen other than the normal and expected depreciation of the improvements. Maybe one day the development/investment math will work. But in the interim, you probably won't be seeing any of those sensational media headlines.
Photo by Andre Gaulin on Unsplash
Condo developers are merchant builders. They build a project and then move on. Because of this, there's a belief that there's little incentive to build for durability, in comparison to say purpose-built rental buildings where the developer might continue to own over an extended period of time. While it is true that putting on an operations hat will make you hyper-focused on everything from garbage collection to how you're going to manage all of your suite keys, there are a few things to consider in this debate.
One, as developers we certainly think and care a lot about our brand and our reputation, both with our customers and with Tarion (warranty program). We ask ourselves: "What will our customers think if we do this?" Irrespective of the tenure we're building, we want our projects to be carefully considered. And in the case of condominium projects, we would like our customers to feel excited and comfortable about buying in one of our future projects. That's the goal. This is no different than any other product that you might buy that doesn't come along with some sort of ongoing subscription.
Two, there's often a spread between condominium and rental values. For example, let's consider a brand new 550 square foot condominium in a central neighborhood of Toronto and let's say it would cost you $1,300 psf to buy it today. (Obviously it could be more or it could be less depending on the area and the building.) Now let's start with a rent and back into a value, using some basic assumptions.
Unit Size (SF) | 550 |
Monthly Rent | $2,400 |
Rent PSF - Monthly | $4.36 |
Rent PSF - Annual | $52.36 |
NOI Margin | 72% |
NOI | $37.70 |
Exit Cap | 3.75% |
Value PSF | $1,005 |
Here I'm assuming that same suite would rent for $2,400 per month. I'm converting that to an annual PSF rent. And then I'm assuming that if you were managing a whole building of these kinds of units, your operating costs might be somewhere around 28%. Crude back-of-the-napkin math to get to a Net Operating Income (psf). Finally, I'm capping this NOI at 3.75%. We can debate my assumptions and if this were in a development pro forma you might "trend" the rents. But I find this comparison helpful. Here we are getting to a value of around $1,005 per square foot. Less than our $1,300 psf above.
The point is that the margins are tighter, which helps to explain why for a long time we saw very few purpose-built rentals being constructed in this city. So even though you might argue that the incentives are in place to build for durability, you do have to weigh that against the realities of what you can actually afford to build. Development is filled with all sorts of these tradeoffs. But if you and/or your investors really want a consistent yield, this strategy can work just fine. Personally, I'm a fan of the long-term approach.
Three, rent control policies can have an impact both on the feasibility of new projects and on people's ability to actually perform maintenance. If you have a scenario where your operating costs -- everything from taxes to utilities -- are rising faster than your allowable rent increases, then you're in a bad situation and you have zero incentive or financial ability to actually invest in the building, despite being a long-term owner.
Finally, there is nothing stopping a purpose-built rental developer from also being a merchant builder. i.e. Selling the entire rental building once it is done and it has been stabilized. So you could argue that we're right back at my first point. Whether you're selling to individual condominium owners or the entire building to one entity, you as the developer have to sit back and ask yourself: "What will our customer(s) think if we do this?"
Building on yesterday's post about inclusionary zoning, below is a telling diagram from the Urban Land Institute showing which areas of Portland can support new development and which areas cannot. To create this map, ULI looked at achievable rents in each US census block to determine, quite simply, where rents will cover the cost of new development (all types of construction).
However, in their models they are also assuming a land value of $0. And typically people want you to pay them money when you buy their land. So in all likelihood, this map is overstating the amount of blue -- that being land where new development is feasible.
But it does tell you something about developer margins. A lot of people seem to assume that the margins on new developments are so great that things like inclusionary zoning can simply be "absorbed" without impacting overall feasibility. The reality is that there are large swaths in most cities where development is never going to happen even if you were to start handing out free land.
This map is also helpful at illustrating some of the impacts of IZ. If you assume that rents are the highest in the center of the city and that they fall off as you move outward, then the outer edge of the above blue area is going to be where development is only marginally feasible. And so any new cost imposed on development would naturally start to uniformly eat away at the blue feasible area -- that is, until rents rise enough to offset it.
Of course, this is a simplified mapping. Land usually costs money. Land values might also be highest in the center and fall off as you move outward, or there could be pockets of high-cost land. There may be more price elasticity in certain sub-markets compared to others. So the impacts of a new development cost may not play out as neatly as I outlined above.
Regardless, there will be impacts, which is why I find this map telling even if it isn't fully accurate or up to date. Maybe some of you will as well.
However, in their models they are also assuming a land value of $0. And typically people want you to pay them money when you buy their land. So in all likelihood, this map is overstating the amount of blue -- that being land where new development is feasible.
But it does tell you something about developer margins. A lot of people seem to assume that the margins on new developments are so great that things like inclusionary zoning can simply be "absorbed" without impacting overall feasibility. The reality is that there are large swaths in most cities where development is never going to happen even if you were to start handing out free land.
This map is also helpful at illustrating some of the impacts of IZ. If you assume that rents are the highest in the center of the city and that they fall off as you move outward, then the outer edge of the above blue area is going to be where development is only marginally feasible. And so any new cost imposed on development would naturally start to uniformly eat away at the blue feasible area -- that is, until rents rise enough to offset it.
Of course, this is a simplified mapping. Land usually costs money. Land values might also be highest in the center and fall off as you move outward, or there could be pockets of high-cost land. There may be more price elasticity in certain sub-markets compared to others. So the impacts of a new development cost may not play out as neatly as I outlined above.
Regardless, there will be impacts, which is why I find this map telling even if it isn't fully accurate or up to date. Maybe some of you will as well.
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