Tag: phoenix

• Current state of autonomous vehicles

  This is an interesting piece by Bloomberg summarizing the current state of autonomous vehicles and in particular the (supposed) dominance of Waymo (Alphabet’s self-driving vehicle arm). Many believe they will be the first real entrant into the market.

  

  The company is currently running an “Early Rider” program in 25 cities. But its Phoenix trials are the furthest along, which isn’t at all surprising given the city’s car orientation and suburban fabric. Already Waymo has started offering passenger rides without a backup driver in the car.

  Overall, the company has come forward with four main business priorities:

  • Ride hailing
  • Trucking
  • Personal vehicles
  • Public transit

  But I still think that we’ll see a blurring of these priorities, if not outright cannibalization, as the cost per mile plummets. I mean, why own a personal vehicle if it is flat out easier and cheaper to just hail a robotaxi? 

  Here is an excerpt from the article talking about pricing:

  Tasha Keeney, an analyst at ARK Invest, says that Waymo could choose to offer an autonomous ride-hailing service today at around 70 cents a mile—a quarter of the cost for Uber passengers in San Francisco. Over time, she says, robotaxis should get even cheaper—down to 35 cents a mile by 2020, especially if Waymo’s technology proves sturdy enough to need few human safety monitors overseeing the autonomous vehicles remotely. “You could see software-like margins,” Keeney says.

  I can’t wait to be driven around for cents on the dollar. Click here to read the full article.

  2018.08.03

• Follow the sun and sprawl

  

  The U.S. Census Bureau recently released it’s 2016 city and town population estimates. The press release can be found here.

  The headline isn’t a new one. Southern cities continue to grow quickly. This is not a new trend. Humans seem to like warm weather and the housing supply in southern cities tends to be more elastic. This keeps home prices relatively in check and allows the cities to more easily accommodate growth.

  From July 2015 to July 2016, 10 of the 15 fastest growing large U.S. cities were in the south (based on % growth). 4 of the top 5 were in Texas. 

  From 2010 to 2016, the population in large southern cities grew an average of 9.4%. Cities in the west clocked in at 7.3%. And cities in the northeast and midwest were at 1.8% and 3.0%, respectively.

  Two outliers near the top are Seattle and Denver. Since 2010, the population of these two cities grew 15.39% and 14.87%, respectively. I’m going to say it’s because of the skiing and snowboarding. Half-joking. For the top 25 large cities ranked by 2010-2016 growth rate, click here.

  In terms of absolute humans, Phoenix had the largest numeric increase between 2015 and 2016: 32,113 or about 88 people per day. After Phoenix it’s Los Angeles (27,173), San Antonio (24,473), New York (21,171), and Seattle (20,847). These are all city proper figures.

  It’s also worth noting which large cities aren’t growing. From 2015 to 2016, Chicago fell -0.32% and Detroit fell -0.52%. Philadelphia was only slightly positive at 0.19%. Going back to 2010, Chicago is still flat at 0.27% and Detroit is even more negative at -5.39%. Philadelphia is 2.5%.

  Follow the sun and the sprawl.

  The below charts are from the United States Census Bureau.

  

  2017.05.29

• Opendoor is now selling ~300 homes per month

  Farhad Manjoo of the New York Times published an article this morning about Opendoor – a startup that I have written about multiple times on this blog – called, The Rise of the Fat Start-Up. (His definition of “fat” is that the startup owns lots of hard assets, which considered atypical in tech.)

  Below are a couple of interesting tidbits from the article:

  • Opendoor has raised over $300 million in equity and over $500 million in debt since inception.

  • Opendoor plans to be in 10 cities by the end of this year.

  • Average commission charged on Opendoor is 7.5%, which is higher than a traditional real estate agent and higher than what was quoted before in the press. The higher % is because of certainty and convenience.

  • Opendoor offers a leaseback option if you’d like to stay in your house for a period of time after you’ve sold it.

  • Their conversion rate (offers made to closings) is about 30%.

  • Other startups are now in the market with similar models, including Offerpad and Knock. Zillow is working with Offerpad on a pilot. Someone is starting to feel threatened.

  The article also quotes a blogger and real estate analyst named Mike Delprete. Heads-up: His blog is called “Adventures in Real Estate Tech.” I’m sure this will appeal to many of you. I obviously just subscribed.

  Mike dug into MLS records in order to figure out Opendoor’s transaction volumes, since the company is not releasing this information. Here’s what he found (the chart is up to March 2017):

  

  The trend line is certainly moving in the right direction. But Mike also believes that Opendoor is only netting around $8,320 in profit per home and that much of it is driven by appreciation. There’s also substantial risk in owning so many homes – each one is usually held for a few months.

  But you can be sure they’re thinking well beyond where they are at today. Expect many more updates on this blog.

  2017.05.24

• Opendoor.com is so risky that it may just work

  

  I have been writing about the startup Opendoor.com for over 2 years now. And I continue to believe that they are the most promising disruptor in the residential real estate space. 

  Here is the first post that I wrote back in July 2014 after they raised their first round of funding. Here is the second post that I wrote after they launched in Phoenix. And here is another post that I wrote 6 months ago where I argued, once again, that they are doing something worth paying attention to. (This last post explains how the platform works.)

  Well, about a week ago it was announced that they have raised another round of funding: a $210 million Series D. In all likelihood, the company’s valuation is now over $1 billion. Here’s the Techcrunch announcement where the message was: huge ass number; risky business model.

  In response to this, Ben Thompson wrote a terrific and widely shared blog post called, Opendoor: A Startup Worth Emulating. I love his post because he says what I have firmly believed and argued for many years: Zillow and Redfin are not disruptive real estate startups.

  This is what he says about Zillow:

  “And yet, the most successful real estate startup, Zillow (which acquired its largest competitor Trulia a couple of years ago), is little more than a glorified marketing tool: the company makes most of its revenue by getting real estate agents — the ones collecting 6% of fees, split between the buying and selling agents — to pay to advertise their houses on the site. Certainly a free tool that makes it easier to find houses in a more intuitive way is valuable — Zillow has acquired the sort of userbase that allow it to build an advertising business for a reason — but at the end of the day the company is a tax on a system that hasn’t really changed in decades.”

  And though very risky, he argues that Opendoor is far better positioned to shake up the status quo. 

  Here are two of his key points:

  “Sellers are uniquely disadvantaged under the current system, which is another way of saying they are an underserved market with unmet needs.” [Sellers are the side of the market that Opendoor is specifically targeting.]

  “Opendoor has a new business model: taking advantage of a theoretical arbitrage opportunity (earning fees on houses sold at a slight mark-up) by leveraging technology in pursuit of previously impossible scale that should, in theory, ameliorate risk.”

  And here’s what that could ultimately mean for the industry:

  “Opendoor has many more reasons why it might fail than Zillow or Redfin, but its potential upside is far greater as a result. First is the immediate opportunity: sellers who can’t wait. However, as Opendoor grows its seller base, especially geographically, its risk will start to decrease thanks to diversification and sheer size; that will allow it to lower its “market risk” charge which will lead to more sellers. More sellers means both less risk and an increasingly compelling product for buyers to access, first with a real estate agent and eventually directly. More buyers will mean lower marketing costs and faster sell-through, which will lower risk further and thus lower prices, pushing the cycle forward. It’s even possible to envision a future where Opendoor actually does uproot the anachronistic real estate agent system that is a relic of the pre-Internet era, and they will have done so with realtors not only not fighting them but, on the buying side, helping them.”

  I’m with Ben on this.

  2016.12.08

• The rise of tech outposts

  What happens when wages and real estate prices become too high in a city? Companies start growing in lower cost locations. We’ve all seen this before. 

  Fred Wilson recently blogged about this “spillover effect”, citing a New York Times article talking about the growth of tech offices in Phoenix. As someone who sits on the board of many technology companies, he was noticing a thematic trend:

  “A big theme of board meetings I’ve been in over the past year is the crazy high cost of talent in the big tech centers (SF, NYC, LA, Boston, Seattle) and the need to grow headcount in lower cost locations.”

  We talk a lot about housing prices on this blog, and so I think it’s useful to see how this, along with high wages, also impacts companies. The two are interrelated.

  Below is a chart from the NY Times article showing the US cities with the highest number of technology jobs and the most growth from 2010 to 2015. 

  

  San Francisco is in a league of its own. But overall, the growth is in tech and many cities are adding lots of technology jobs. Look at Detroit and Boston right beside each other (Detroit obviously has a smaller starting base). And look at how Miami is nowhere to be found.

  Of course, one interesting question is whether these new outposts – such as Phoenix – can truly come into their own and carve out a niche:

  “We don’t want to be San Francisco’s back office — we need more creators here,” said Scott Salkin, a founder and the chief executive of Allbound, which is based in Phoenix, makes sales software and has offices down the hall from Gainsight’s.

  Even with the high cost of living, it’s hard to supplant the coastal hegemony. That’s where people go to chase riches. As comedian Daniel Tosh likes to say, “the middle of the country is for people who gave up on their dreams.”

  Though for some, living in a place like Denver or Salt Lake City and snowboarding every weekend is a better outcome than living in a studio apartment and commuting an hour to work.

  2016.08.23

• A money back guarantee on your next home

  

  I’ve written about Opendoor.com a few times. As far as I can tell, they are the furthest ahead in terms of disrupting the residential real estate market. So I like to follow them quite closely.

  They’ve recently launched some new features, so I figured it would be a good time to check-in on what they’re up to. But first – for those of you might not be familiar with Opendoor – here’s what they do.

  Opendoor offers instant liquidity to homeowners by buying homes site unseen. The fee they charge seems to amount to less than 10% of the value of the home. 

  They also say that they typically offer prices that are about 1-3% less than the market value of the home 3 months into the future. (Apparently 3 months is the average time-on-market for the cities in which they operate.)

  Once they’ve bought the home, they then make improvements and put it back on the market. As of today, they are buying about 10 homes a day in the two markets in which they operate (Phoenix and Dallas). They are spending about $75 million a month buying homes.

  To mitigate their risk, they won’t buy a home built before 1960, a home that was pre-fabricated, a home with a solar lease, and so on. They also stick to values that are between $100,000 to $600,000. But apparently this covers off about 90% of homes in the United States. (You can read their full FAQ here.)

  To accomplish all of this, they have raised about $110 million in venture capital.

  What’s fascinating about all of this is that they are starting to create a seamless marketplace. As they continue to buy more homes (and aggregate supply), more buyers are starting to come to their marketplace. They also allow people to easily find local contractors.

  Over time as they gain scale and as their algorithms improve, one could imagine their pricing becoming more competitive, them taking more of the market, and them bearing much less market risk as homes quickly trade. 

  They liken their model to car trade-ins. Apparently 60% of people who buy a new car are trading in an old one. That’s an interesting comparison that I hadn’t thought about before.

  So what’s new?

  Two things…

  First, they are offering a 30 day full refund on new home purchases. In other words, if you buy a home through their platform and, for whatever reason, you end up not liking it, they’ll buy it back (minus some transaction costs and so on).

  Second, they are providing a 180-point inspection report to buyers and if anything breaks in the first two years of ownership (presumably it is something that contravenes the inspection), they’ll come and fix it.

  These additions are helpful because it starts to target buyers, which will help them fill out the other side of their marketplace. It also promotes greater transparency because now they’re partially on the hook for the home’s performance.

  I like what they are doing and, again, I can’t think of any other company making such big bets in this space.

  2016.06.07

• Sprawling, but affordable

  The Wall Street Journal recently published an interesting article that ties in nicely with two of my recent posts. My post about North American population growth and my post about the San Francisco pro-development group known as BARF.

  The WSJ article is about the growing divide between affordable and expensive cities in the US. And the argument is that expansionist, or sprawling, cities are better at suppressing home values and maintaining affordability:

  “The developed residential area in Atlanta, for example, grew by 208% from 1980 to 2010 and real home values grew by 14%. In contrast, in the San Francisco-San Jose area, developed residential land grew by just 30%, while homes values grew by 188%.”

  Now, here’s a chart saying that same thing:

  

  The reality is that greenfield development (suburban sprawl) generally has far fewer barriers to development than urban infill development. So I’m not surprised to see cities like Las Vegas, Atlanta, and Phoenix clustered towards the bottom right.

  At the same time though, I’m obviously not convinced that sprawl is an optimal outcome. I think there are other costs not reflected in the chart above. So what’s the best solution here, assuming we want to build inclusive mixed-income cities?

  2016.04.19

• Opendoor.com launches in Phoenix

  Yesterday Opendoor.com finally launched their product in Phoenix. If you’re a regular reader of Architect This City, you might remember that back in July of this year I wrote about how they had just raised $10M of funding to make selling your home as easy as a few clicks.

  Well, since then, I’ve been following them like a hawk. I had all the founders on Twitter notification (so I got notified every time they tweeted) and I was eagerly anticipating their launch.

  Now that they’ve launched, we have a much better idea of how their business model is going to work. I say “better idea” only because there’s still portions of it that are a question mark for me.

  In any event, Opendoor basically provides instant liquidity to homeowners. You go on, tell them about your home, and they then make you an offer to buy, which looks like this and lasts for 3 days. The offer they make you is calculated using comparable sales and adjustments based on your home’s unique characteristics.

  Upon accepting their offer, they then schedule a home inspection (at their cost) to confirm your home’s condition. Once this is done, you just select your move out date and Opendoor handles the rest. The fee for all this is 5.5%, which the company claims is less than the 6% that realtors typically charge (this would be high for Toronto).

  After buying your home, Opendoor plans to turn around and resell it.

  What this reminds me of is a “bought deal.” In the world of investment banking, a bought deal is when the bank itself agrees to buy the entire offering of a particular security, as opposed to going out to the market and trying to raise the money. The advantage to the company (offering the securities) is that there’s no financing risk. They know they’re going to get their money. But it usually means the company gets a lower price.

  So what I wonder, is if this is what’s going to happen here. Since Opendoor is effectively taking on the selling risk, does that mean their offers will be lower? Or are all their costs built into that 5.5% and that’s truly their core business model? I’m sure some of this will surface in the coming weeks.

  I do, however, think they are smart to be focusing on the supply-side of the marketplace and offering virtually perfect liquidity to homeowners. Real estate is a unique asset in that it’s difficult to bring supply to the market. And so if control the supply-side, I think you have a pretty good shot at controlling the market as a whole.

  2014.12.10