Search results for: “opendoor”

• Opendoor is back to positive gross margins

  March 26, 2025 · View original

  ---

  If you recall, the largest buyer of single-family houses in the US last year was Opendoor. This is according to SFR Analytics. Opendoor is a so-called iBuyer, meaning they provide cash offers to sellers, close quickly, and then turnaround and sell each home for — hopefully — a profit. They also collect commissions, and make money in other ways (such as through home loans).

  This process seemed to be working reasonably well up until 2022, but then the market turned. They then quickly discovered that they couldn’t sell their homes for a profit and so they ramped down acquisitions. Here’s a chart from another post by SFR Analytics showing the fall off in purchase volume in the second half of 2022:

  

  The worst performing market at this time was Phoenix, which apparently accounted for around 50% of the company’s losses. In some cases, their gross margins were -$60,000 per property. But once they recalibrated their models (I’m just assuming this is what they did), they were able to regain positive unit economics. Here’s Phoenix starting from their January 2023 cohort:

  

  Opendoor has not done well as a public company. But it is the biggest buyer of single-family houses and it seems to be back to positive gross margins. Maybe that’s something.

  Charts from SFR Analytics; cover photo by Chris Tingom on Unsplash

  2025.03.26

• Thoughts on Opendoor Exclusives

  My most recent post about Opendoor, the so-called iBuying company, is about how it wants to become the “transaction layer for homes.” What that means is they would like to start facilitating third-party transactions between buyers and sellers, and move away (either partially or completely) from actually owning homes for a period of time.

  The company is still trying to sell homes that it purchased in Q2-2022, which, as we all know, was a very different kind of housing market. So by doing this, Opendoor would be both reducing the market risk that it takes on and making its business model less capital intensive.

  Knowing this, I actually think that “iBuyer” is the wrong moniker for their business. As I see it, the long-term objective is not to just be an iBuyer of homes. The objective is to ultimately facilitate transactions in a capital efficient kind of way. The point of iBuying is/was to seed their two-sided marketplace with sellers.

  As we have discussed before, two-sided marketplaces usually always have a chicken-and-egg problem. No sellers equals no buyers, and vice versa. So you have to figure out a clever way to attract one side. Of course, now that Opendoor has sellers, the company can start to aggregate the demand side (i.e. buyers). And that is exactly what it is doing with Opendoor Exclusives.

  Exclusives works like this:

  • The inventory consists of “off-market” homes that have yet to be listed on MLS
  • The homes are discounted about 2-4%
  • They are available for 14 days
  • You can’t negotiate the price — it’s first come, first served
  • If your appraisal comes in lower, Opendoor will price match
  • And finally, Opendoor will not pay any buyer commissions (which is reflected in the above discount)

  As I understand it, if the home doesn’t sell, it then gets listed on MLS and all of the normal terms and practices would apply. But before that happens, the key objective is to facilitate a quick transaction in one of two ways.

  The first way is for the seller to request an offer from Opendoor’s network of buyers. In this scenario, Opendoor never needs to own the home or perform any improvements (which is usually what it does when it iBuys). It is an intermediary earning some sort of take.

  The second way is for Opendoor to do its usual thing and make an instant offer to buy the home. But here’s the thing. With enough buyers on its platform and by creating a sense of urgency (hey, here’s a lower price!), presumably the idea is that it may never need to close on a number of these homes. It just needs to find another buyer within 14 days.

  If it works, this could be an interesting business.

  2023.03.22

• Opendoor wants to be a transaction layer for homes

  We have spoken a lot over the years about Opendoor. And for a period of time, iBuying seemed like a very good idea. Zillow go into it. Redfin got into it. Everybody was iBuying. But then this year everybody started losing money, mostly due to algorithms that could not contend with falling prices.

  It turns out that being a market maker for homes can be a tough business because there is a lag between when you buy the home and when you hope to sell it. And so right now, few people want to be an iBuyer. Zillow no longer does it. Redfin no longer does it. And Opendoor’s stock is, at the time of writing this post, down 87.19% YTD.

  It is pretty easy to be pessimistic on this space, and that pessimism may be warranted. Though it may not be. My thinking has always been as follows. The process of buying and selling a home will eventually move online. The industry is ripe for change and there is no debating that. The real question is: how the hell do you do it? Everybody, including me in my late 20s, has tried.

  Two-sided marketplaces are tricky, because you always run into a chicken-and-egg problem. If you don’t have buyers, no seller is going to bother with your real estate marketplace. And if you don’t have sellers (i.e. homes), no buyer is going to bother with your real estate marketplace. So generally speaking, the way to build a marketplace is to start with one side, somehow get them on and using the platform, and then open it up to the other side.

  And this is exactly what iBuying hopes to do. Today it is largely a tool for sellers. It is a tool that says, “I will give you instant liquidity for your home so you don’t have to worry or care about who might actually buy it.” This is, of course, convenient for sellers, which is why people have been using it; but it is capital intensive and, as we have seen this year, it transfers some risk to the iBuyer.

  In the world of Opendoor, they call this a first-party (1P) transaction. It is them buying directly from sellers. But the larger vision is for Opendoor to become more of a transaction layer and instead just facilitate third-party (3P) transactions. This is currently being done through Opendoor Exclusives and the objective here is to match buyers and sellers directly, so that Opendoor can avoid taking on the risk of actually owning homes for a period of time.

  Will this work? I don’t really know. But I do think it is exciting and I do think it is the way to think about what Opendoor is ultimately trying to do with their business.

  Reminder: I am long $OPEN

  2022.11.23

• Opendoor is creating too many rentals

  Steven Levy over at Wired recently wrote a short piece comparing Opendoor’s iBuying approach to what Zillow was doing when it was in the space. (Thank you Robert Wright for forwarding me the article.)

  As we have talked about before, the fundamental problem with Zillow’s model is that it couldn’t accurately predict where home prices were going. It was losing too much money and so they shut down that side of their business.

  The article talks about Opendoor’s approach and how they’ve spent the last 8 years refining a valuation model/approach that is now apparently pretty accurate. That’s positive. But here’s another excerpt that I found particularly interesting:

  There’s one controversial aspect of the business model that Wong didn’t bring up. It appears that when companies like Zillow and Opendoor can’t easily sell a home, the fallback is what’s called an “institutional sale.” All iBuyers sell a small but not insignificant percentage to institutional investors with aspirations of being “mega-landlords.” While the marketing materials of the iBuyers emphasize clean sunny rooms and frictionless transactions, that segment of the market involves hedge funds like KKR and Blackstone snapping up properties for rental, limiting the inventory available for families seeking homes. Even the Biden administration has weighed in on the evils of this trend: “Large investor purchases of single-family homes and conversion into rental properties speeds the transition of neighborhoods from homeownership to rental and drives up home prices for lower cost homes, making it harder for aspiring first-time and first-generation home buyers, among others, to buy a home,” said a recent White House dispatch.

  It’s interesting for two reasons.

  First, these highly tuned valuation models are now being used to scale the acquisition of single family homes. No specific figures are given, but Levy speculates that some iBuyers could be feeding up to 20% of their homes to institutional buyers. Economies of scale are a challenge with this asset class. Here technology is helping.

  Second, I don’t like the tone toward renters in the above White House dispatch: “[It] speeds the transition of neighborhoods from homeownership to rental.” This line in particular implies that renting is perceived as being suboptimal to homeownership and that “speeding”’ towards the former is something that should be avoided for reasons of social good.

  Even the words that are used here suggest biases. A single-family home is called, well, a home. But a rented one is a rental property. I reckon that a home is a home regardless of whether it’s low-rise, high-rise, rented, or owned.

  2022.02.18

• Opendoor launches cash-backed offers

  Opendoor is best known for allowing homeowners to instantly sell their homes online. Enter your address. Get a cash offer. And then choose a closing date. (The commissions are around 5%.)

  Today, Opendoor announced something new called cash-backed offers. What it does is help to reduce the friction on the buy side and how it works is that Opendoor literally backs your offer with cash.

  If for whatever reason you can’t come up with suitable financing, Opendoor will buy the home themselves and you’ll have 240 days to figure out your affairs and buy it back from them for the same price and at the same terms.

  The idea is that it helps to improve the attractiveness of your offer, which is particularly useful in competitive low interest rate environments, such as the one we’re living through right now. (Already about 36% of the market in the US is compromised of all-cash homes sales.)

  Opendoor started by dramatically reducing the barriers to selling a home (supply). And now they’re trying to make things easier on the demand side of the marketplace. At the same time, the process is going digital. I think this is great for consumers.

  For more on the trends shaping home buying in the US, check out this report that was published by Opendoor last month.

  Full disclosure: I am long $OPEN.

  2021.03.04

• Knock knock — more on Opendoor

  Packy McCormick’s latest “Not Boring” essay is up and it’s about Opendoor. It’s a good follow up to last week’s announcement.

  Maybe that’s why housing is one of the last major categories that technology has left alone. Sure, companies have tried. Tons of them. The startup graveyard is filled with companies led by entrepreneurs who realized that the way we buy and sell homes sucks, but couldn’t ultimately figure out how to change it. They weren’t thinking big or long-term enough. The companies that have made the biggest impact, like Zillow and Redfin, make it easier to search for houses, but then kick buyers over to agents to go through the offline process, the same way it’s always been done. 

  This is topic/problem that is near and dear to me because I spent a year of my life working on a startup that initially set out to solve this exact problem. But like countless others, we couldn’t figure out how exactly to change things. So we pivoted.

  Has Opendoor finally cracked the code? I don’t know. But they’re on to something. It is, however, worth noting that the company was founded in 2013. And so what is happening today is already 7 years in the making — and probably longer if you consider the founder’s past startups.

  Tough problems clearly require time. Money doesn’t hurt either.

  2020.09.22

• People are camping out in Opendoor’s homes

  Inc. Magazine just did a profile on Opendoor, which is a company that we have, of course, talked a lot about on this blog and that I continue to follow closely.

  It’s interesting to read about some of the challenges that they’ve been having as a result of their frictionless open houses. Since all you need is a smartphone, the company has been having the ongoing problem of people camping out in their listed homes. Sometimes for weeks. They’ve been working to address this by restricting the hours (6AM to 9PM) and by installing motion detectors. I am sure they will figure it out.

  The company is also having to be careful in terms of how it positions itself alongside realtors. There are many livelihoods at stake here. Here’s an excerpt from the article:

  During interviews, Wu has chosen his words carefully when discussing Opendoor’s potential to replace Realtors. “The reality with Realtors today,” he said on stage at the Startup Grind Global Conference in Silicon Valley in February, “is their role is shifting from project management–especially in our ecosystem, where we’re automating a lot of the processes–to advisement.”

  Fred Wilson (venture capitalist) has argued many times before on his blog that business model innovation is far more disruptive than technical innovation. I think it’s valuable to keep that in mind in the context of this discussion.

  Opendoor continues to charge a commission fee (sometimes a higher one than is typical), but it also makes money on the flipping of homes and it has plans to vertically integrate other aspects of the real estate business.

  Will that do it?

  2019.08.03

• Opendoor is now selling ~300 homes per month

  Farhad Manjoo of the New York Times published an article this morning about Opendoor – a startup that I have written about multiple times on this blog – called, The Rise of the Fat Start-Up. (His definition of “fat” is that the startup owns lots of hard assets, which considered atypical in tech.)

  Below are a couple of interesting tidbits from the article:

  • Opendoor has raised over $300 million in equity and over $500 million in debt since inception.

  • Opendoor plans to be in 10 cities by the end of this year.

  • Average commission charged on Opendoor is 7.5%, which is higher than a traditional real estate agent and higher than what was quoted before in the press. The higher % is because of certainty and convenience.

  • Opendoor offers a leaseback option if you’d like to stay in your house for a period of time after you’ve sold it.

  • Their conversion rate (offers made to closings) is about 30%.

  • Other startups are now in the market with similar models, including Offerpad and Knock. Zillow is working with Offerpad on a pilot. Someone is starting to feel threatened.

  The article also quotes a blogger and real estate analyst named Mike Delprete. Heads-up: His blog is called “Adventures in Real Estate Tech.” I’m sure this will appeal to many of you. I obviously just subscribed.

  Mike dug into MLS records in order to figure out Opendoor’s transaction volumes, since the company is not releasing this information. Here’s what he found (the chart is up to March 2017):

  

  The trend line is certainly moving in the right direction. But Mike also believes that Opendoor is only netting around $8,320 in profit per home and that much of it is driven by appreciation. There’s also substantial risk in owning so many homes – each one is usually held for a few months.

  But you can be sure they’re thinking well beyond where they are at today. Expect many more updates on this blog.

  2017.05.24

• Opendoor.com is so risky that it may just work

  

  I have been writing about the startup Opendoor.com for over 2 years now. And I continue to believe that they are the most promising disruptor in the residential real estate space. 

  Here is the first post that I wrote back in July 2014 after they raised their first round of funding. Here is the second post that I wrote after they launched in Phoenix. And here is another post that I wrote 6 months ago where I argued, once again, that they are doing something worth paying attention to. (This last post explains how the platform works.)

  Well, about a week ago it was announced that they have raised another round of funding: a $210 million Series D. In all likelihood, the company’s valuation is now over $1 billion. Here’s the Techcrunch announcement where the message was: huge ass number; risky business model.

  In response to this, Ben Thompson wrote a terrific and widely shared blog post called, Opendoor: A Startup Worth Emulating. I love his post because he says what I have firmly believed and argued for many years: Zillow and Redfin are not disruptive real estate startups.

  This is what he says about Zillow:

  “And yet, the most successful real estate startup, Zillow (which acquired its largest competitor Trulia a couple of years ago), is little more than a glorified marketing tool: the company makes most of its revenue by getting real estate agents — the ones collecting 6% of fees, split between the buying and selling agents — to pay to advertise their houses on the site. Certainly a free tool that makes it easier to find houses in a more intuitive way is valuable — Zillow has acquired the sort of userbase that allow it to build an advertising business for a reason — but at the end of the day the company is a tax on a system that hasn’t really changed in decades.”

  And though very risky, he argues that Opendoor is far better positioned to shake up the status quo. 

  Here are two of his key points:

  “Sellers are uniquely disadvantaged under the current system, which is another way of saying they are an underserved market with unmet needs.” [Sellers are the side of the market that Opendoor is specifically targeting.]

  “Opendoor has a new business model: taking advantage of a theoretical arbitrage opportunity (earning fees on houses sold at a slight mark-up) by leveraging technology in pursuit of previously impossible scale that should, in theory, ameliorate risk.”

  And here’s what that could ultimately mean for the industry:

  “Opendoor has many more reasons why it might fail than Zillow or Redfin, but its potential upside is far greater as a result. First is the immediate opportunity: sellers who can’t wait. However, as Opendoor grows its seller base, especially geographically, its risk will start to decrease thanks to diversification and sheer size; that will allow it to lower its “market risk” charge which will lead to more sellers. More sellers means both less risk and an increasingly compelling product for buyers to access, first with a real estate agent and eventually directly. More buyers will mean lower marketing costs and faster sell-through, which will lower risk further and thus lower prices, pushing the cycle forward. It’s even possible to envision a future where Opendoor actually does uproot the anachronistic real estate agent system that is a relic of the pre-Internet era, and they will have done so with realtors not only not fighting them but, on the buying side, helping them.”

  I’m with Ben on this.

  2016.12.08

• Opendoor.com launches in Phoenix

  Yesterday Opendoor.com finally launched their product in Phoenix. If you’re a regular reader of Architect This City, you might remember that back in July of this year I wrote about how they had just raised $10M of funding to make selling your home as easy as a few clicks.

  Well, since then, I’ve been following them like a hawk. I had all the founders on Twitter notification (so I got notified every time they tweeted) and I was eagerly anticipating their launch.

  Now that they’ve launched, we have a much better idea of how their business model is going to work. I say “better idea” only because there’s still portions of it that are a question mark for me.

  In any event, Opendoor basically provides instant liquidity to homeowners. You go on, tell them about your home, and they then make you an offer to buy, which looks like this and lasts for 3 days. The offer they make you is calculated using comparable sales and adjustments based on your home’s unique characteristics.

  Upon accepting their offer, they then schedule a home inspection (at their cost) to confirm your home’s condition. Once this is done, you just select your move out date and Opendoor handles the rest. The fee for all this is 5.5%, which the company claims is less than the 6% that realtors typically charge (this would be high for Toronto).

  After buying your home, Opendoor plans to turn around and resell it.

  What this reminds me of is a “bought deal.” In the world of investment banking, a bought deal is when the bank itself agrees to buy the entire offering of a particular security, as opposed to going out to the market and trying to raise the money. The advantage to the company (offering the securities) is that there’s no financing risk. They know they’re going to get their money. But it usually means the company gets a lower price.

  So what I wonder, is if this is what’s going to happen here. Since Opendoor is effectively taking on the selling risk, does that mean their offers will be lower? Or are all their costs built into that 5.5% and that’s truly their core business model? I’m sure some of this will surface in the coming weeks.

  I do, however, think they are smart to be focusing on the supply-side of the marketplace and offering virtually perfect liquidity to homeowners. Real estate is a unique asset in that it’s difficult to bring supply to the market. And so if control the supply-side, I think you have a pretty good shot at controlling the market as a whole.

  2014.12.10