Daily insights for city builders, delivered every morning at 6 AM ET. I’m Brandon Donnelly — a Toronto-based real estate developer and founder of Globizen. I’ve been writing here since 2013.

Search results for: “opendoor”

  • Opendoor.com raises $9.95M to make selling your home as easy as a few clicks

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    If you’re a regular reader of ATC, you’ll know that I’ve been following the startup Opendoor.com for a few months now. I first wrote about it when it was codenamed Homerun and I just recently wrote about them as preface to a real estate survey I was conducting.

    Well, about an hour go it was announced that they’ve just raised $9.95M in venture funding from everyone and their grandmother. Here’s the list of investors (via TechCrunch):

    Paypal co-founder Max Levchin, Former YouTube and Facebook CFO Gideon Yu, Eventbrite co-founder Kevin Hartz, Y Combinator’s Sam Altman, Quora CEO Adam D’Angelo, Yammer co-founder David Sacks, Angelist’s Naval Ravikant, Yelp CEO Jeremy Stoppelman, Box CEO Aaron Levie, Initialized Capital’s Harjeet Taggar, Garry Tan and Alexis Ohanian, Former Twitter vice president Elad Gil, Blippy co-founder David King, Flixster co-founder Joe Greenstein, Angel investor Mike Greenfield, Quora co-founder Charlie Cheever, Path’s Dave Morin, Facebook vice president Dan Rose, Trevor Traina, Resolute Ventures’ Mike Hirshland, Caffeinated Capital’s Ray Tonsing, Felicis’ Aydin Senkut, True Ventures’ Om Malik, Thrive Capital’s Josh Kushner, Crunchfund’s Michael Arrington (who disclaimer: founded TechCrunch) and SV Angel.

    Not surprisingly, there are quite a few people who see an opportunity in the $20 trillion US residential real estate market – which I think is a good thing. This is a space that–despite its size–hasn’t seen an awful lot of innovation.

    There still isn’t a lot of information about the product, but there’s a clear focus on creating liquidity in the marketplace. Despite being located in San Francisco, the company will be launching in 3 markets outside of California – where liquidity isn’t as great for homeowners.

    The goal is to transform the typical 90 day selling process into a few clicks online. Homeowners submit their home to the platform and then Opendoor makes an instant offer to buy. Done.

    What I wonder then is if it’s going to be an arbitrage play. They buy the homes below market (because they’re offering total liquidity) and then they turn around and sell them at market.

    Do you have any guesses as to their business model?

  • The 10 largest buyers of US single-family houses in 2024

    March 19, 2025 · View original


    Over the last few years, there’s been growing concern around institutional buyers (namely “Wall Street”) buying up too many single-family houses and then renting them out.

    But as we spoke about last year, the number of homes owned in this way is actually quite small. The vast majority of homes are owner occupied. And the second largest share of owners is what you might call “small landlords.” That is, people who own somewhere between 1-9 homes.

    So if the specific concern is that people are out there buying houses and then renting them out, the more fruitful target would be these small landlords. But nobody seems too fussed by them, which leads me to believe that this is an instance of symbolic politics theory. In other words, it’s the association with the big bad Wall Street that people don’t like.

    Whatever the reason, here’s the data on the largest single-family house buyers in the US last year (2024) via SFR Analytics:

    Here are the metro areas where they transacted:

    And here’s this same data in heat map form:

    The largest buyer was Opendoor, which is a so-called iBuyer. We’ve spoken about this company a lot on this blog. They don’t actually want to hold any of the homes they buy. Instead, they buy, renovate, and then resell as quickly as possible.

    The second largest was New Western. They are a wholesaler or “double-close buyer.” These buyers want to own for an even shorter period of time and sometimes never actually own the home; instead they just assign their contract. What they’re trying to do is buy at a discount and then immediately turn around and sell for a profit.

    Note: SFR Analytics believes that New Western’s count might be meaningfully understated in the above data. The company uses lots of different LLCs and acquisition strategies and so it’s hard to aggregate the data. Assigning a contract also doesn’t show up in any county records, so it’s kind of impossible to track these. It’s just like assigning a pre-construction condominium agreement.

    Even still, what this data suggests is that single-family rental funds aren’t as dominant as some might think. The overall counts for all of the largest buyers also remain relatively small. Last year, over 4 million existing homes (including condominiums and co-ops) were bought and sold in the US. And this was a nearly 30-year low.

    Cover photo by Michael Tuszynski on Unsplash

  • Who owns single-family houses in the US

    Here is a chart from a recent Bloomberg article summarizing who owns single-family houses in the US.

    As of Q1-2024, about 69% were owner-occupied, about 26.6% were owned by small landlords (1-9 homes), and the rest were owned by what many are now calling “corporate landlords.”

    The point of this graph was to show that, despite getting a lot of political attention, corporate landlords still own very little. Let’s call it sub 4%, excluding iBuying companies like OpenDoor. So how much of a problem is this, really?

    Smaller landlords control much more of the US market. And at the end of the day, a house owned by a small landlord versus a corporate landlord doesn’t change the supply-demand balance of a market. It still represents an available home.

    The first and more important problem to solve is overall housing supply. Because that does change the supply-demand balance of a market. And once again, there’s no shortage of data to support the finding that increased supply tends to moderate rental growth.

    For the record, I also dislike using the term home to refer to single-family houses. Home is not a housing type. It is simply a place where people live permanently. So whenever I see a title like “US homes,” I get confused, because I don’t actually know what they’re referring to.

    If you read the article, it would appear they’re only talking about single-family houses. But implying that these are the only kind of home feels to me like an anachronism.

  • Market making for houses

    Matt Levine’s latest Money Stuff column does a good job explaining why a lot of smart people are trying to figure out a market-making model for homes (see companies such as Opendoor):

    People want to apply the market-making model to homes. This makes sense. Buying or selling a home is a long slow uncertain annoying process. The value of immediacy is high, especially for a seller. If you decide to sell your house and go to a website and spend 10 minutes filling out a form and then someone wires you cash for the value of your house, that is much much much better than hiring a broker and listing the house and holding open houses and so forth. You’d be willing to pay a market maker a lot for that immediacy. (By selling your house to the market maker at a discount.) And if the market maker is good at acquiring houses, then it will have a lot of inventory, which will make it a good seller of houses. If you want to buy a house, you will naturally go to the market maker’s website, because it’s where the houses are.

    Levine also explains why a market-making model is that much more difficult for homes compared to things like stocks. In a slowing/slumping housing market, it’s pretty easy to lose money as a market maker. (That is, unless you can somehow accurately predict that a slump is coming.)

    Last month, Opendoor lost money on 42% of its home transactions. This is a result of them buying homes from people when prices were X and then selling these homes many months later when prices were less than X.

    However, I’m not so sure that this has to be an existential problem. Opendoor’s primary value proposition is instant liquidity for homeowners. And this value proposition is at its strongest when the market is in fact slumping. Because the alternative — selling with a broker — is less attractive.

    So the current environment may eventually turn out to be a boon for Opendoor. Of course, we won’t know for a number of months.

    Full disclosure: I am long $OPEN. And yes, it is painful right now.

  • All-in-one real estate transactions

    Opendoor just published its 2021 year in review.

    In it are a few interesting figures about the housing market in the US. According to a recent survey that the company did, the average first-time buyer made 10 offers before successfully securing a home last year. The percentage of all-cash offers is also up to 25% from 15% a year ago. What is clear is that demand is currently outstripping supply. Based on these figures, housing supply in the US is at the lowest it has been since the early 1980s.

    But of course, the real point of the year in review was to talk about all of the great things that Opendoor has been doing to digitize the real estate industry. Perhaps the most interesting is its focus on creating “all-in-one real estate transactions.” What this aims to do is consolidate the now separate processes of selling a home, buying a new home, and obtaining financing, into one digital workflow. Whether or not Opendoor is the one to do it, I believe that this is the future.

    And what we have learned from other industries (that have successfully digitized) is that when you make something super easy, people end up doing a lot more of it.

    Full disclosure: I’m still long $OPEN.

  • The Zillow postmortem

    The postmortems surrounding Zillow’s exit from the algorithmic home-flipping business are starting to surface. Here’s an article from the WSJ and here’s Matt Levine’s take on it. The latter piece is very Levine-like and is called, “Zillow tried to make less money.”

    The obvious story is that Zillow’s algorithms were not valuing homes correctly. But the story is more nuanced than this. In Q1 of this year, Zillow’s home flipping business was actually more profitable than it had initially expected. And that’s because its algorithms were consistently undervaluing homes. So when it did transact, it was doing so at favorable / low cost bases.

    The problem was that the company was not transacting enough and there was a fear of losing ground to competitors like Opendoor. Apparently only about 10% of people who requested an offer from Zillow actually ended up accepting it. Margins were good, but volumes were too low.

    So what Zillow did was tweak its algorithm to be more aggressive (see above chart from the WSJ). But this created the opposite problem: low/negative margins, higher volumes.

    Once again, it shows you some of the challenges with bringing real estate online. The supply of homes is largely heterogenous and there are a lot of qualitative factors that play into what someone is willing to pay.

  • Zillow exits algorithmic home-flipping business

    Things are happening in the algorithmic home-flipping business right now.

    A few weeks ago I wrote about Zillow pausing this part of its business. It was then later revealed that the company was set to take a loss on many/most of the homes that it had purchased through this “iBuying” division. In October, it listed some 250 homes in Phoenix and on average they were priced about 6.2% below what they had bought them for.

    So it is perhaps no surprise that today the company announced that it will be the exiting the business of buying high and selling low. Turns out this isn’t good for business.

    But does this mean that the model doesn’t work or that Zillow simply didn’t have its algorithms tuned correctly? Following the news, competitor Opendoor took to Twitter to reassure everyone that the digitization of real estate is still well underway:

    Opendoor also announced today that it will be expanding technical hiring into Canada — starting first with Toronto. The plan is to hire upwards of 100 people over the next several years. Presumably this is about access to talent, but presumably it also means that Opendoor is looking toward one day expanding into Canada.

    Stay tuned.

    Disclosure: I continue to be long $OPEN.

  • Zillow pauses algorithmic homebuying business

    Zillow just announced that it has paused its (algorithmic) US homebuying business for the remainder of this year. The company acquired some 3,800 homes in Q2 of this year and, apparently, it now has a backlog of repairs and sales to work through. As a reminder, this business model, which is sometimes referred to as iBuying, is based on using algorithms to quickly value and buy homes (mostly online). The homes are then renovated and flipped for a profit. The problem, as most of you know, is that this pandemic has, among other things, disrupted construction supply chains and made it difficult to hire people. That has hurt the renovation component of this model.

    Today’s news was bad for Zillow’s stock, but good for Opendoor’s stock, which is their main competitor. Opendoor subsequently came out and announced that they remain open for business. (Disclosure: I am long $OPEN). But this announcement is perhaps a good reminder that buying and selling real estate remains a different animal than, say, buying and selling stocks. And so there are some perfectly understandable reasons for why real estate hasn’t been disrupted by the internet in the same way that other industries have. Matt Levine does a great job explaining this in his recent column, “Sorry, Zillow’s Computer Can’t Buy Your House Right Now.”

    Here’s an excerpt:

    “I’ll pay you $350,000 for your house as long as a human can go out there, look around, and make sure that price isn’t wildly off” is an interesting model but it’s not quite the same as “push this button to sell your house for $350,000.” And “I’ll pay $350,000 for a house and then send out a crew to replace the carpets” is not quite the same as “I’ll pay $350,000 for a house and flip it 20 minutes later for $355,000, collecting a small spread for providing liquidity.” Computerization has come into the housing market, but it hasn’t taken it over yet.

    One of the challenges is that the supply of homes is heterogeneous, even in a suburban community or in a multi-family building where you might have the same set of floor plans that repeat. Because maybe the home has been renovated and fit out entirely in gold. Or maybe it’s the opposite and it has been poorly maintained. There are variables to contend with that have historically necessitated more rather than less human involvement. Homes are also something that don’t trade all that frequently, which is less than optimal when it comes to online marketplaces.

    But what if buying and selling a home was dramatically cheaper and easier to do? How often would people actually do it? Presumably more often. I agree with Matt that “computerization” hasn’t taken over the real estate industry just yet. But algorithmic homebuying still appears to be one of the more promising approaches.

  • “As-is” residential real estate marketplace raises $80 million

    Sundae, which is a residential real estate marketplace that connects distressed sellers and/or dated properties with potential investors, has just raised $80 million in Series C funding. Since its founding in 2018, the company has raised a total of $135 million.

    The marketplace is largely targeted at investors looking to buy, renovate, and then flip off-market homes. The company has also said that it is looking to protect distressed and/or uninformed sellers from opportunistic buyers.

    The way it works is that Sundae lists the home and then aggregates demand from qualified local investors. These investors then bid against each other, in an auction, to buy the home. Presumably this is a good thing for homeowners.

    Once a bid has been accepted, Sundae will then advance $10k to the seller to help with moving and other expenses. Supposedly the company delivers, on average, about 10 offers within the first few days of a listing.

    Sundae appears to have a narrower focus compared to other real estate startups like Opendoor. This is a marketplace for “as-is” homes and a solution to “predatory wholesalers” who buy off-market and then quickly assign the paper.

    But perhaps this is just the start of more change in the real estate industry.

  • How to get rich (and why talking about money is okay)

    I’ve written about this before on the blog, but one of my qualms about architecture school was that it was too often taboo to talk about business and money. Why? Talking about and understanding the realities of the world doesn’t have to mean that you’re compromising on good design. Constraints are often good for design innovation. Similarly, I’ve always felt that personal finance should feature more prominently in schools at an early age. It should be considered a basic life skill.

    In any event, I came across this tweet thread last night by Naval Ravikant talking about how to get rich (without getting lucky). It’s from 2018, but the lessons — and there are many — obviously haven’t changed. (For those of you who may not be familiar, Naval was the co-founder of AngelList and was an early stage investor in companies like Uber, Twitter, and Opendoor.)

    When you see a headline like this it’s perfectly normal for your bullshit radar to go off. (In fact, it is one of his points.) But this thread is not bullshit. It’s about building wealth. Owning equity instead of renting out your time. Working hard. Taking a long view. Leveraging your time and skills. Understanding compound interest. Partnering with people of integrity. Being accountable. And becoming the best at what you do because you’re pursuing genuine curiosity (among many other great points).

    Here are a couple of his tweets. But I would encourage you to have a full read.