Daily insights for city builders, delivered every morning at 6 AM ET. I’m Brandon Donnelly — a Toronto-based real estate developer and founder of Globizen. I’ve been writing here since 2013.
The price of an existing home in the Netherlands increased 14.6% in the first 6 months of this year alone, according to this recent FT article. This is in comparison to 6.1% for existing homes across the EU on a year-over-year basis. Some economists estimate that the Netherlands is short about 330,000 homes right now and that it needs to build at least 1 million more over the next decade to better align supply and demand. I know that there is a lot of debate about the extent to which supply alone can solve problems of affordability. And indeed there are other factors at play here, such as low interest rates. But 330,000 is a lot of missing housing and numbers like this are not unique to the Netherlands. Most big cities have a supply of housing that is highly inelastic because of how difficult we make it to build. Most of us recognize this. But it remains a problem.
Our cost consultant, Finnegan Marshall, gave our team a presentation today on what’s happening with construction costs in Toronto and across Canada. I’ve said this before, but hard costs are no joke right now.
One of the areas that they focused on was the impact that inclusionary zoning is likely to have on development economics here in Toronto. To illustrate the point, a sample high-rise condominium pro forma was used. Think something in the 30-35 storey range.
Assuming a requirement of 10% affordable (the policy details are still TBD), there is going to be a real cost to development pro formas that will need to be somehow paid for.
One school of thought is that land prices will simply adjust downward. In this case, the landowner would be the one paying. I don’t think this will be the case (land prices tend to be sticky), but if they were to adjust downward, it would need to drop by $44 per square foot buildable to maintain the project’s margins in this example. (That’s $13.2 million on a 300,000 sf project.)
If, on the other hand, the price of the remaining market rate condominium suites were to increase to offset the cost of the affordable component, they would need to increase by $91 per square foot. This translates, in the above example, into a sticker price increase of approximately $60,000 per suite.
These numbers are, of course, not exact. That is not the point of this post. Every project is different. But hopefully it gives you an idea of some of the levers that will invariably need to be pulled when inclusionary zoning comes into force.
My sense is that this latter scenario is more likely to happen. I have yet to see land prices adjust downward in the face of rising costs. So all of this is likely to be bad for broad-based affordability, but good if you want to be bullish on market rate home prices.
This is a good follow-up to my recent post about the barriers to developing mid-rise here in Toronto. I have just learned (thanks to Michael Mortensen) that Vancouver has proposed some specific zoning changes that are intended to increase the supply of new rental housing.
Oddly enough, some of these proposed changes are consistent with what I put forward in my post and include 1) streamlining the development approvals process and 2) simplifying the allowable built form. i.e. Fewer step-backs.
Here’s a capture from the report that went to City Council:
The report is dated May 2020 and I truthfully don’t know the current status of these proposed changes. I’m sure Michael would have all of the details. But regardless, the report very clearly acknowledges that lengthy entitlement timelines are a barrier to new rental housing, as are more complicated building forms. Speed and simplicity can go a long way.
The clearest way to understand NYC's housing market, and the politics involved, is to tell you a story about oranges.
A thread:
— Jeremiah Johnson 🌐 (@JeremiahDJohns) June 6, 2021
A friend of mine circulated this tweet storm over the weekend. It is an explanation of how NYC’s housing market works using the example of oranges. The author ends by saying that, “it is a parody and an exaggeration, but I promise you it’s not much of one.”
The crux of this story about oranges is that if you don’t deliver enough to meet market demand, you’re going to invariably run into a problem of affordability. If people really want oranges, they are going to bid up the price of whatever oranges they can get their hands on. The same is true for housing.
But there are, of course, some obvious differences between homes and oranges. People don’t live in oranges. And I would imagine that there are other ways to get your daily recommended intake of vitamin C.
As far as I know, people also don’t buy oranges with the hope that they can derive a rental income stream and/or that they will be worth more tomorrow. And so I’m sure that many of you will be quick to point out that it is perhaps the speculative nature of housing that makes it different from most oranges.
Still, there’s no denying that, in most cities around the world, we do a lot to make it exceedingly difficult to build new housing. We constrain supply — such that we perpetually underserve the market — and then we wonder why prices continue to rise.
Disagree with this take? Let me know in the comment section below.
Urbanation released its Q1-2021 quarterly condo market update for the Greater Toronto Area at the end of last month. And there’s some good stuff in it. New condo sales totaled 5,385 units in the first quarter of this year, which is higher than the 10-year average of 4,924 units and only slightly below sales from a year ago (Q1-2020). By and large, the numbers are starting to feel a bit pre-pandemic-like.
If you remember what happened back in the second quarter of last year, there was a quick shift in demand toward the suburbs and outskirts of Toronto. Part of this was driven by affordability. But I guess part of this was also driven by the fact that some people seemed to think that our cities had never before experienced a health crisis and were going to somehow die. Or perhaps it was because Zoom is so much fun (and not at all exhausting) and that this time was destined to be different. Either way, I never understood this.
Fast forward a year and the core is not surprisingly coming back. The oldest part of the city (former City of Toronto) saw 2,886 new condo sales in the first quarter of this year. This is actually higher than sales in Q1-2020. New condo openings in downtown Toronto sold for an average price of $1,419 per square foot. And overall absorption was about 76% in the quarter, which is the highest it has been since 2017.
Some of you may be looking at these numbers and thinking WTF. But when developers look at the costs in their pro forma, as well as what’s on the horizon — ahem, inclusionary zoning — it’s usually that same feeling. So it’s hard to imagine average prices and rents going anywhere but up.
This recent article by Bloomberg CityLab, about “how California set off a backyard apartment boom,” has some interesting stats about the extent in which accessory dwelling units (ADUs) are quickly being adopted and delivered across the state.
For one, a majority (87%) of jurisdictions have enacted at least one ordinance related to ADUs, though many have several. These policies might include everything from by-right zoning to some form of financial assistance if you build. Here is a graph showing the cities and counties that have created ADU ordinances since 2013:
All of this has translated into housing supply. In 2019, California homeowners brought over 12,000 accessory dwelling units to the market (based on permits issued). Though a relatively small quantity based on the state’s overall housing deficit, this number is surely growing thanks to policies and programs, like this one here, that are working to remove the barriers to building.
In the fourth quarter of last year, the average house price to earnings ratio in the UK was about 8.4x. Apparently this is about as high as it has been in the past 120 years. But interestingly enough, if you go back to the 19th century, this ratio was even higher. It was over 12x back in 1845, but then went on a steady decline until about the 1920s. What changed, according to some researchers, is three things: homes got smaller (making them more affordable), incomes rose, and supply increased.
So what’s going on today? The obvious answer is perhaps that interest rates are low. But in this recent FT article by Martin Wolf, he argues that that’s not really the primary driver. Part of his logic is that low interest rates are a global phenomenon. And so how is it that real home prices in the UK rose 93% between 2000 and 2020, but only 29% in Germany? There must be some other structural force(s) at work. (Germany has a lower homeownership rate for whatever that’s worth.)
Wolf argues that it’s a problem of housing supply. Very little housing was built during WW2, for obvious reasons, but housing delivery did really spike in the post-war period in the UK. Local authorities also played a major role. If completions from 2000 to 2019 had averaged the same rate seen between 1950 and 1970, the country would have 2.9 million more homes today, representing a 13% increase to total dwelling count.
This, Wolf argues, would be having an impact on house price dynamics.
Back in 2019, Lake Research Partners conducted a housing study for California YIMBY. One of the questions that California voters were asked was about whether or not they support or oppose having more housing built in their community. Here is how people responded (about 700 interviews were conducted by phone and about 500 people were asked online):
What this seems to suggest is that most people (61% of all voters) support more housing in their community, with 38% (the darker bar) feeling very strongly about it. These results also seem to suggest that if you’re already a homeowner and/or if you’re a Republican, that you are then less likely to support housing in your community (51% and 54%, respectively). Even still, one possible conclusion that you can draw from these findings is that, perhaps in all cases, a majority of people (>50%) support the idea of more housing in their community.
However, the problem with this approach is that you’re ultimately asking a pretty generic and theoretical question about housing supply. I am presuming that this is a scenario where the rubber has not yet hit the road. Indeed, most people will say that they support new housing in their backyard, but is that actually how things will play it? It’s pretty common, for example, to hear things like: “I support new development, but I think this project is simply too ___________.”
So while I think that there are some interesting directional indicators that one could draw from these findings, I suspect that the numbers in the real world might be slightly less rosy.
Here are a few interesting stats from a brief report that New York City published this month about their supply of new housing units:
From January 1, 2010 to June 30, 2020, New York City delivered 205,994 net new housing units across the five boroughs.
This total includes 202,956 units from new construction and 29,161 units from the alteration/conversion of existing buildings. However, it also factors units that were lost as a result of demolition (-17,400) or alteration (-8,723).
Brooklyn saw the most supply, followed by Manhattan. The four highest-growth Community Districts were responsible for 1/3 of all new housing additions. These CDs are all formerly non-residential areas that were rezoned to allow living.
Manhattan saw the greatest loss in housing units as a result of alterations (people combining units). This was most prevalent in wealthy neighborhoods such as the Upper East Side, Upper West Side, and Greenwich Village.
What is interesting about this last point is that it shows you that cities are far from static. New York City lost 26,123 housing units during the above time period, with 8,723 units being lost to alterations and people combining units.
The orange areas on the above map are neighborhoods which actually became less dense over the last decade. And of course, this phenomenon is not unique to New York City. We are seeing the same thing play out in some/many neighborhoods in Toronto.
What this mean is that the role of new development is really twofold. It allows a city to grow (i.e. house new New Yorkers), but it also replaces lost housing and relieves some of the pressures on the existing housing stock. I don’t think many people appreciate this dynamic — or perhaps they don’t care.
For a copy of the full report (it’s only two pages), click here.
Another day, another set of announcements about large companies and rich people moving to lower cost US states. Yesterday it was announced that Oracle will move its corporate headquarters from Silicon Valley to Austin, Texas. (If you remember, Elon Musk also recently announced that he had moved himself to Austin from California.) The company has said that the move puts Oracle in the best position to grow and to give its employees greater flexibility about where and how they work.
While these sorts of moves are making headlines right now, it’s important to keep in mind that this is not necessarily a new phenomenon. In fact, depending on how you look at it, you could argue that these headlines are a lagging indicator for trends that have been underway for some time. Below is a chart from New Geography showing the top 50 state-to-state moves last year. Number one is the move from California to Texas with 45,172 net movers. And number two is the move from New York to Florida with 38,512 net movers.
According to New Geography, California saw a net domestic migration loss of 912,000 people from 2010 to 2019. And the most popular receiving states are what you would expect: Florida (1,230,000 people) and Texas (1,146,000 people). A big part of this story obviously has to do with housing affordability and the search for an overall lower cost of living. As well, since companies are always in need of young and smart talent, it makes since for them to locate in places where young and smart people want to live.
But urbanists like Richard Florida have also pointed out at this relocation of companies could be a leading indicator for something else: the decline of innovation in America. Here, he argues that in the nascent stages of a new invention, there tends to be a tight clustering phenomenon. Think steel in Pittsburgh, cars in Detroit, and computing in Silicon Valley. However, as the industry matures, the tendency to centralize seems to decline and companies then start moving around.
I’m not yet convinced that this is what’s happening. Because there seems to be a pile on happening in specific cities like Austin (which, by the way, I hear is terrific). Even before this pandemic, there was a growing sense (from the outside, mind you) that the Bay Area had simply gotten too expensive, both for individuals and for companies. It would seem that when you greatly restrict the supply of new housing and make it unattainable for many, people go find housing somewhere else. Sometimes in other states.
