Daily insights for city builders, delivered every morning at 6 AM ET. I’m Brandon Donnelly — a Toronto-based real estate developer and founder of Globizen. I’ve been writing here since 2013.
Toronto’s chief planner Gregg Lintern (who you can follow over here on Twitter) was recently in the Toronto Star talking about the city’s plans to allow more multi-unit dwellings in our low-rise single-family neighborhoods.
I was careful to say “more” because they are already permissible in some areas. The challenge is that they’re not happening at any sort of meaningful scale, which is an obvious signal that some key ingredients are still missing.
Or perhaps there are too many required ingredients. For example, right now the zoning by-law requires one car parking space for every dwelling in a multi-unit building. This is, of course, dumb and the requirement should be completely eliminated.
Changes like this, as well as many others, are long overdue. Not just in Toronto, but in many other cities. And it is partially what I was getting at when I wrote about laneway housing this past weekend and hinted at the need for other solutions to increase housing supply.
So when you have a few minutes, I would encourage you to complete the city’s survey on expanding permissions for multiplexes across the city. I just did it and voted to bring on the multiplexes.
Eric Jaffe, of Sidewalk Labs, recently wrote about an interesting research paper — from the Journal of the American Planning Association — that looked at the developer response to an inclusionary zoning policy change in London. The full research paper can be found over here.
The change was an expansion to existing mandatory IZ policies. Between 2005 and 2008, each of the 33 local authorities in Greater London reduced the minimum threshold for new housing projects. Previously it only applied to new developments with 15 or more units, but it was reduced to projects with 10 or more units. In other words, projects with a total of 10-14 units were now subject to IZ, whereas they were previously exempt.
These feel like small unit counts, but I guess it speaks to the scale of development happening in London. You generally need pretty high prices to make these kinds of boutique projects pencil out. By comparison, the IZ threshold here in Toronto is expected to be 100 or more units.
In any event, here’s what happened in London:
Before the policy change developers were effectively building up to the 14 unit mark (to avoid IZ). Following that new supply dropped off. After the change, developers simply adjusted their project sizes and built more projects with less than 10 units.
Interestingly enough, the researchers found that there was generally no net loss of new homes during the study period (2004 to 2014); developers simply built more projects with lower unit counts. But more importantly, the team discovered that the policy change only kind of worked.
The increase in affordable housing was modest. The researchers uncovered a net increase of two affordable units per borough, per year, among projects within the 10-14 unit band. That’s something. But London is a big place.
Of course, this is a response to a particular kind of policy change in a particular kind of market. Development is a local business and it’s oftentimes hard to generalize. But it does speak to the fact that there are nuances, complexities, and market distortions to consider when it comes to land use policies.
We talk a lot on this blog about laneway housing and ADUs, including, of course, the one that Globizen built earlier this year. But beyond being exceedingly cool (see above), what has this policy change meant at the macro level? To what extent is it actually helping housing supply? Let’s consider Toronto.
As a reminder, “laneway suites” became permissible in the former/old City of Toronto in 2018. The policies where then expanded to the entire city of Toronto in the summer of 2019. So we’ve had just over 2 years of this housing type being fully allowed city-wide.
Though it’s worth keeping in mind that there are only so many laneways in Toronto (which is why “garden suites” are going to be important and may actually end up being more impactful):
Between the introduction of laneway suites and June 2021, the City of Toronto received 306 permit applications to construct, of which 238 were associated with a unique address (the same address can have multiple permit applications).
During this same time period, 183 permits were issued. 107 were still under review at the time this report was written. 15 were refused. And 1 was classified as “unknown”, which I guess means it got lost in the ether or under someone’s desk.
Some of you will probably argue that this isn’t enough new housing for a city of 3 million people with high home prices, high demand, and high immigration. And I would agree.
But it’s still early days, there will be an adoption curve, and the policies are still being tweaked to further remove some of the barriers associated with delivering this housing type. Of the 238 unique addresses that submitted a permit application, just over a quarter of them had an associated minor variance application, which means that they did not fully conform to the current laneway suite by-law.
The most common obstacles appear to be the 1.5m laneway setback, the soft landscaping requirements, and the required fire access. But I know that there are others too. I could have used another foot or two in height on mine.
But as I mentioned before, there are more areas in this city without laneways than with. And so garden suites are going to be an integral component of city-wide ADUs. This will certainly help the adoption curve.
I continue to believe that these are all steps in the right direction and that this is an exciting time for Toronto. We are in the midst of transforming our laneways. But we’re not done yet. We’re going to have to make many other tough decisions in order to further increase housing supply. I’m positive we’ll get there.
There is a commonly held view that short-term rentals (such as the ones you might find on platforms like Airbnb) are bad for housing affordability because they take long-term rentals out of the market and they help to drive up property values. And there’s evidence for this. A study published in Harvard Business Review found that home-sharing alone might be responsible for about 20% of the average annual rent increases across the US.
Findings like these have encouraged municipalities around the world to put restrictions in place for STRs. But like most policy issues, there are nuances. And the thoughtful answers are rarely as obvious as they may initially seem. This has been part of my complaint around inclusionary zoning. It sounds good when politicians say it: let’s just get developers to build us free affordable housing. But again, there are nuances to consider.
Short-term rentals are similar. A recent follow-up study that was again published in Harvard Business Review has actually uncovered some interesting longer-term benefits to STRs.
Using residential permit data, Airbnb listings, and STR policies across the US, the team found that when you look over a longer time horizon, Airbnb listings actually tend to increase the supply of residential housing. On average, a 1% increase in Airbnb listings led to a 0.769% increase in permit applications. Supply is of course good for a whole host of reasons, one of which is boosting the local tax base.
Conversely, they found that restricting STRs tended to reduce the supply of new housing and renovations. After new regulations were put in place affecting STRs, Airbnb listings fell on average by about 21% and residential permits fell by 10%.
Restrictions also seem to have a direct impact on the construction of things like accessory dwelling units (laneway and garden suites for us here in Toronto). When analyzing data in and around the borders between jurisdictions in Los Angeles County, the researchers found that areas without STR regulations saw 17% more ADU permit applications compared to the areas that had restrictions.
For the 15 US cities that the team studied, they conservatively estimated that STR restrictions reduced property values by about $2.8 billion and impacted tax revenues by about $40 million per year. Some cities, like Chicago, have also found success using STRs as an economic development strategy in distressed neighborhoods, which would further bolster the tax base.
All of these findings suggest that a more nuanced approach to STR policies is probably merited.
CityLab recently published this article about “why Hong Kong is building apartments the size of parking spaces.” It’s about the city’s “microflats” which are typically in the range of 150 to 300 square feet. Supposedly there about 8,500 of these apartments across Hong Kong and in 2019 (this was apparently peak microflat) they represented about 7% of all new residential construction.
Hong Kong is one of the densest and most supply constrained real estate markets on the planet. And so there are very good reasons for these affordability pressures and the push toward smaller apartments. The article gets into a number of them. The concern I have is that the article also seems to blame developers for a number of these problems, without a clear understanding of the economics behind new construction.
It is not enough to simply say that developers need to be less greedy and build bigger apartments. If a 250 sf apartment currently costs $1 million and you think it should be twice as big, then the price is now also going to be somewhere around twice as big. Is the answer more $2 million apartments? Developers trade in space and more space costs more money to build.
All of this is not to say that housing affordability isn’t a problem worth addressing. It of course is. I am simply saying that there is a cost structure behind every new development that is driving decision making and driving what ultimately gets built. Understanding it can be helpful when looking for solutions. Believe it or not, not all developers are bad. Some actually want to help build beautiful, sustainable, and prosperous cities.
New Zealand has been in the news lately for sweeping housing legislation that effectively abolishes single-family zoning throughout most of Auckland, Hamilton, Tauranga, Wellington, and Christchurch.
But before I get into how this will all work, here’s a bit of background from an article that Matt Gurney wrote talking about Toronto’s inability to build affordable housing and create safe streets:
Now it’s time to segue back to the New Zealand thing, and there’s no particularly graceful way to do it, so I’ll just be blunt and inelegant: the federal government in New Zealand intervened on local housing rules because there was a crisis that local leaders were unable or unwilling to address. New Zealand has severe housing-affordability challenges (though Canada seems determined to close the gap). This has been a problem in New Zealand for years, and not enough was done, so the federal government stepped in… The government expects this to immediately spur construction of new housing units.
It is no doubt a top down approach. But we all know how difficult it is to build anything at all when you start from the other end.
So the way this new legislation will work is that it forces local councils to allow landowners to build up to 3 homes and 3 storeys on most lots. This is instead of 1 home per lot. The maximum site coverage has also been increased to 50%. And all of this will be available on an as-of-right basis, so no special permissions or variances needed.
The pitch is that this will unlock as many as 105,000 new homes in already built-up areas. This is, of course, a good thing for a whole host of reasons. It uses land and infrastructure more efficiently, it makes public transit more viable, and it increases housing supply in a highly constrained market.
I suspect that we will be seeing a lot more of this in the coming years.
Read this today: “…City’s studies show [inclusionary zoning] has the potential to create thousands of units of affordable rental housing every year, without costing the City a dime.” So who does it cost? 🤔
It upsets me when I read things like this (click here if you can’t see the embedded tweet above). I think it creates a false sense of a free lunch and ignores all of the nuances and complexities associated with inclusionary zoning.
IZ is an obligation to provide a certain number of affordable units in new housing developments. There’s a lot of detail and debate around where this should apply, how much needs to be provided, and at what degree of affordability.
But at the end of the day, it’s important to keep in mind that at meaningful levels of affordability, these IZ homes are going to be built at steep losses. More info on the economic impacts of IZ can be found here.
The simple math is that the costs to build these homes are going to be greater than the revenues that they bring in. Which is why developers aren’t out building affordable housing everywhere. There’s no margin.
In order to build, somebody or something needs to provide a subsidy so that this revenue-expense shortfall can be made up. How this works its way through the market is where I have tried to focus the discussion when writing about IZ. There are complexities. Some lessons from Portland, here.
But to just assume that these costs will get magically absorbed by housing developers, with no other knock-on effects or distortions to the market, is incorrect.
A close friend of mine is part of a company here in Toronto called Ourboro. They are a home financing company that offer up to $250,000 toward down payments on homes. In exchange for this, they take a stake in the home and their pro-rata share of any future appreciation. So they are really co-owners. And they make their money on the gains. The maximum hold period is 10 years, but the principal owner is free to buy out Ourboro and stay in the home if they want.
It’s an interesting model (and I have written about analogous ones before on the blog). Because in expensive housing markets like Toronto, saving up enough of a down payment is usually the biggest barrier to homeownership. But the question that I continually ask my friend is this: Does a model like this actually end up hurting overall affordability by increasing people’s buying power? Similar to what happens when interest rates go down. People can now afford more home.
Perhaps. But Ourboro’s roots are in social enterprise and their focus is on helping people who might not otherwise be able to buy a place. They also see their approach as addressing the “fundamental imbalance of housing supply and demand in Canada.” We know that more supply would help with affordability, but so does this I guess. And it’s easier to implement.
I suppose another way to look at this model is that it’s allowing individual homeowners to bring on co-investors, which is, of course, normal practice in the world of commercial real estate and development. Most developers don’t have all the equity needed to finance their own projects. They raise it from outside investors (and prosper through the magic of carried interest). Now end-users can do that too (but sorry, no carried interest per se).
So if you’re in the market for a new home in the Greater Toronto Area and are looking for a little help with the down payment, Ourboro might be an option for you to consider.
I watched a bit of the English leadership debate the other night. Eventually I got frustrated and went to bed, but I understand that housing affordability and overall affordability were important topics.
What is clear, to anyone who cares to look, is that in most big cities we are not building enough new housing. According to the above Economist article (linked in the above tweet), the “rich world” has seen new housing production drop by about 50% (relative to population) since the 1960s.
There are many reasons for this. But part of the problem is bureaucracy. Things move exceedingly slow. And another part of the problem is community opposition. Urban sprawl can be easier to swallow because there’s an out-of-sight-out-of-mind phenomenon at work. Stuff may be happening, but it’s not happening in my backyard.
But now that so much of what we do is centered around intensifying existing neighborhoods, we are faced with a battle between the incumbents (existing residents) and the future residents of a community that don’t have nearly as much say — if any at all.
What I like about the Economist article is their line of thinking for how to address this dynamic, which, at the end of the day, is rooted in what I will call expected selfishness.
The approach is around aligning incentives. How could we better structure the delivery of new housing so that more stakeholders stand to directly benefit? Because as we have seen with laneway housing here in Toronto, homeowners will gladly build in their backyard when they stand to benefit directly.
Here’s some recent data from RENTCafe looking at the supply of new multifamily rental apartments in the US. About 334,000 rental units are expected to be completed and occupied this year, which is a decline from the 2018 peak of 357,000 units, though still a relatively high number. This year is expected to be the fifth consecutive year where supply is greater than 330,000 units. Below you can also see how this breaks down across the largest MSAs (metropolitan statistical areas).
For this study, RENTCafe looked at new apartment construction data for buildings with 50 or more units (so no smaller infill projects). It covers 109 US metro areas. To determine whether a building is likely to be completed in 2021, they looked at confirmed certificate of occupancies and also used some sort of fancy algorithm to predict the likelihood that an under construction project will get one before the year is out.
