Daily insights for city builders, delivered every morning at 6 AM ET. I’m Brandon Donnelly — a Toronto-based real estate developer and founder of Globizen. I’ve been writing here since 2013.

Search results for: “road pricing”

  • Revisiting electronic road pricing as a way to fight traffic congestion

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    As disappointing as this week’s vote on Toronto’s Gardiner Expressway East was, there is one good thing that has come to the forefront and that is the will to explore road pricing. At this point, I have almost no confidence that this City Council would ever vote it in, but at least we’re talking about it. That’s better than not talking about it.

    If you’ve been reading Architect This City since the beginning, you might know that I’ve been a vocal supporter of road pricing. I wrote two posts on the topic: The case for electronic road pricing (which was based on an HBS case I did as part of my MBA) and More on electronic road pricing (which was a Lunch & Learn I did while I was at TAS).

    I continue to believe that road pricing is a highly sensible solution to big city traffic congestion. But I do think that an electronic/variable pricing model is preferable to and more equitable than a flat toll model. A variable model means that the price of using the road adjusts based on congestion levels and/or the time of day. I also think that we should use as much of the revenues as possible to fund continuous transit improvements.

    If you’re interested in learning more about this topic, check out the two posts mentioned above. I’d also love to hear your thoughts on road pricing in the comment section below. Would you welcome it in your city?

  • Road pricing chicken and egg

    Regular readers of this blog will know that I’m a big supporter of road pricing. I think it’s an incredibly efficient way of reducing congestion, improving regional productivity, making us more sustainable, and funding other infrastructure, like transit.

    But one of the arguments I often hear against road pricing is that it’s unfair to force a segment of the market out of their car if there’s no good alternative (ie. proper transit). And even if the revenue produced from road pricing goes towards transit, we all know that new infrastructure takes a very, long, time.

    So we end up with a chicken and egg problem: Road pricing is a great way to fund transit, but it’s difficult to implement without the proper transit in place. So what should we do? What comes next?

    I have two thoughts.

    First, road pricing doesn’t necessarily mean that you can no longer drive without paying. Effective road pricing matches price with demand. Therefore if there’s nobody else on the road, you wouldn’t be paying (or at least wouldn’t be paying much). This is what makes it efficient—it adjusts. So for somebody without the willingness to pay for peak congestion pricing, they could still have the option of driving at another time. Go in early or go in later.

    But what it does mean is that no matter what time you’re driving, the road could be priced so that it actually functions again. In Toronto today, many of our roads are completely failing. Demand greatly exceeds available supply (the amount of road we have) and so you can’t use them to get anywhere in an efficient way. So what we have is equal access to terrible non-functioning roads.

    Second, there’s no such thing as a free lunch and nobody said it was going to be easy to build phenomenal infrastructure. We all complain and say we want it, but when push comes to shove, are you willing to open up your wallet and pay for it?

    So I say forget pontificating about chickens and eggs and just do it. If we priced roads and setup other appropriate revenue tools, I’m sure there are some financial wizards in this city that could use tax increment financing or other mechanisms to ensure that we get shovels in the ground today for the new infrastructure that we so desperately need.

    These are important discussions to be having no matter what city you live in. I would love to hear your thoughts in the comment section below or on twitter.

  • More on electronic road pricing

    We recently started a Lunch & Learn program at TAS. I did the first one on electronic road pricing and followed-up with the blog post below. Let me know what you think. It’s also cross-posted here on TAS’s website.

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    Last week at TAS I kicked started our new Lunch & Learn program with a talk on electronic road pricing. It was based on an HBS case that I had prepared for a pricing class I took at the Rotman School.

    The case is essentially about traffic congestion in Hong Kong and a decision to either build more road (a bypass road running adjacent to the harbour: The Central-Wan Chai Bypass) or implement an Electronic Road Pricing (ERP) system, similar to what was implemented in Singapore in the 70s and in London in 2003.

    My own view is that road pricing makes a lot of sense. And I’ve written extensively about it on my own personal blog. But to quickly summarize the economics behind it all, take a look at this graph:

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    What this graph plots is the marginal cost of products and services with a fixed capacity.  An example of a product or service with a fixed capacity would be a road. Roads can only handle a certain amount of drivers before it becomes unusable (gridlock). What this graph tells us is that once you reach that capacity—variable k in the graph—the marginal cost goes from zero to basically infinity.

    In laymen terms, it’s telling us that at 4am when nobody is on the road, the cost—to society, to productivity levels, and so on—of adding each one additional driver is basically zero. But, as soon as you hit capacity, at say 830am, and traffic is at a standstill, the cost shoots way, way up!

    So how do you solve this problem? Well, you price congestion. This invariably removes or forces drivers to other times of day and makes it so that demand for the road drops below the available supply. Then the road is able to function as it’s intended to. I don’t know about you, but this makes a ton of sense to me. What good are roads if they’re clogged with traffic?

    What I’d like to do now is bring the discussion back to Toronto. For those of you with an interest in transit, you’re probably aware that Metrolinx has a “Big Move” transit and infrastructure plan that’s going to cost the region $2 billion a year to implement. I view this as investment in our region and so I think it’s absolutely the right move.

    However, the billion dollar question is, where is the money going to come from? Earlier this year Metrolinx proposed 4 main revenue tools. They are:

    – A 1% sales tax (estimated to raise $1.3 billion annually)
    – A business parking levy (estimated to raise $350 million annually)
    – A $0.05 fuel and gasoline tax (estimated to raise $330 million annually)
    – And a 15% increase in development charges (estimated to raise $100 million annually)

    What I would suggest is that there should be a road pricing plan in this list in addition to—or instead of—some of the items listed above. Taxes are just taxes. And they discourage consumption depending on the elasticity of the demand for those items.

    However, I would argue that a well executed road pricing model should be considered not as a tax, but instead as an incredibly accurate way to price roads according to actual usage patterns and costs incurred. Think of it like time-of-use utility billing. Do you think of high-peak utility billing as a tax or as simply the price to use the service when demand is the highest?

    The benefits of a road pricing system would be numerous:

    – We’d get a consistent revenue stream for transit investment in the region (instead of having to rely on government hand outs)
    – We’d be helping to decouple transit building from the political process (because Metrolinx would now make its own money)
    – We’d eliminate traffic congestion (yes, it can be done)
    – We’d increase productivity levels across the region (people will actually be able to get around)
    And we’d be reducing our impact on the environment by encouraging alternate forms of transportation

    This is an incredible list of benefits. However, I think one of the challenges with implementing electronic road pricing is that it’s often misunderstood. People just view it as a tax. Hopefully by looking at the economics behind it all, it has become clearer that it’s actually a bit more nuanced than that.

  • The case for electronic road pricing

    I just finished reading an HBS business case on road pricing in Hong Kong for a class I’m taking as part of my MBA. Since it’s a topic that’s integral to cities, I thought I would post my case prep here. Below are the questions I was asked to my prepare, with my answers below.

    The case is essentially about traffic congestion in Hong Kong and a decision to either build more road (a bypass route running adjacent to the harbour: The Central-Wan Chai Bypass) or implement an Electronic Road Pricing (ERP) system, similar to what was implemented in Singapore in the 70s and in London in 2003.

    If you’re a reader of this blog, you can probably guess which side I’m going to lean towards. I believe fundamentally that the only way to construct a large well functioning urban region is on the shoulders of mass transit. 

    Q: For a typical commuter, what are the costs and benefits involved in using a car over using public transportation? Why would a commuter choose to drive? Who are the most likely to drive?

    A: In my view it’s a trade off between cost, time and, to some extent convenience, although convenience and time are somewhat linked.

    From a cost standpoint, your typical driver has the fixed cost of owning a car (payments, insurance, maintenance, etc.) and the variable costs of driving (gas, parking, applicable road prices, etc.). For those who have already committed to purchasing a car, probably as a result of where they’ve decided to live, it then becomes largely a question of variable costs. In most cases, these costs are higher for driving than they are for public transportation.

    But then comes the question of time and convenience. Residents of global cities, such as Hong Kong, are becoming increasingly cash rich and time poor. There’s a real value to time. And driving often offers speed, as well as the convenience of a personalized and “comfortable” ride (personally, I find gridlock highly uncomfortable). So if the value of the time you’re going to save by driving exceeds the variable cost of driving, you’re likely going to drive. In other words, higher income individuals should choose to drive.

    Q: What are the costs of traffic and congestion for society?

    A: The costs of traffic and congestion to society are huge. You have the lost productivity as a result of people and goods sitting idle. You have the strain on family life caused by working parents struggling to find enough time outside of work. And you have the environmental impact of idling cars.

    Here’s a few stats from Natural Resources Canada:

    “In fact, if Canadian motorists avoided idling for just three minutes every day of the year, CO2 emissions could be reduced by 1.4 million tonnes annually. This would be equal to saving 630 million litres of fuel and equivalent to taking 320,000 cars off of the road for the entire year. Eliminating unnecessary idling is one easy action that Canadians can take to reduce their GHG emissions that are contributing to climate change.”

    Q: Discuss the effect of electronic road pricing (ERP) on: (a) urban re-development and town planning, as well as residential property prices; (b) fare faced by public transport.

    A:

    (a) Based on London’s experience, their property market “recorded no impact, positive or negative, in or around the charging zone.” (Case) However, intuitively, I would expect development pressures and pricing to increase within the boundary of any charging zone and for prices to fall outside, along the periphery. The reason for this is that urban real estate models, such as the Monocentric City Model, argue that as you move out from the center of a city, land prices fall, but transportation costs increase. It ties into the whole “drive to affordability” notion. In the case of ERP, transportation costs have now increased for the periphery, so it could drive down land/property prices. 

    (b) Relatively speaking, an ERP system should make pubic transportation fares appear cheaper since the marginal cost of driving has now increased. Therefore, in the longer term, it may create an opportunity to raise fares.

    Q: Why is the use of road usually free of charge?

    A: Roads are thought of as a public good. And so they’ve been typically priced as such. However, roads, and in particular highways, are also thought of as an economic development engine. They’re a heavily subsidized form of infrastructure that have been used as a tool to spur suburban and exurban growth. By driving down the cost of transportation (without factoring in the environmental costs, of course), extensive highway networks have been used to unlock the value of previously under utilized outlying land. However, I disagree with the notion that all roads should be “free.”

    Q: Why roads are often provided and managed by the government and not by profit- maximizing firms?

    A: Because typically profit-maximizing firms require paying customers. Also, since they’re viewed as a public good, governments typically want to control them.

    Q: What are the differences between ERP and a classic toll?

    A: A classic toll is typically based on a fixed price that is paid regardless of the time of day. ERP is variable. Pricing fluctuates based on the time of day and/or the traffic and congestion levels. It’s the idea that as demand for the public good in question rises, so does the price of using it.

    Q: What are the advantages of implementing ERP?

    A: There are number of advantages. The first is that you get an immediate drop in traffic/congestion. This has been clearly shown through previous case studies in Singapore, London and Scandinavia. As a result of this, the city is then able to offer an improved user experience for those who are willing to pay the increased transportation costs. At the same time, the city now has a new revenue source that it can dedicate towards other infrastructure improvements, such as public transportation. Indirectly, the city will also benefit from increased productivity levels and a smaller environmental footprint.

    Q: Why are there such few cities that have successfully adopted ERP despite the fact that the idea is praised by many economists? Singapore is one of the few successful examples, why?

    A: It’s politically unfavourable. Nobody likes any sort of new “tax”. When Livingston first proposed a congestion charge in London residents called it “Carmageddon.” Few leaders have the guts to push something like this through.

    Singapore, on the other hand, had no choice. Geographically they couldn’t afford not to discourage car use and so the political will was there. I think that Hong Kong is in a similar boat.

    Q: Imagine that you were the government official responsible for the introduction of ERP. What would be your strategy to persuade the public to support your implementation?

    A: I would focus on two main ideas: (1) the value proposition being offered and (2) the future use of the funds being collected through ERP. 

    The main value proposition is reduced congestion for a segment of the population that I suspect would be willing to pay for the convenience. Again, I return to the idea of being cash rich and time poor. 

    For those with absolutely no willingness to pay for this convenience, the value proposition becomes increased investment in public transportation (as a result of the ERP funds). This is how I believe the funds should be allocated.

    I also think it’s critical to be open and transparent to the public about how exactly the funds will be used. You don’t want the public to think of ERP as a tax. You want them to think about it as investment in infrastructure in the region.

    However, it’ll take a change in mindset. People are accustomed to roads being “free.” But to paraphrase Harvard economist Edward Glaeser, from his recent book the Triumph of the City, if you offer a hugely valuable good—such as a road or highway—and make it free, you’ll never be able to keep up with demand. It’s for this reason that building new and more roads is rarely the answer. Traffic patterns simply adjust to take advantage of the increased supply.

    If you want to control usage, you need to slap a price tag on it.

  • Congestion pricing solves traffic, but what about road safety?

    June 13, 2026 · View original


    Okay, so, we know that New York’s congestion pricing in lower Manhattan is doing exactly what it’s supposed to do. It has reduced traffic congestion and average drive times, improved air quality, increased public transit ridership, and continues to generate lots of money for the city.

    Because of this, a majority of New Yorkers now say they want congestion pricing to continue, despite many vehemently objecting to it before its enactment. It is, in fact, a car-friendly policy. It makes driving faster and easier by reducing congestion.

    But here’s another way to look at its effects. A recent study by the Columbia University Mailman School of Public Health (in partnership with the Yale School of Public Health) found that, at the highest level, the program is also helping road safety. Car crashes have declined since the program began.

    But this is for overall crashes. Interestingly enough, the results are less obvious when looking specifically at injury and fatal crashes. One possible explanation for this is that congestion pricing is, you know, working. Cars are able to drive faster! And since I would imagine that vehicle speed is correlated with injury severity, this makes sense.

    So, congestion pricing won’t solve all of your city-building problems. It will, however, solve a great number of them. Which city will be bold enough to step up next?


    Cover photo by Stian Skevig on Unsplash

  • Time-of-use electricity pricing is like congestion pricing for roads

    August 8, 2025 · View original


    At the risk of sounding obvious, pricing is fundamental to the functioning of markets. It determines profitability, it allocates resources, and it influences customer behavior, among other things. Take the example of electricity pricing.

    In Ontario, we use something called time-of-use (TOU) pricing. What that means is that electricity rates vary according to the time of the day and the time of the year. In the summer, the expensive peak usage period is the afternoon (because of air conditioning) and in the winter it’s the morning and early evening (because of heating and lighting when people are generally not at work).

    What this pricing strategy does is incentivize customers to change their consumption behaviours. Instead of doing laundry during a peak period, maybe you set a timer and have it run during a low-peak period. In other words, it helps to flatten the demand curve. This is valuable for utility providers because peak periods are more expensive to supply and they also create the risk of brownouts and blackouts. So you worry about peak demand.

    With this in mind, let’s now switch and talk about highway congestion. The parallels are almost identical, and yet, most highways are free to use, which means we do absolutely nothing to manage peak demand. Instead, we encourage the equivalent of brownouts where demand greatly exceeds supply, traffic crawls, and roads become practically unusable. Why is that? Why should highways be viewed any differently?

    In the case of highways, there are even alternatives such as transit (thought not always, of course). But if you need electricity from a monopolistic utility provider, you’re paying whatever rates they charge. As you might expect, the answer is not technical or economic. We know with 100% certainty that pricing congestion will reduce it. The reason we don’t do it is political. Free roads are preferred to functioning roads.

    Cover photo by Hooman R. on Unsplash

  • How Ontario’s new HST rebate changes new home pricing

    April 9, 2026 · View original


    On March 25, 2026, the Ontario government announced that it would be expanding the HST rebate to lower the cost of new homes. Here’s the full media briefing PDF. Since then, every developer, lawyer, and sales team in the city has been scrambling to figure it all out and incorporate it into their projects. This includes us.

    Today on the blog, I thought it might be useful to do the following: (1) explain how I understand the proposed rebate program works (or will work, to be exact), (2) talk about how I’m seeing the industry respond to the announcement (naturally, there’s been some criticism), and (3) shamelessly plug one of our HST rebate-eligible homes at Junction House.

    First, I need to caveat this post by saying that, oh boy, I’m not an accountant or lawyer, and that this proposal is still subject to regulatory enactment. So, I could be wrong about something, the proposal might not get passed, or maybe something outrageous happens, potentially precipitated by a post on Truth Social. Do your own research. Talk to your advisors. Having said all this, the industry fully expects this to pass, and developers are already relying on the fact that it will, perhaps by this summer.

    Second, it’s helpful to understand how new homes are typically priced in the market and how the existing new home HST rebate works. Developers in the Toronto market typically price their homes inclusive of HST, but net of the current new home HST rebate. As it stands today, this rebate caps out at $24,000, translating to an effective HST rate that is lower than the current rate of 13%, depending on the price of the home.

    Let me explain:

    – Price on the purchase agreement: $925,000 (again, this is inclusive of HST but net of the $24k rebate) – Base price excluding any HST = ($925,000 + $24,000) / 1.13 = $839,823.01 – HST payable to government = $925,000 – $839,823.01 = $85,176.99 – Effective HST rate = $85,176.99 / $839,823.01 = 10.1% (which is less than 13% because of the $24k rebate)

    In practice, the way this typically works is that the buyer, who is assumed to qualify for the rebate, assigns it to the developer as part of the closing process. The developer receives the benefit of this rebate, and so they only need to remit the remaining 10.1% to the government. Importantly, this particular rebate is meant for people intending to move into the new home. If they are not doing this, then a separate rebate process applies.

    Now, here’s what’s proposed for the new HST program, which is available only for purchases made between April 1, 2026 and March 31, 2027, and applicable to homes used as a primary place of residence or as a residential rental property:

    – Up to $1,000,000: Full 13% HST rebate (up to $130,000). – $1,000,001 to $1,500,000: Flat maximum rebate of $130,000. – $1,500,001 to $1,850,000: The rebate phases down proportionally from $130,000 to $24,000. – Over $1,850,000: The rebate is capped at the standard Ontario maximum of $24,000 (same as today).

    Given that most developers have been pricing inclusive of HST, but net of the current rebate, there’s some math involved to figure out what purchasers will ultimately be paying for a new home bought over the next 12 months. But for homes under $1,850,000, the answer is less than before! (More on this below.)

    Another important question is how this will work given that the eligibility time period has started, but the proposal hasn’t passed and isn’t in force yet. The way we are thinking about it is generally in the following two ways.

    If a purchaser is buying a new home and closing on it today, they will have to pay the HST as has been customary in the past, but then the expectation is that, once the proposal is enacted, the purchaser will get it refunded (as per the above). Going back to our $925k example above, the $85k would still get paid up front, and then remitted to the government, but then the purchaser would get it back, bringing their net price down to $839k.

    If a purchaser is buying a new home today and expecting to close on it after the proposal is enacted, one reasonable assumption is that the proper protocols will be in place such that the purchaser isn’t paying the HST upfront only to get it back later. In our example, they would instead be paying the $839k up front. Developers are contracting for this scenario today, but how exactly the paperwork will flow in the future remains TBD.

    One of the unexpected benefits of this proposal, at least for me, is that it has me thinking more in terms of net prices, excluding any HST. And I like this better. I think it’s a more transparent way to communicate with purchasers. We as an industry should use this moment as an opportunity to move toward this practice.

    In fact, what I would like to be able to do is enumerate the following to buyers: “Here is the price of your new home. Now let’s add the HST, development charges, education development charges, parkland dedication fees, community benefit charges, and so on.” Because I think, only then, would it become clear to the general public how much we tax new housing.

    Now let’s talk more broadly about how the market is responding to this proposal.

    One of the criticisms of this proposal is that it will only serve to increase developer margins. And indeed, this proposal does represent a cost reduction in development pro formas. But what I will say is that every single developer that I have spoken to is using this as an opportunity to reduce their pricing and pass along the savings (typically 1:1) to new home buyers. The reality is that the market is too soft to do anything else.

    This is a perfect example of the cost-plus pricing model that we often talk about on this blog. Developers typically price based on their costs. Now that costs have come down (because of this proposal), they are lowering their prices accordingly. And those who do not follow suit will no longer be competitive in the market.

    The market froze out in recent years because, suddenly, the price people were willing to pay for new homes was less than developers’ costs. The floor had been reached. But now the floor has been lowered in a direct effort to clear out inventory and reset the market. It’s a good time to be a new home buyer, and I have already started to feel a change in sentiment across the industry.

    On that note, I would like to turn your attention to a penthouse suite at Junction House that we just listed for sale. It’s a two-bedroom and two-bath home and, yes, it’s HST rebate-eligible! It’s one of my favourite suites in the building. If you’d like to learn more, reach out to Paul Johnston at Unique Urban Homes ([paul@pauljohnston.com](mailto:paul@pauljohnston.com)).

  • A new opportunity for congestion pricing

    March 27, 2026 · View original


    We’ve been talking about the merits of congestion pricing for as long as I’ve been writing this blog. But it remains politically unpopular, despite the overwhelming evidence that it consistently does what it’s supposed to do: it reduces congestion, shortens commute times, improves air quality, and raises money for alternative modes of transport, among other things.

    The status quo bias is strong, but right now we have an opportunity. Self-driving cars are in the midst of shifting the mobility landscape, and there’s a growing belief that (1) roads are going to need to be more accurately priced to deal with the surge in demand, and (2) this is a moment in time that grants us the opportunity to do it. Here’s a recent tweet by Chris Spoke of Toronto Standard that makes this point and that I agree with.

    The basic idea behind point number two is that many voters don’t like the idea of a congestion charge for themselves, but will probably mind a charge on robot cars a lot less — both because they are robot cars and because there are relatively few of them on the road today. However, at some point, robot cars will form the majority of vehicles on the road, so now would be a good time to establish new practices.

    What do you think?


    Cover photo by Minku Kang on Unsplash

  • This is what happens when you price roads

    As a general rule, road pricing isn’t popular. But that’s not because it doesn’t work. The problem is that it works too well, and people don’t like the idea of driving less and paying for roads (that currently have a zero marginal cost).

    Here’s a recent study by Robert Bain and Deny Sullivan that looked at just how well it can work. In it, they examine 76 data points from 16 countries, including roads, bridges, tunnels, and cordons (areas).

    The question: What happens to demand once the marginal cost of using a road goes from $0 to some cost greater than zero? (As part of this, they also looked at whether the road or bridge in question has viable alternatives.)

    The results:

    The median traffic reduction was 25%. But the interquartile range was -17% to -44%. This is all very significant. Said differently, the traffic impact in nearly a quarter of the examples was -45% or more. So almost a halving of traffic congestion.

    These reductions are obviously a function of the cost of using each road, but regardless, the overarching takeaway remains the same: You may not like or want road pricing, but it totally works.

  • Dynamic transit pricing

    Over the years on this blog, we’ve spoken a lot about dynamic pricing when it comes to roads and traffic congestion. And in this instance, the principal intents are to price congestion, improve traffic flows, and encourage other modes of transport. It follows the logic that if you’re going to tax things, tax the things you want less of.

    But what about using dynamic pricing for the opposite purpose — to induce demand?

    Diana Lind recently wrote about this here and talked about how London is exploring using dynamic pricing on its transit system. But rather than increasing prices during periods of high demand, I would imagine that the idea is to reduce prices when demand is lower. Already, it is piloting reduced fares on Fridays when its ridership drops by about 10%.

    It’s an interesting idea because, if done correctly, it should get more bums into seats on transit. And maybe it’s actually a more equitable pricing model.