There's a lot of money at work right now trying to reinvent the way that homes are bought and sold. Perhaps the most popular trend is "instant buying" or algorithmic home buying. I have been writing about this for years, mostly because of Opendoor. But now there are lots of companies competing in this space. With this model, home sellers get the benefit of an almost immediate sale, though usually it's at a slightly lower price.
Redfin, on the other hand, is returning to something that it first tried out back in 2006: a buy now button on its online listings. It failed back then. But maybe it was simply too early. The feature allows unrepresented buyers -- that is, buyers without an agent -- to make online offers. Naturally, it's far from a single click process. But when accepted, the seller ends up paying about half the amount of commission.
According to the New York Times, the company started testing the feature in late March in the Boston area. Of the 120 homes listed on Redfin with a "start an offer" button, 5 ended up being purchased via an online bid. That's more than I would have expected. But Redfin positions these offers as being the stronger option because they save sellers money. There's also an option to tour the home on your own.
Given this initial response, the company is now working to roll out this feature nationally, market by market. Is this the future of home buying?
The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 (US) created something known as Opportunity Zones. These are low-income and high-poverty census tracts that are designed to attract investment by offering a number of different tax benefits. I first wrote about it on the blog, here.
Now that some time has passed since the final Opportunity Zones were announced, Zillow Economic Research decided to look at the possible impact of this designation on real estate values. In other words: To what extent, if at all, are the tax benefits getting capitalized into the value of the properties?
Below is a chart showing the year-over-year change in the 12-month moving average sale price for low-income census tracts that were (1) eligible and selected as an Opportunity Zone; (2) eligible and not selected; and (3) not eligible.
Bloomberg recently published a good summary of Zillow's business and their move into algorithm home buying and flipping. (They are trying to avoid the "flipping" moniker because of the negative connotations associated with it.) Zillow started buying homes directly from owners last spring. They charge the seller between 6-9%, so more than using a typical agent, but inline with their competitors. There's clearly a segment of the market willing to pay a premium for the added convenience. The thinking used to be that discount brokerages were the way to disrupt the housing market. This is the opposite strategy. Interestingly enough, Zillow felt that they needed to make this pivot with their business model. It used to be about selling ads. They were definitive in that they were not a disruptor of real estate agents. But now:
If getting an offer from an iBuyer became a crucial step in the selling process, they worried, Zillow could lose its audience and its advertising base. What’s more, market researchers kept finding that consumers said they’d pay a modest premium to get a cash offer. “People expect to press a button and have magic happen,” says Rascoff, a 43-year-old former Expedia executive who’d earlier started the travel search engine Hotwire, which he sold to Expedia for $700 million. Getting into the business of buying homes directly, Rascoff says, was “the only way to remain in a leadership position.”
Here is a map of the companies in this particular space and the cities in which they operate:
There's a lot of money at work right now trying to reinvent the way that homes are bought and sold. Perhaps the most popular trend is "instant buying" or algorithmic home buying. I have been writing about this for years, mostly because of Opendoor. But now there are lots of companies competing in this space. With this model, home sellers get the benefit of an almost immediate sale, though usually it's at a slightly lower price.
Redfin, on the other hand, is returning to something that it first tried out back in 2006: a buy now button on its online listings. It failed back then. But maybe it was simply too early. The feature allows unrepresented buyers -- that is, buyers without an agent -- to make online offers. Naturally, it's far from a single click process. But when accepted, the seller ends up paying about half the amount of commission.
According to the New York Times, the company started testing the feature in late March in the Boston area. Of the 120 homes listed on Redfin with a "start an offer" button, 5 ended up being purchased via an online bid. That's more than I would have expected. But Redfin positions these offers as being the stronger option because they save sellers money. There's also an option to tour the home on your own.
Given this initial response, the company is now working to roll out this feature nationally, market by market. Is this the future of home buying?
The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 (US) created something known as Opportunity Zones. These are low-income and high-poverty census tracts that are designed to attract investment by offering a number of different tax benefits. I first wrote about it on the blog, here.
Now that some time has passed since the final Opportunity Zones were announced, Zillow Economic Research decided to look at the possible impact of this designation on real estate values. In other words: To what extent, if at all, are the tax benefits getting capitalized into the value of the properties?
Below is a chart showing the year-over-year change in the 12-month moving average sale price for low-income census tracts that were (1) eligible and selected as an Opportunity Zone; (2) eligible and not selected; and (3) not eligible.
Bloomberg recently published a good summary of Zillow's business and their move into algorithm home buying and flipping. (They are trying to avoid the "flipping" moniker because of the negative connotations associated with it.) Zillow started buying homes directly from owners last spring. They charge the seller between 6-9%, so more than using a typical agent, but inline with their competitors. There's clearly a segment of the market willing to pay a premium for the added convenience. The thinking used to be that discount brokerages were the way to disrupt the housing market. This is the opposite strategy. Interestingly enough, Zillow felt that they needed to make this pivot with their business model. It used to be about selling ads. They were definitive in that they were not a disruptor of real estate agents. But now:
If getting an offer from an iBuyer became a crucial step in the selling process, they worried, Zillow could lose its audience and its advertising base. What’s more, market researchers kept finding that consumers said they’d pay a modest premium to get a cash offer. “People expect to press a button and have magic happen,” says Rascoff, a 43-year-old former Expedia executive who’d earlier started the travel search engine Hotwire, which he sold to Expedia for $700 million. Getting into the business of buying homes directly, Rascoff says, was “the only way to remain in a leadership position.”
Here is a map of the companies in this particular space and the cities in which they operate:
My understanding is that the "not eligible" category represents census tracts with similar characteristics to the other two categories but, for whatever reason, were not eligible to become an Opportunity Zone. There are criteria.
The program is still quite new, but what Zillow found was that the eligible census tracts (green and yellow lines) seemed to exhibit similar sale price increases after the Act was signed, but before the final Opportunity Zones were announced. Once the final Zones were announced, sale prices in the selected category (green line) began to surge and move away from the pack.
This may be evidence that the tax benefits are starting to get capitalized, or it may not be. One question I have is about why pricing in the selected Opportunity Zones seems to be a lot more volatile -- even before the Act was announced.
Some investors aren't sold on this strategy and have begun short selling Zillow (according to the Bloomberg article). I keep getting the sense that there's a greater end game in the cards here. It is about building up A (algorithmic home buying and flipping) in order to unlock B. But what's B -- a new end-to-end transactional model for the housing market?
My understanding is that the "not eligible" category represents census tracts with similar characteristics to the other two categories but, for whatever reason, were not eligible to become an Opportunity Zone. There are criteria.
The program is still quite new, but what Zillow found was that the eligible census tracts (green and yellow lines) seemed to exhibit similar sale price increases after the Act was signed, but before the final Opportunity Zones were announced. Once the final Zones were announced, sale prices in the selected category (green line) began to surge and move away from the pack.
This may be evidence that the tax benefits are starting to get capitalized, or it may not be. One question I have is about why pricing in the selected Opportunity Zones seems to be a lot more volatile -- even before the Act was announced.
Some investors aren't sold on this strategy and have begun short selling Zillow (according to the Bloomberg article). I keep getting the sense that there's a greater end game in the cards here. It is about building up A (algorithmic home buying and flipping) in order to unlock B. But what's B -- a new end-to-end transactional model for the housing market?
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