In 2021, San Jose had the least affordable housing among the 92 major US housing markets, with a median multiple of 12.6. San Francisco had a median multiple of 11.8, Los Angeles was at 10.7, followed by San Diego, at 10.1).7 Housing was severely unaffordable even in the interior markets, with Riverside-San Bernardino at 7.4 and Sacramento at 6.7.
And there are some explanations for why that is the case:
Dartmouth economist William Fischel published an early seminal review 9 of housing affordability in California (1970 to the 1990s). Fischel suggested that regulatory research should look for major changes that “are adopted in some places but not in others.”
Fischel examined the higher house price increases that occurred in California compared to the rest of the nation between the late 1960s and late 1980s. Fischel cites various possible causal factors. He found that the higher prices could not be explained by higher construction cost increases, demand, higher personal income growth, the quality of life, amenities, Proposition 13, land supply or water issues.
In 2021, San Jose had the least affordable housing among the 92 major US housing markets, with a median multiple of 12.6. San Francisco had a median multiple of 11.8, Los Angeles was at 10.7, followed by San Diego, at 10.1).7 Housing was severely unaffordable even in the interior markets, with Riverside-San Bernardino at 7.4 and Sacramento at 6.7.
And there are some explanations for why that is the case:
Dartmouth economist William Fischel published an early seminal review 9 of housing affordability in California (1970 to the 1990s). Fischel suggested that regulatory research should look for major changes that “are adopted in some places but not in others.”
Fischel examined the higher house price increases that occurred in California compared to the rest of the nation between the late 1960s and late 1980s. Fischel cites various possible causal factors. He found that the higher prices could not be explained by higher construction cost increases, demand, higher personal income growth, the quality of life, amenities, Proposition 13, land supply or water issues.
Instead Fischel cites stronger land use restrictions --- There were two principal issues, the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) and local growth management restrictions.10
We have discussed this issue many times before on the blog, but Wendell Cox's article is helpful in pointing out that zoning in and of itself wasn't the problem. The problem arose, at least according to Fischel's research, when these policies went from "ordinary zoning" to something that became a tool to restrict growth.
The illustrate what "ordinary zoning" means, Cox uses the idiom, "a place for everything, but everything in its place." And I think this is an interesting way of putting it. Part of the reason why we have zoning is that it is a way to organize uses. It is a way of saying that sex shops and cannabis shops can't go here, but they can go over there.
But the key part of this idiom is its first part: a place for everything. What this implies is that the answer should never just be, "no, sorry, you can't build this." At most, it should be, "no, sorry, you can't build this here, but you can over there." There is a place for everything.
Of course, this is much harder to do when you flip from sprawl development to infill development. Because now there are fewer places "over there." You really have to figure out "here."
Today's post is perhaps a good follow-up to yesterday's post about housing supply in Ontario. Below are a few charts taken from a recent article by Wendell Cox looking at net domestic migration across the US. The takeaway here is that the shift from larger cities to smaller cities seems to be accelerating, following a trend that started before COVID.
Instead Fischel cites stronger land use restrictions --- There were two principal issues, the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) and local growth management restrictions.10
We have discussed this issue many times before on the blog, but Wendell Cox's article is helpful in pointing out that zoning in and of itself wasn't the problem. The problem arose, at least according to Fischel's research, when these policies went from "ordinary zoning" to something that became a tool to restrict growth.
The illustrate what "ordinary zoning" means, Cox uses the idiom, "a place for everything, but everything in its place." And I think this is an interesting way of putting it. Part of the reason why we have zoning is that it is a way to organize uses. It is a way of saying that sex shops and cannabis shops can't go here, but they can go over there.
But the key part of this idiom is its first part: a place for everything. What this implies is that the answer should never just be, "no, sorry, you can't build this." At most, it should be, "no, sorry, you can't build this here, but you can over there." There is a place for everything.
Of course, this is much harder to do when you flip from sprawl development to infill development. Because now there are fewer places "over there." You really have to figure out "here."
Today's post is perhaps a good follow-up to yesterday's post about housing supply in Ontario. Below are a few charts taken from a recent article by Wendell Cox looking at net domestic migration across the US. The takeaway here is that the shift from larger cities to smaller cities seems to be accelerating, following a trend that started before COVID.
The data in these charts is organized according to population and by Core Based Statistical Areas (CBSAs). At the bottom are America's two megacities: New York and Los Angeles. Both have metro areas that exceed 10 million people. As you can, these two city regions have been losing the most people, both in terms of total humans and on a percentage basis. The goldilocks sweet spot seems to be cities in the 500k to 1 million range.
But the most telling figure is probably this one here:
This chart adds up all major metropolitan areas with a population greater than 1 million, and then shows net migration over the last decade. Here you can see when this trend started (around 2016) and how it has been accelerating. In this case, it does appear that COVID added some fuel to the fire. But the question remains: Why is this longer-term trend even happening?
Is it a short-term phenomenon? Is it because once a city reaches a certain size it simply becomes more annoying to live in it and people would prefer to live elsewhere? Or is it more about overall affordability? That is, if we could figure out how to deliver more affordable housing in our cities, could we stymie the bleeding toward smaller and more affordable ones?
I don't know the answers to the questions. But they have been widely debated and I still think they're interesting ones. If all things were equal (or closer to equal), how and where would most people choose to live? Put differently, how much of this is some sort of natural market outcome and how much of it is a direct result of our actions (or inactions)?
the data has been clear
. Many Americans are moving from expensive cities, like Los Angeles, to less expensive metropolitan areas like Dallas-Fort Worth.
But Wendell Cox's recent article over at New Geography is a good reminder that these data sets can be limited. The US Census Bureau currently tracks domestic migration at the county level only. This can be a bit of a problem as counties vary dramatically in terms of geography and population.
The New York metropolitan area, for example, is comprised of 25 different counties averaging about 750,000 residents. The Los Angeles metropolitan area, on the other hand, is compromised of two counties averaging about 6.6 million residents.
These sorts of nuances become important when you're trying to figure out things like whether people are moving to/from urban cores or the suburbs. Case in point: The San Diego metro area is compromised of a single county. When people move there, the data says nothing about how urban or suburban they might be.
Dallas-Fort Worth is a lot easier to read. Since 2010, it has had the largest net domestic migration of any metro area in the US: +443,000 residents. But county data reveals that it is entirely suburban. The core (Dallas County) actually lost 57,000 people from 2010 to 2019. And this is not unique to the Dallas-Fort Worth area.
The data in these charts is organized according to population and by Core Based Statistical Areas (CBSAs). At the bottom are America's two megacities: New York and Los Angeles. Both have metro areas that exceed 10 million people. As you can, these two city regions have been losing the most people, both in terms of total humans and on a percentage basis. The goldilocks sweet spot seems to be cities in the 500k to 1 million range.
But the most telling figure is probably this one here:
This chart adds up all major metropolitan areas with a population greater than 1 million, and then shows net migration over the last decade. Here you can see when this trend started (around 2016) and how it has been accelerating. In this case, it does appear that COVID added some fuel to the fire. But the question remains: Why is this longer-term trend even happening?
Is it a short-term phenomenon? Is it because once a city reaches a certain size it simply becomes more annoying to live in it and people would prefer to live elsewhere? Or is it more about overall affordability? That is, if we could figure out how to deliver more affordable housing in our cities, could we stymie the bleeding toward smaller and more affordable ones?
I don't know the answers to the questions. But they have been widely debated and I still think they're interesting ones. If all things were equal (or closer to equal), how and where would most people choose to live? Put differently, how much of this is some sort of natural market outcome and how much of it is a direct result of our actions (or inactions)?
the data has been clear
. Many Americans are moving from expensive cities, like Los Angeles, to less expensive metropolitan areas like Dallas-Fort Worth.
But Wendell Cox's recent article over at New Geography is a good reminder that these data sets can be limited. The US Census Bureau currently tracks domestic migration at the county level only. This can be a bit of a problem as counties vary dramatically in terms of geography and population.
The New York metropolitan area, for example, is comprised of 25 different counties averaging about 750,000 residents. The Los Angeles metropolitan area, on the other hand, is compromised of two counties averaging about 6.6 million residents.
These sorts of nuances become important when you're trying to figure out things like whether people are moving to/from urban cores or the suburbs. Case in point: The San Diego metro area is compromised of a single county. When people move there, the data says nothing about how urban or suburban they might be.
Dallas-Fort Worth is a lot easier to read. Since 2010, it has had the largest net domestic migration of any metro area in the US: +443,000 residents. But county data reveals that it is entirely suburban. The core (Dallas County) actually lost 57,000 people from 2010 to 2019. And this is not unique to the Dallas-Fort Worth area.
