What do you think of this beautiful low-rise apartment building? It is called Spadina Gardens and it was built (allegedly illegally) on Toronto's Spadina Avenue in 1906, shortly before the City enacted an outright ban on "disease-breeding tenements" (i.e. apartment buildings) in all residential neighborhoods.
This, of course, is a form of exclusionary zoning. Our predecessors had decided that apartments were bad, they promoted disease and immorality, and that they were likely to destroy or at least corrupt Toronto by making it, you know, less waspy.
Important studies are underway here in Toronto, and across North America, to determine whether we should do something about this longstanding city building tradition. Should we allow a mixture of different housing types in our residential neighborhoods, or should we keep things just the way that they are? That being low-rise and single-family.
What do you think of this beautiful low-rise apartment building? It is called Spadina Gardens and it was built (allegedly illegally) on Toronto's Spadina Avenue in 1906, shortly before the City enacted an outright ban on "disease-breeding tenements" (i.e. apartment buildings) in all residential neighborhoods.
This, of course, is a form of exclusionary zoning. Our predecessors had decided that apartments were bad, they promoted disease and immorality, and that they were likely to destroy or at least corrupt Toronto by making it, you know, less waspy.
Important studies are underway here in Toronto, and across North America, to determine whether we should do something about this longstanding city building tradition. Should we allow a mixture of different housing types in our residential neighborhoods, or should we keep things just the way that they are? That being low-rise and single-family.
In the meantime, we are implementing things like
inclusionary
zoning, which I guess makes some people feel better about themselves and the current state of affairs. But in the end, it sits very much on top of our exclusionary past.
Low-rise single-family home neighborhoods remain off limits. Apartments should only go in select locations (provided they don't bother the single-family homes). And any efforts to create greater affordability and diversity should only impact the new apartments and not the low-rise single-family homes that already exist.
I would encourage all of you to have a listen to 99% Percent Invisible's recent episode about Toronto's "missing middle." It does a great job explaining why Toronto looks and performs the way that it does today, and why it's time that we do something about it. It's also highly relevant to not just Toronto, but many cities across North America.
The "drive until you qualify" approach to finding housing that you can afford is a well established practice. Anecdotally, I can tell you that I have friends who are right now looking for a grade-related home under the C$1 million mark. This constraint, as most of you know, is pushing them to the outer reaches of Toronto's suburbs. But if it were up to them, it would be their preference to stay in the city. According to the "two millennials" behind The Habistat, the average distance of an entry level detached house from the Toronto core (defined as a 3 bed, 1 bath under $800,000) is now 81.8km.
There's a lot to be said about this. For one, home prices across many/most markets are way up. Earlier this week on the blog it was mentioned that the average price of a US home is up about 19% year-over-year. This is likely unsustainable. We are coming off of a period of easy money policies and at some point things will normalize along with the broader economy. Looking at the equity and crypto markets, it may be happening right now, but I don't really know. (Fred Wilson wrote a post last year calling this "one of the great asset bubbles of modern times.")
We know that the centralizing forces inherent to most cities have been weakened during this pandemic. For periods of time, they were completely off. So it is no surprise that we have seen greater decentralization (sprawl) than what might have ordinarily happened. I was in a (zoom) meeting this past week with somebody who has spent the last two years traveling around South America while working remotely. It sounded like a lot of fun and I was admittedly a little bit envious of her adventures. But as I argued at the beginning of this year, I think most people are going back to offices and this centralizing force will have an impact on real estate.
Because "driving until you qualify" is a function of an affordability constraint, it tells you certain things about consumer preference, but not all things. What I mean by this is that it tells you that somebody is willing to trade the cost of a commute for more space and/or the housing type of their choice. This has been an easier trade during COVID because the cost of commuting has been relatively -- albeit temporarily -- low for many people. So less of a discount for distance. But what I think this doesn't tell you is what true consumer preference would be if all things were more equal and we increased housing supply and options in other areas of our cities.
At the same time, there's a very real question of whether the measuring stick in the above chart should be a grade-related detached house? Is this a reasonable expectation in the same way it was for prior generations? I am not a fan of dictating what people should and shouldn't do. But maybe 100km away from the core becomes untenable. And again, maybe if we increased both supply and options, we would find new housing preferences revealing themselves. I am specifically thinking of those who would prefer to stay in the city, but can't find something they think is suitable.
At the end of the day, we can't ignore the fact that we are profoundly hypocritical when it comes to the delivery of new housing. We acknowledge that we're in a housing crisis and we acknowledge that we need more affordable housing (both for sale and for rent), and yet we continue to make it systematically more difficult and more expensive to deliver it. The development charges, parkland fees, and many other costs that continue to increase and get applied to new housing are a real worry to those in the industry.
It is a worry because we're all wondering how much price elasticity is left in the market. That is, how much more can consumers afford before they stop buying and renting? It is a worry because it means that new rental housing, which has always been a challenge to pencil in our market, is now completely infeasible in many more submarkets. Our solution to all of this is to mandate a certain number of affordable units in new developments. But this is yet another tax on new housing.
To be fair, the delivery of new housing is subject to countless competing interests. This is arguably why it is such a tricky problem to solve and why there are no easy answers. But that's what we do around here. We explore new ideas. And maybe, just maybe, there are other options besides just driving until you qualify. Next up (or soon up): A look at the competing interests behind new housing.
One company that came up during our discussion was not surprisingly Amazon.com. But the initial comment was that they don’t make any money. Fortunately for me I had just gone through a presentation by venture capitalist Benedict Evans the night before called: Mobile is eating the world. And so I pulled out my phone and presented this slide:
The fact that Amazon operates with basically no net income is on purpose. Look at their revenue growth! So I wouldn’t dismiss them as being a fad. They may only account for 1% of all US retail sales today, but I’d put money on that percentage growing.
The other reason I bring up Amazon is because, in some ways, I think of them as the online equivalent of a big box store. Just like a Walmart or Costco, where you can buy everything from tires to groceries to prescription drugs, I buy a lot of different things, besides just books, off of Amazon.com. You might do the same as well. And this is where I see the immediate threat to offline retailing and retail real estate: big box stores.
In the second half of the 20th century, big box stores were incredibly disruptive to the retail landscape (and to cities). They used cheap land on the outskirts of cities, cheap buildings, and economies of scale to offer rock bottom prices to consumers. The value proposition was about cheap, not about differentiation. But as cheap as they may be, the internet can still do it cheaper.
And retailers know this, which is why I think they all now sell groceries. Groceries have a very low online penetration. Basically everybody still buys groceries in-person. So if you offer that, you have a reason to draw people inside your store, where they will hopefully buy all the other stuff that they need. But as the online value proposition continues to get stronger, I think we’ll see many other, more significant, changes.
zoning, which I guess makes some people feel better about themselves and the current state of affairs. But in the end, it sits very much on top of our exclusionary past.
Low-rise single-family home neighborhoods remain off limits. Apartments should only go in select locations (provided they don't bother the single-family homes). And any efforts to create greater affordability and diversity should only impact the new apartments and not the low-rise single-family homes that already exist.
I would encourage all of you to have a listen to 99% Percent Invisible's recent episode about Toronto's "missing middle." It does a great job explaining why Toronto looks and performs the way that it does today, and why it's time that we do something about it. It's also highly relevant to not just Toronto, but many cities across North America.
The "drive until you qualify" approach to finding housing that you can afford is a well established practice. Anecdotally, I can tell you that I have friends who are right now looking for a grade-related home under the C$1 million mark. This constraint, as most of you know, is pushing them to the outer reaches of Toronto's suburbs. But if it were up to them, it would be their preference to stay in the city. According to the "two millennials" behind The Habistat, the average distance of an entry level detached house from the Toronto core (defined as a 3 bed, 1 bath under $800,000) is now 81.8km.
There's a lot to be said about this. For one, home prices across many/most markets are way up. Earlier this week on the blog it was mentioned that the average price of a US home is up about 19% year-over-year. This is likely unsustainable. We are coming off of a period of easy money policies and at some point things will normalize along with the broader economy. Looking at the equity and crypto markets, it may be happening right now, but I don't really know. (Fred Wilson wrote a post last year calling this "one of the great asset bubbles of modern times.")
We know that the centralizing forces inherent to most cities have been weakened during this pandemic. For periods of time, they were completely off. So it is no surprise that we have seen greater decentralization (sprawl) than what might have ordinarily happened. I was in a (zoom) meeting this past week with somebody who has spent the last two years traveling around South America while working remotely. It sounded like a lot of fun and I was admittedly a little bit envious of her adventures. But as I argued at the beginning of this year, I think most people are going back to offices and this centralizing force will have an impact on real estate.
Because "driving until you qualify" is a function of an affordability constraint, it tells you certain things about consumer preference, but not all things. What I mean by this is that it tells you that somebody is willing to trade the cost of a commute for more space and/or the housing type of their choice. This has been an easier trade during COVID because the cost of commuting has been relatively -- albeit temporarily -- low for many people. So less of a discount for distance. But what I think this doesn't tell you is what true consumer preference would be if all things were more equal and we increased housing supply and options in other areas of our cities.
At the same time, there's a very real question of whether the measuring stick in the above chart should be a grade-related detached house? Is this a reasonable expectation in the same way it was for prior generations? I am not a fan of dictating what people should and shouldn't do. But maybe 100km away from the core becomes untenable. And again, maybe if we increased both supply and options, we would find new housing preferences revealing themselves. I am specifically thinking of those who would prefer to stay in the city, but can't find something they think is suitable.
At the end of the day, we can't ignore the fact that we are profoundly hypocritical when it comes to the delivery of new housing. We acknowledge that we're in a housing crisis and we acknowledge that we need more affordable housing (both for sale and for rent), and yet we continue to make it systematically more difficult and more expensive to deliver it. The development charges, parkland fees, and many other costs that continue to increase and get applied to new housing are a real worry to those in the industry.
It is a worry because we're all wondering how much price elasticity is left in the market. That is, how much more can consumers afford before they stop buying and renting? It is a worry because it means that new rental housing, which has always been a challenge to pencil in our market, is now completely infeasible in many more submarkets. Our solution to all of this is to mandate a certain number of affordable units in new developments. But this is yet another tax on new housing.
To be fair, the delivery of new housing is subject to countless competing interests. This is arguably why it is such a tricky problem to solve and why there are no easy answers. But that's what we do around here. We explore new ideas. And maybe, just maybe, there are other options besides just driving until you qualify. Next up (or soon up): A look at the competing interests behind new housing.
One company that came up during our discussion was not surprisingly Amazon.com. But the initial comment was that they don’t make any money. Fortunately for me I had just gone through a presentation by venture capitalist Benedict Evans the night before called: Mobile is eating the world. And so I pulled out my phone and presented this slide:
The fact that Amazon operates with basically no net income is on purpose. Look at their revenue growth! So I wouldn’t dismiss them as being a fad. They may only account for 1% of all US retail sales today, but I’d put money on that percentage growing.
The other reason I bring up Amazon is because, in some ways, I think of them as the online equivalent of a big box store. Just like a Walmart or Costco, where you can buy everything from tires to groceries to prescription drugs, I buy a lot of different things, besides just books, off of Amazon.com. You might do the same as well. And this is where I see the immediate threat to offline retailing and retail real estate: big box stores.
In the second half of the 20th century, big box stores were incredibly disruptive to the retail landscape (and to cities). They used cheap land on the outskirts of cities, cheap buildings, and economies of scale to offer rock bottom prices to consumers. The value proposition was about cheap, not about differentiation. But as cheap as they may be, the internet can still do it cheaper.
And retailers know this, which is why I think they all now sell groceries. Groceries have a very low online penetration. Basically everybody still buys groceries in-person. So if you offer that, you have a reason to draw people inside your store, where they will hopefully buy all the other stuff that they need. But as the online value proposition continues to get stronger, I think we’ll see many other, more significant, changes.
