This Twitter thread by UC Davis Law Professor, Chris Elmendorf, is a good reminder that there can be a meaningful difference between actual completed homes and zoned land that might one day becoming new housing.

The point he makes is as follows: The state of California's housing needs allocation for the city of San Francisco is approximately 80,000 new homes over the next decade. In the past, cities could demonstrate that they were able to meet these targets through, as I understand it, some fairly loose assumptions. But more recently, amendments have made it such that the probability of new homes actually getting built needs to be considered.

San Francisco has been doing this and, according to Chris, the conclusion was that the city should upzone portions of the city -- primarily on the west side -- to allow for some 22,000 new homes. Sounds cool. But as part of this process, the city also hired an outside consultant to run indicative pro formas and assess overall development feasibility. This is what they found:

I haven't seen any of the actual numbers, but what this chart is saying is that nobody is going to develop on the west side of the city no matter what entitlements you put in place (tier 3 and tier 4 market areas). The only new development that is likely to take place is high-rise development over 24 storeys in the highest value submarkets (tier 1 and tier 2 market areas).

Based on this, the 22,000 new homes figure is probably closer to 0 new homes.

I watched a bit of the English leadership debate the other night. Eventually I got frustrated and went to bed, but I understand that housing affordability and overall affordability were important topics.

What is clear, to anyone who cares to look, is that in most big cities we are not building enough new housing. According to the above Economist article (linked in the above tweet), the "rich world" has seen new housing production drop by about 50% (relative to population) since the 1960s.

There are many reasons for this. But part of the problem is bureaucracy. Things move exceedingly slow. And another part of the problem is community opposition. Urban sprawl can be easier to swallow because there's an out-of-sight-out-of-mind phenomenon at work. Stuff may be happening, but it's not happening in my backyard.

But now that so much of what we do is centered around intensifying existing neighborhoods, we are faced with a battle between the incumbents (existing residents) and the future residents of a community that don't have nearly as much say -- if any at all.

What I like about the Economist article is their line of thinking for how to address this dynamic, which, at the end of the day, is rooted in what I will call expected selfishness.

The approach is around aligning incentives. How could we better structure the delivery of new housing so that more stakeholders stand to directly benefit? Because as we have seen with laneway housing here in Toronto, homeowners will gladly build in their backyard when they stand to benefit directly.

This recent article by Bloomberg CityLab, about "how California set off a backyard apartment boom," has some interesting stats about the extent in which accessory dwelling units (ADUs) are quickly being adopted and delivered across the state.

For one, a majority (87%) of jurisdictions have enacted at least one ordinance related to ADUs, though many have several. These policies might include everything from by-right zoning to some form of financial assistance if you build. Here is a graph showing the cities and counties that have created ADU ordinances since 2013:

All of this has translated into housing supply. In 2019, California homeowners brought over 12,000 accessory dwelling units to the market (based on permits issued). Though a relatively small quantity based on the state's overall housing deficit, this number is surely growing thanks to policies and programs, like this one here, that are working to remove the barriers to building.

For the full CityLab article, click here.