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Let's say that we have a piece of development land worth $100. That is the market value of the land based on its highest and best use at this particular point in time. Now let's assume that the land was just encumbered with a new burden: inclusionary zoning. All of a sudden there is now a requirement to make available X% of any residential units built at 50% of average market rents for the area.
Technically, the land is now worth less than $100. And there is a school of thought out there that, in instances like this one, the price of all land should automatically reset downward to offset and account for the inclusionary zoning burden. But as I have argued before on the blog, land prices tend to be fairly sticky, unless the owner is distressed and really needs to sell.
So what can often happen is that the land owner will stubbornly cling to the original $100 number. The thinking being, "I was once told that my land is worth $100 and so that's the minimum price I'm willing to accept." In this scenario, you may need a broad increase in rents in order for a transaction to occur. This way the market rate units might be able to fully subsidize these new affordable units, preserving any margins and justifying the original $100 number.
Of course, the impact of inclusionary zoning is a hotly debated topic and there are a number of variables to consider. And so I will leave it at that for today. The real purpose of this post is to consider another permutation. Let's once again say that we have a piece of development land worth $100. But instead of being owned by 13 siblings -- and 3 cousins that live abroad and can't be reached other than by fax -- it's owned by the government.
In this case, the government wants to sell the land and is considering two options. It can either (1) sell it for $100 and maximize immediate taxpayer revenue or (2) it can sell it for $80 with the condition that the buyer agree to deliver X% of affordable units (and a bunch of other goodies and positive externalities). I would also add that this fictitious town is experiencing what some might call a housing crisis.
If you were a private sector actor, you would probably choose option 1. You would take the additional $20 and retire to Florida (I'm off by a few zeros). But this is the government we're talking about and presumably the government is thinking about the broader public good. Which option do you think is better at maximizing that?
In June of this year, Sidewalk Labs released its draft Master Innovation and Development Plan (MIDP) for Toronto's eastern waterfront. I wrote about it here. It was a draft document that was subject to further discussion and refinement, with October 31, 2019 being an important deadline for a lot of that to happen.
Some of the critical issues included project scope (just Quayside?), the possibility of a Waterfront LRT (needs to happen), data governance (who owns and manages the data that will be generated by this new smart city?) and, of course, land value. How much is Quayside worth?
A number of these key issues have now been "realigned," including the land value piece. Waterfront Toronto and Sidewalks Labs have agreed on a fair market value of $590 million (before accounting for any investments that will be required in order to achieve Waterfront Toronto's goals).
For a summary of the critical issues and what has been agreed to, click here. With these items now firmed up, Waterfront Toronto's board voted unanimously to proceed to the next phase. The next critical date is March 31, 2020, which is when the project will seek final approval. Mark your calendars.
Yesterday I wrote about a new book that was just released called The Next Urban Renaissance.
The first essay in the book, written by Ingrid Gould Ellen of New York University, is centered around three ideas to help cities deal with the affordable housing problem. This is something that successful cities all around the world are grappling with.
The first idea is land-value taxation, which is also known as a “split-rate” tax. I’ve touched on land-value taxation before on ATC, but I never really dug into it. So this was a good reminder to do that.
The idea behind land-value taxation is to split property taxes into a land tax and an improvements tax (i.e. the building), and then shift more of the burden over to the land side. Economists tend to really like this model because taxing buildings/improvements can discourage property investment and development, whereas taxing land doesn’t impact supply. The supply of land is fixed.
So in the context of affordable housing, land-value taxation is thought to be a way to encourage more development and to increase the supply of new housing – which is usually a good way to keep home prices in check.
Here’s how Ingrid Gould Ellen described it:
…a land tax would discourage speculators from hoarding undeveloped land and incentivize them to develop their parcels to the full extent allowable. Regardless of whether a parcel sits vacant, houses a partially occupied, one-story retail strip, or holds a 30-story apartment tower, the annual tax bill would be the same. By switching to a land tax, a city could therefore increase the supply of housing and, by doing so, reduce prices across the board.
But I can’t help but wonder if this isn’t more applicable to cities or areas that are currently struggling to encourage development. For instance, would boom town Toronto really benefit (in terms of affordable housing) from a tax change that ends up encouraging more high-rise development?
It also strikes me as being exceptionally difficult to implement, particularly in city like Toronto that is growing and changing so quickly. Is it reasonable to ask the owner of a small downtown parking lot to being paying property taxes as if a 90 storey supertall had been built on top of it? Because that is the reality in some parts of this city.
And if we opted to phase in this new land tax, would it then become a game of arbitrage where developers look for properties with the lowest land taxes but the highest achievable densities?
Finally, I wonder if it wouldn’t exacerbate some of the problems that already exist in rapidly growing cities, one of which is the preservation of smaller heritage buildings in centrally located neighborhoods:
In the case of a split-rate tax, the losers will be owners of parcels with high land-to-building value ratios, or owners of small buildings on valuable, centrally located parcels, who will likely see an increase in their tax bills after the switch to a split-rate tax.
Land-value taxation is something that I’ve been thinking about for a number of months now. But I am struggling to come up with a decisive position. If you have any thoughts on this, it would be great to hear from you in the comments.
Let's say that we have a piece of development land worth $100. That is the market value of the land based on its highest and best use at this particular point in time. Now let's assume that the land was just encumbered with a new burden: inclusionary zoning. All of a sudden there is now a requirement to make available X% of any residential units built at 50% of average market rents for the area.
Technically, the land is now worth less than $100. And there is a school of thought out there that, in instances like this one, the price of all land should automatically reset downward to offset and account for the inclusionary zoning burden. But as I have argued before on the blog, land prices tend to be fairly sticky, unless the owner is distressed and really needs to sell.
So what can often happen is that the land owner will stubbornly cling to the original $100 number. The thinking being, "I was once told that my land is worth $100 and so that's the minimum price I'm willing to accept." In this scenario, you may need a broad increase in rents in order for a transaction to occur. This way the market rate units might be able to fully subsidize these new affordable units, preserving any margins and justifying the original $100 number.
Of course, the impact of inclusionary zoning is a hotly debated topic and there are a number of variables to consider. And so I will leave it at that for today. The real purpose of this post is to consider another permutation. Let's once again say that we have a piece of development land worth $100. But instead of being owned by 13 siblings -- and 3 cousins that live abroad and can't be reached other than by fax -- it's owned by the government.
In this case, the government wants to sell the land and is considering two options. It can either (1) sell it for $100 and maximize immediate taxpayer revenue or (2) it can sell it for $80 with the condition that the buyer agree to deliver X% of affordable units (and a bunch of other goodies and positive externalities). I would also add that this fictitious town is experiencing what some might call a housing crisis.
If you were a private sector actor, you would probably choose option 1. You would take the additional $20 and retire to Florida (I'm off by a few zeros). But this is the government we're talking about and presumably the government is thinking about the broader public good. Which option do you think is better at maximizing that?
In June of this year, Sidewalk Labs released its draft Master Innovation and Development Plan (MIDP) for Toronto's eastern waterfront. I wrote about it here. It was a draft document that was subject to further discussion and refinement, with October 31, 2019 being an important deadline for a lot of that to happen.
Some of the critical issues included project scope (just Quayside?), the possibility of a Waterfront LRT (needs to happen), data governance (who owns and manages the data that will be generated by this new smart city?) and, of course, land value. How much is Quayside worth?
A number of these key issues have now been "realigned," including the land value piece. Waterfront Toronto and Sidewalks Labs have agreed on a fair market value of $590 million (before accounting for any investments that will be required in order to achieve Waterfront Toronto's goals).
For a summary of the critical issues and what has been agreed to, click here. With these items now firmed up, Waterfront Toronto's board voted unanimously to proceed to the next phase. The next critical date is March 31, 2020, which is when the project will seek final approval. Mark your calendars.
Yesterday I wrote about a new book that was just released called The Next Urban Renaissance.
The first essay in the book, written by Ingrid Gould Ellen of New York University, is centered around three ideas to help cities deal with the affordable housing problem. This is something that successful cities all around the world are grappling with.
The first idea is land-value taxation, which is also known as a “split-rate” tax. I’ve touched on land-value taxation before on ATC, but I never really dug into it. So this was a good reminder to do that.
The idea behind land-value taxation is to split property taxes into a land tax and an improvements tax (i.e. the building), and then shift more of the burden over to the land side. Economists tend to really like this model because taxing buildings/improvements can discourage property investment and development, whereas taxing land doesn’t impact supply. The supply of land is fixed.
So in the context of affordable housing, land-value taxation is thought to be a way to encourage more development and to increase the supply of new housing – which is usually a good way to keep home prices in check.
Here’s how Ingrid Gould Ellen described it:
…a land tax would discourage speculators from hoarding undeveloped land and incentivize them to develop their parcels to the full extent allowable. Regardless of whether a parcel sits vacant, houses a partially occupied, one-story retail strip, or holds a 30-story apartment tower, the annual tax bill would be the same. By switching to a land tax, a city could therefore increase the supply of housing and, by doing so, reduce prices across the board.
But I can’t help but wonder if this isn’t more applicable to cities or areas that are currently struggling to encourage development. For instance, would boom town Toronto really benefit (in terms of affordable housing) from a tax change that ends up encouraging more high-rise development?
It also strikes me as being exceptionally difficult to implement, particularly in city like Toronto that is growing and changing so quickly. Is it reasonable to ask the owner of a small downtown parking lot to being paying property taxes as if a 90 storey supertall had been built on top of it? Because that is the reality in some parts of this city.
And if we opted to phase in this new land tax, would it then become a game of arbitrage where developers look for properties with the lowest land taxes but the highest achievable densities?
Finally, I wonder if it wouldn’t exacerbate some of the problems that already exist in rapidly growing cities, one of which is the preservation of smaller heritage buildings in centrally located neighborhoods:
In the case of a split-rate tax, the losers will be owners of parcels with high land-to-building value ratios, or owners of small buildings on valuable, centrally located parcels, who will likely see an increase in their tax bills after the switch to a split-rate tax.
Land-value taxation is something that I’ve been thinking about for a number of months now. But I am struggling to come up with a decisive position. If you have any thoughts on this, it would be great to hear from you in the comments.
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