As we have talked about many times before, the best answer to this question is that it's worth whatever money is left in your pro forma once you've accounted for everything else. This is what is called the "residual claimant" in a development model. And it means you start with your revenue, you deduct all project costs, including whatever profit you and your investors need to make in order to take on the risk of the development, and then whatever is left can go to pay for the land.

This is the most prudent way to value development land; but of course, in practice, it doesn't always work this way. In a bull market, the correct answer to my question might be, "whatever most market participants are willing to pay." And sometimes/oftentimes, this number will be greater than what your model is telling you, meaning you'll need to be more aggressive on your assumptions if you too want to participate. (Not development advice.)

Given that determining the value of land starts with revenue, one way to do a very crude gut check is to look at the relationship between land cost and revenue. This is sometimes called a land-to-revenue ratio. And historically, for new condominiums in Toronto, you wanted a ratio that was no greater than 10%. Meaning, if the most you could sell condominiums for was $1,000 psf, then the most you could afford to pay for land was $100 per buildable square foot.

However, this is, again, a very crude rule of thumb. I would say that it's only really interesting to look at this after the fact. Because in reality, things never work this cleanly. For one thing, there is always a cost floor. Don't, for example, think you can buy land in Toronto for $80 pbsf and sell condominiums for $800 psf, because this will not be enough to cover all of your costs. You will lose money.

Secondly, there are countless variables that have a huge impact on the value of development land. Things like a high required parking ratio, development charges and other city fees, inclusionary zoning, and so on. All of these items are real costs in a development model, and so they will need to be paid for somehow.

Typically this happens by way of higher revenues (in a rising market), a lower land cost (in a sinking market), or some combination of the two. But in all of these cases, it means your land-to-revenue ratio must come down to maintain project feasibility. This is why suburban development sites typically have a lower ratio -- too much loss-leading parking, among other things.

Of course, there are also instances where the correct answer could be a land-to-revenue ratio approaching zero, or even a negative number. In this latter case, it means your projected revenues aren't enough to cover all of your other costs, excluding land. For anyone to build, they will require some form of subsidy. And this is basically the case with every affordable housing project. They don't pencil on their own. (For a concrete example of this, look to the US and their Low-Income Housing Tax Credits.)

So once again, the moral of this story is that the best way to think about the value of development land is to think of it as "whatever money is left in the pro forma once you've accounted for everything else." Because sometimes there will be money there, and sometimes there won't be.

Photo by Jannes Glas on Unsplash

One of the things that you'll notice on real estate listings in France is an Energy Performance Diagnostics (EPD) rating. In French, it gets reversed, and so it's a DPE (diagnostic de performance énergétique). What it tells you is how much energy the dwelling (or building) consumes and how much greenhouse gas it emits. And it is a requirement on all real estate listings and for all dwellings, except those that are occupied for less than 4 months per year. The output of this diagnostic is a rating from A (best) to G (worst).

According to FT, this is how primary residences in France rank today:

Less than 5% of homes are rated A and B (the most energy efficient). And many more are rated G and F. Beyond just being energy inefficient, this is potentially a problem because there are penalties and restrictions for the lowest rated homes, one of which is that you are not allowed to rent out the property. Right now and as of January 1 of this year, the upper consumption limit is 450 kWh per square meter per year. Go above this and the home becomes ineligible.

This number is also planned to reduce over time:

• January 1, 2023: Rental ban on properties with G+ energy label

• January 1, 2025: Rental ban on all properties with G energy label

• January 1, 2028: Rental ban on all properties with F energy label

• January 1, 2034: Rental ban on all properties with E energy label

Now here's what this is thought to mean for overall rental supply:

By 2028, 5.2mn homes rated F and G, or 17 per cent of total housing stock, will become ineligible for rental. By 2034, all E properties will also be excluded, amounting to about 40 per cent of homes.

This raises an interesting question: Is it more important to have energy-efficient homes or to have greater overall supply? Now obviously the goal and ideal scenario is both; lots of affordable homes that are also energy efficient. And presumably, one of the objectives of this rental ban is to stick/carrot owners into investing in energy measures. But it's not exactly obvious as to how many owners will be able to renovate their homes in time, and how many homes will become ineligible for rent. This will be an interesting policy to watch as it plays out.

Last week we spoke about how many businesses don't want to own their own real estate, but that some do. We then spoke about Prada's recent acquisition of 720 and 724 Fifth Avenue for $835 million. However, they're not the only ones. According to New York's The Real Deal (thank you John Bell for the article), last year saw the following transactions:

• Swiss fashion house Akris bought a property from SL Green for $40.6 million

• Japanese coffee retailer Geshary bought a property on Fifth Avenue from the Riese Organization for $38 million

• And Dyson bought a building in Soho for $60 million

Now, some, or a lot of this, is strategic. New York is New York, and global brands need to be there. Another part of this is that there was less competition last year. Fewer real estate companies wanted to buy retail and office buildings, and so end users seem to have stepped in at what they presumably saw as favourable prices.

But it's also not totally foreign for retailers to want to own their own real estate. Perhaps the most famous example is McDonald's, which owns its own real estate and then leases it out to franchisees. Though as I alluded to last week, it's important to know what business you're ultimately in. And McDonald's knows it's in the real estate business.