In this last one, he specifically talks about things like price gouging (starting with the grocery industry) and apartment rent controls. Each is worth a full read when you have the time, but here I'll leave you all with a few city building-related thoughts.
In this last one, he specifically talks about things like price gouging (starting with the grocery industry) and apartment rent controls. Each is worth a full read when you have the time, but here I'll leave you all with a few city building-related thoughts.
Marks describes economics as the study of choice. And within these choices, there are many complicated moving pieces and second-order consequences. Take, for example, rent control in New York City. What rent control does is stop the free market from being able to freely set rents. The result:
A person in favor of this arrangement would argue that it maintains affordability and diversity. What it means in purely economic terms is that some people who couldn’t afford to live in New York City if rents were set by free-market forces are able to live there if they’re lucky enough to secure an apartment with regulated rent. But other people who would like to live in New York City and can afford higher rents can’t do so because there are no apartments for them. And lastly, landlords that have apartments that are somehow unregulated can command higher rents than would be the case if additions to the supply of apartments weren’t being discouraged. It’s a matter of personal philosophy whether this is good or bad. But clearly, the laws of economics and the actions of free markets aren’t at work in New York City. Someone in government is making the decisions.
Much like inclusionary zoning in the case of new housing, the tradeoffs with regulated rents are that you get (1) less overall housing supply and (2) more expensive prices for the people that can pay market rents.
You could argue, as Marks suggests, that these are acceptable outcomes; but regardless of your opinion, there are real consequences to this policy decision. There's no such thing as a "free lunch" in economics, and consequently there's no such thing as no-cost affordable housing. The question is: Who pays?
Going back to the topic of traffic congestion from yesterday's post, Toronto's general reluctance to implement any form of road or congestion pricing is also an economic choice. We have priced our roads so cheaply that demand is always going to outstrip supply. And this is expected. What we are experiencing today is a natural market outcome.
Targeting bike lanes as part of the problem is meant to counter this by increasing road supply. Less bike lanes means more space for cars, right? But the second-order consequence of this choice is that you push people off their bikes (which take up less road space) and into cars (which take up more road space). So demand is also likely to increase.
The stark reality of solving traffic congestion is that it will require greater change. It will mean fewer people driving, more people taking transit and biking, and the people who do continue to drive will have to pay more for it.
Of course, this is not what any politician wants to talk about. As Marks says: "In the world of politics, there can be limitless benefits and something for everyone. But in economics, there are only tradeoffs." The tradeoff we have decided to make is cheap roads in exchange for crippling traffic congestion.
Over the weekend, we spoke about how the "GTA condo market is in a state of economic lockdown." What this generally means is that the math isn't making sense to build new condominiums. And so the market is necessarily pausing.
We spoke about what this will likely mean for supply in the coming years, but I think it's also interesting to talk about this in the context of something else: unfunded inclusionary zoning.
As a reminder, inclusionary zoning is, in its most basic form, a requirement to build a certain amount of affordable housing as part of new housing developments. And what I mean by "unfunded" is that there are no subsidies or other incentives being provided to the project.
This means that the cost of providing this housing -- and there is an additional cost -- needs to be shouldered by the project, which ultimately means the market-rate units need to pay for it.
Which is why if you look at most policy studies, you'll often find recognition that, because of this economic reality, IZ tends to work better in areas where home prices/rents are higher. And again, that's because the market-rate homes need to shoulder the cost.
We have questioned, many times, on this blog, whether this is the right approach to delivering affordable housing, but I think this question becomes even more critical in our current market environment.
If the entire market is, for the most part, in a state of economic lockdown, should we really be layering on additional costs and making it broadly more difficult to build any sort of new housing? It seems counterintuitive.
Montreal has a bylaw that came into effect on April 1, 2021 and that requires developers to contribute to the city's supply of social, affordable, and family housing. (All three of these have their own definition.)
Developers can meet this requirement in a number of different ways:
They can build the social, affordable, and/or family housing
They can contribute land or a building
Or they can pay cash-in-lieu
Usually, I think of inclusionary zoning as being the first of these three bullet points: a hard requirement to build a certain amount of non-market housing. That is not an absolute requirement here, and so I see this policy as being IZ lite.
Since the bylaw came into force, there have been approximately 150 new projects by private developers in Montreal, according to this CBC article. That has resulted in about 7,100 new market-rate homes. At the same time, it has resulted in exactly zero non-market homes.
From what I can tell from the article, every single developer has opted for option three: pay the cash-in-lieu instead of actually building the housing. Supposedly this has produced about $24.5 million in new fees, which sounds like a lot. But if you divide it by 7,100 homes, it isn't all that much: just under $3,500 for each new home.
So what is clear is that this is the least expensive option. That's why everybody is choosing it. If the fee was significantly higher and it was cheaper to just build the social/affordable/family housing, then every developer would just do that. This is how development pro formas work.
But at the end of the day, we are still taxing new housing and new home consumers for the purpose of trying to create a smidgen of more affordable housing. And this has never sat well with me, especially considering that there are plenty of other things that we could be doing to make new housing more affordable for everyone.
Marks describes economics as the study of choice. And within these choices, there are many complicated moving pieces and second-order consequences. Take, for example, rent control in New York City. What rent control does is stop the free market from being able to freely set rents. The result:
A person in favor of this arrangement would argue that it maintains affordability and diversity. What it means in purely economic terms is that some people who couldn’t afford to live in New York City if rents were set by free-market forces are able to live there if they’re lucky enough to secure an apartment with regulated rent. But other people who would like to live in New York City and can afford higher rents can’t do so because there are no apartments for them. And lastly, landlords that have apartments that are somehow unregulated can command higher rents than would be the case if additions to the supply of apartments weren’t being discouraged. It’s a matter of personal philosophy whether this is good or bad. But clearly, the laws of economics and the actions of free markets aren’t at work in New York City. Someone in government is making the decisions.
Much like inclusionary zoning in the case of new housing, the tradeoffs with regulated rents are that you get (1) less overall housing supply and (2) more expensive prices for the people that can pay market rents.
You could argue, as Marks suggests, that these are acceptable outcomes; but regardless of your opinion, there are real consequences to this policy decision. There's no such thing as a "free lunch" in economics, and consequently there's no such thing as no-cost affordable housing. The question is: Who pays?
Going back to the topic of traffic congestion from yesterday's post, Toronto's general reluctance to implement any form of road or congestion pricing is also an economic choice. We have priced our roads so cheaply that demand is always going to outstrip supply. And this is expected. What we are experiencing today is a natural market outcome.
Targeting bike lanes as part of the problem is meant to counter this by increasing road supply. Less bike lanes means more space for cars, right? But the second-order consequence of this choice is that you push people off their bikes (which take up less road space) and into cars (which take up more road space). So demand is also likely to increase.
The stark reality of solving traffic congestion is that it will require greater change. It will mean fewer people driving, more people taking transit and biking, and the people who do continue to drive will have to pay more for it.
Of course, this is not what any politician wants to talk about. As Marks says: "In the world of politics, there can be limitless benefits and something for everyone. But in economics, there are only tradeoffs." The tradeoff we have decided to make is cheap roads in exchange for crippling traffic congestion.
Over the weekend, we spoke about how the "GTA condo market is in a state of economic lockdown." What this generally means is that the math isn't making sense to build new condominiums. And so the market is necessarily pausing.
We spoke about what this will likely mean for supply in the coming years, but I think it's also interesting to talk about this in the context of something else: unfunded inclusionary zoning.
As a reminder, inclusionary zoning is, in its most basic form, a requirement to build a certain amount of affordable housing as part of new housing developments. And what I mean by "unfunded" is that there are no subsidies or other incentives being provided to the project.
This means that the cost of providing this housing -- and there is an additional cost -- needs to be shouldered by the project, which ultimately means the market-rate units need to pay for it.
Which is why if you look at most policy studies, you'll often find recognition that, because of this economic reality, IZ tends to work better in areas where home prices/rents are higher. And again, that's because the market-rate homes need to shoulder the cost.
We have questioned, many times, on this blog, whether this is the right approach to delivering affordable housing, but I think this question becomes even more critical in our current market environment.
If the entire market is, for the most part, in a state of economic lockdown, should we really be layering on additional costs and making it broadly more difficult to build any sort of new housing? It seems counterintuitive.
Montreal has a bylaw that came into effect on April 1, 2021 and that requires developers to contribute to the city's supply of social, affordable, and family housing. (All three of these have their own definition.)
Developers can meet this requirement in a number of different ways:
They can build the social, affordable, and/or family housing
They can contribute land or a building
Or they can pay cash-in-lieu
Usually, I think of inclusionary zoning as being the first of these three bullet points: a hard requirement to build a certain amount of non-market housing. That is not an absolute requirement here, and so I see this policy as being IZ lite.
Since the bylaw came into force, there have been approximately 150 new projects by private developers in Montreal, according to this CBC article. That has resulted in about 7,100 new market-rate homes. At the same time, it has resulted in exactly zero non-market homes.
From what I can tell from the article, every single developer has opted for option three: pay the cash-in-lieu instead of actually building the housing. Supposedly this has produced about $24.5 million in new fees, which sounds like a lot. But if you divide it by 7,100 homes, it isn't all that much: just under $3,500 for each new home.
So what is clear is that this is the least expensive option. That's why everybody is choosing it. If the fee was significantly higher and it was cheaper to just build the social/affordable/family housing, then every developer would just do that. This is how development pro formas work.
But at the end of the day, we are still taxing new housing and new home consumers for the purpose of trying to create a smidgen of more affordable housing. And this has never sat well with me, especially considering that there are plenty of other things that we could be doing to make new housing more affordable for everyone.
