Let's say that we have a piece of development land worth $100. That is the market value of the land based on its highest and best use at this particular point in time. Now let's assume that the land was just encumbered with a new burden: inclusionary zoning. All of a sudden there is now a requirement to make available X% of any residential units built at 50% of average market rents for the area.

Technically, the land is now worth less than $100. And there is a school of thought out there that, in instances like this one, the price of all land should automatically reset downward to offset and account for the inclusionary zoning burden. But as I have argued before on the blog, land prices tend to be fairly sticky, unless the owner is distressed and really needs to sell.

So what can often happen is that the land owner will stubbornly cling to the original $100 number. The thinking being, "I was once told that my land is worth $100 and so that's the minimum price I'm willing to accept." In this scenario, you may need a broad increase in rents in order for a transaction to occur. This way the market rate units might be able to fully subsidize these new affordable units, preserving any margins and justifying the original $100 number.

Of course, the impact of inclusionary zoning is a hotly debated topic and there are a number of variables to consider. And so I will leave it at that for today. The real purpose of this post is to consider another permutation. Let's once again say that we have a piece of development land worth $100. But instead of being owned by 13 siblings -- and 3 cousins that live abroad and can't be reached other than by fax -- it's owned by the government.

In this case, the government wants to sell the land and is considering two options. It can either (1) sell it for $100 and maximize immediate taxpayer revenue or (2) it can sell it for $80 with the condition that the buyer agree to deliver X% of affordable units (and a bunch of other goodies and positive externalities). I would also add that this fictitious town is experiencing what some might call a housing crisis.

If you were a private sector actor, you would probably choose option 1. You would take the additional $20 and retire to Florida (I'm off by a few zeros). But this is the government we're talking about and presumably the government is thinking about the broader public good. Which option do you think is better at maximizing that?

Developing a building can often feel like you're trying to solve a rubik's cube. Among other things, you have to manage a myriad of different stakeholders, all of which -- naturally -- operate in their own self-interest. There's the city, community, politicians, various agencies, consultants, tenants, purchasers, lenders, investors, the market at large (of which you really have no control of), and many others. Oftentimes you even have stakeholders whose interests are mutually exclusive. Indeed, the things that they want can sometimes be at odds with each other. Your job is to figure out a solution that satisfies as many of these interests as possible.

To give you an example, let's say that you've been asked to introduce a stepback into your building in order to break up the elevation. From an urban design standpoint, this may make perfect sense. Hello, datum line. But now your construction costs just went up. You have to transfer your mechanical lines, insulate the roof, introduce new bulkheads, and, for the purposes of this example, let's say you now need to introduce a structural transfer. This is big cost item that you hadn't accounted for. And because you just reduced the height of the building to satisfy another stakeholder, you don't have the excess clear height to accommodate the additional depth required by this new structural element. There is, of course, always a solution. But usually something will need to give.

At the same time, this raises some interesting philosophical questions. What's more important in this example? The urban design move or keeping construction costs low so that the building can be delivered more affordably? The cynics will argue that this is a moot point because developers will always profit maximize. But I would encourage you to check out some of my past posts, such as "Cost-plus pricing" and "The impact of inclusionary zoning on development feasibility." This problem solving dynamic is one of the things that makes development so challenging. But it is also one of the things that makes it incredibly rewarding.

Photo by Ivan Bandura on Unsplash

On February 1, 2017, an inclusionary zoning ordinance came into effect in Portland, mandating that all new residential projects with 20 or more units dedicate a portion of the building to affordable housing. For the first year, the requirement was 8% of all units for households earning 60% of the Area Median Income or 16% of all units for households earning 80% of the AMI. I'm not sure if it was or is possible to do a blend of the two income levels. After the first year, the requirement was supposed to step up to 10% and 20% of all units, respectively. But that step up was never enacted, which had many industry analysts arguing that it was a clear signal the ordinance was not performing as intended. According to Joe Cortright of City Observatory (which is based in Portland), the new ordinance largely resulted in 3 things happening: (1) Developers rushed to get new applications in during the transition period so that they would not be subjected to the new IZ rules; (2) applications increased for projects with less than 20 units (avoid the rules by building smaller); and (3), following the initial transition surge, building permit applications, as a whole, dropped off. This last point is what usually comes up in debates around inclusionary zoning. Does the requirement to build affordable housing actually reduce overall housing supply? I've written about this before, but the math is pretty simple. Inclusionary zoning policies are a drag on revenue and a direct cost to the project. What that means is that something else will need to give in order for the numbers to balance. That could come in the form of lower costs (such as an impact fee abatement) or in higher rents on the balance of the units. But this latter approach is easier said than done. Sometimes you need to wait for the market to "catch up", which could be what some developers in Portland are doing. They're waiting for housing to get more expensive -- overall -- so they can then offset the pro forma drag from the affordable units.