Development charges are a topic that is near and dear to this blog.
In theory, development charges are supposed to be "growth paying for growth." In other words, they are intended to pay for the incremental services and infrastructure required strictly because of new development. This, of course, sounds right. More people will equal more demand on city services.
However, development charges also increase the cost of new homes and there is a growing concern that development charges now pay for more than they should. Meaning, they have become a "housing tax", which is more or less the opposite of what you want if you think there's a shortage of new homes.
Part of the challenge, I think, is that city budgets are complicated. As far as I know, it's largely impossible for the average person to try and figure out which municipal costs are associated with growth and which are associated with ongoing operations (i.e. they should be paid for through things like property taxes).
That said, I think this current market environment could create a bit of a litmus test for development charges.
Development charges are a topic that is near and dear to this blog.
In theory, development charges are supposed to be "growth paying for growth." In other words, they are intended to pay for the incremental services and infrastructure required strictly because of new development. This, of course, sounds right. More people will equal more demand on city services.
However, development charges also increase the cost of new homes and there is a growing concern that development charges now pay for more than they should. Meaning, they have become a "housing tax", which is more or less the opposite of what you want if you think there's a shortage of new homes.
Part of the challenge, I think, is that city budgets are complicated. As far as I know, it's largely impossible for the average person to try and figure out which municipal costs are associated with growth and which are associated with ongoing operations (i.e. they should be paid for through things like property taxes).
That said, I think this current market environment could create a bit of a litmus test for development charges.
As most of you know
, new home sales in Toronto have fallen to levels not seen since the global financial crisis and the early 90s.
This means that construction activity has now also fallen and that, in turn, fewer developers are paying development charges. I haven't seen the exact numbers, but intuitively the drop in development charges paid should be precipitous.
Now, if these charges are strictly paying for growth, then in theory, cities should be completely agnostic to this decline. Sure, they're collecting less revenue, but they also don't have the new growth. Any growth that is still in the pipeline (i.e. under construction) would have already paid for their impacts.
However, if this is not the case, and municipal budgets start getting negatively impacted by this drop in development charge revenue, then it suggests that one of two things could be going on.
Either development charges aren't enough to cover the true cost of growth and the whole thing is a bit of a Ponzi scheme. That is, we need a constant flow of new developments to pay for the shortfalls of the last. Or, we're overtaxing new homebuyers for the benefit of incumbent ratepayers.
I'm sure it's more complicated than I'm making it seem right now. But this is the crux of this debate: Are we equitably levying development charges on new homes? This current market could offer a clue. If cities start running out of money, it might suggest the answer is no.
Deeply affordable housing is mostly infeasible to build.
This is why you don't see the market naturally building this kind of housing on its own. It, for the most part, doesn't make any economic sense to do so. So this is also why the US has fabricated things like low-income housing tax credits. They are a way to make up the economic shortfall that exists with low-income rental housing and get the private sector building this kind of housing.
We sometimes try to convince ourselves -- or maybe it is a way of shirking responsibility -- that there can be such a thing as no-cost affordable housing through things like inclusionary zoning. But I think we all know that there's no such thing as a free lunch. Somebody is ultimately going to need to pay. The big question, of course, is who should that be?
By definition, we acknowledge that the people who will ultimately live in these affordable homes cannot afford to pay market rates. So by default, the subsidies will need come from somewhere else. But again, from where and from who? Should it be specific people who pay or should it be mostly everyone who pays?
If we return to the Toronto building industry's favorite topic right now --
As most of you know
, new home sales in Toronto have fallen to levels not seen since the global financial crisis and the early 90s.
This means that construction activity has now also fallen and that, in turn, fewer developers are paying development charges. I haven't seen the exact numbers, but intuitively the drop in development charges paid should be precipitous.
Now, if these charges are strictly paying for growth, then in theory, cities should be completely agnostic to this decline. Sure, they're collecting less revenue, but they also don't have the new growth. Any growth that is still in the pipeline (i.e. under construction) would have already paid for their impacts.
However, if this is not the case, and municipal budgets start getting negatively impacted by this drop in development charge revenue, then it suggests that one of two things could be going on.
Either development charges aren't enough to cover the true cost of growth and the whole thing is a bit of a Ponzi scheme. That is, we need a constant flow of new developments to pay for the shortfalls of the last. Or, we're overtaxing new homebuyers for the benefit of incumbent ratepayers.
I'm sure it's more complicated than I'm making it seem right now. But this is the crux of this debate: Are we equitably levying development charges on new homes? This current market could offer a clue. If cities start running out of money, it might suggest the answer is no.
Deeply affordable housing is mostly infeasible to build.
This is why you don't see the market naturally building this kind of housing on its own. It, for the most part, doesn't make any economic sense to do so. So this is also why the US has fabricated things like low-income housing tax credits. They are a way to make up the economic shortfall that exists with low-income rental housing and get the private sector building this kind of housing.
We sometimes try to convince ourselves -- or maybe it is a way of shirking responsibility -- that there can be such a thing as no-cost affordable housing through things like inclusionary zoning. But I think we all know that there's no such thing as a free lunch. Somebody is ultimately going to need to pay. The big question, of course, is who should that be?
By definition, we acknowledge that the people who will ultimately live in these affordable homes cannot afford to pay market rates. So by default, the subsidies will need come from somewhere else. But again, from where and from who? Should it be specific people who pay or should it be mostly everyone who pays?
If we return to the Toronto building industry's favorite topic right now --
In the wake of Bill 23, there has been a lot of discussion and concern around development charges and parkland dedication revenues. At a high level, the concern is that the proposed changes will reduce the amount of money that cities are able to collect from developers, and that this will exacerbate any existing funding shortfalls and possibly force municipalities to do things like raise property taxes. In the case of Toronto, the estimated figure is about $230 million of lost revenue per year.
For all intents and purposes, this is objectively true. Bill 23 includes changes that will reduce the amount of revenue that cities are able to collect when new stuff is being built. Here is one such example:
New sections 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 provide, respectively, for exemptions from development charges for the creation of affordable residential units and attainable residential units, for non-profit housing developments and for inclusionary zoning residential units.
This makes for great headline fodder: "Bill 23 is bad, it is going to reduce city revenues by $X million, your property taxes may need to go up, so you should be deeply upset about this." Hmm. We should talk about this. I'm not going to suggest that Bill 23 is entirely perfect. But I do think it is important to consider two important facts when it comes to things like development charges.
Firstly, the above exemption (to use just one example) is specifically related to affordable and attainable housing. It is not a reduction in DCs for the sake of reducing DCs. It is an attempt to recognize that we need more affordable/attainable housing and so maybe we should do things that make it easier and less costly to build it. And this brings me back to a point that I frequently make on this blog, which is that we can talk all we want about the need for more affordable housing, but at the end of the day it comes back to this: Who is going to pay for it? There is no such thing as a free lunch.
The common rebuttal to exemptions like this is that developers will always profit maximize and price their housing at the most the market will bear. In other words, there is no evidence that developers will pass on any cost savings to the end consumer. But this is not entirely true. For developers, pricing a project is typically a cost-plus exercise: how much is this going to cost to build and what do I need in revenue in order to hit my required returns?
When costs go down, it reduces what you need to make a project feasible. This in turn reduces developer risk, because there is always a very real question of absorption. The more you push pricing, the more you slow market absorption. So you might actually be better off selling for less, more quickly. An example of this line of thinking is when condominium developers choose to sell 100% of their inventory upfront as opposed to holding some back with the expectation that prices will increase in the future. Doing this means that you value certainty over profit maximization.
Development charges are fees collected from developers at the time a building permit to help pay for the cost of infrastructure required to provide municipal services to new development, such as roads, transit, water and sewer infrastructure, community centres and fire and police facilities.
Put differently, development charges are based on the idea that growth should pay for growth. When you build something new you create additional servicing demands, and so developers should pay for whatever incremental needs their projects are creating. This is, of course, fair. However, it is not the intent that growth pays for existing services. i.e. Ones that would be required regardless of whether there was the presence of development.
So in theory, if new development were to shut off entirely and if development charge revenue were to go to $0, there shouldn't be any issues funding the existing services. And in theory, nobody should be complaining about this lost revenue, because there is actually no need for this additional revenue. There is no growth to fund and all existing services are being adequately funded by the residents who are already there and using them.
Of course, not all city services are self sustaining. Public transit, for instance, typically requires subsidies. Ridership fares aren't enough to pay for operations, and this shortfall got understandably a lot worse during the pandemic. But is this a growth-related problem or is it an existing-resident problem? I mean, technically the problem is notenough riders. So isn't that kind of the opposite of growth related? More people would be a benefit right now.
In any event, the point I am raising today is that there is a right way and a wrong way to complain about lost development charge revenue. The wrong way is thinking, "ah, this lost revenue is going to impact my quality of life and the existing city services that I enjoy. I may have to pay higher property taxes." The relevant points for this particular discussion should not be that there's an operating budget shortfall or that existing taxpayers maybe can't afford to pay.
The more valid way to complain would be to say, "hey, these reduced development charges are going to make it difficult to fund the growth-related upgrades needed to support new and more housing in my community. And we need more housing!" Because if the concern is not actually this second one, then the headlines are a great big red herring. We have a larger financial problem on our hands that we are not speaking about.
-- you'll see that under the current rates, every new 2 bedroom or larger apartment that is constructed must pay $3,727 toward affordable housing. Under the proposed rates, this will increase to $12,545 for every new large apartment. It's by far the largest proposed percentage increase (237%) and also one of the largest service items.
This raises two interesting philosophical questions.
One, should the buyers of new housing be responsible for contributing to affordable housing in this way? Because what we are in effect saying to these people is, "Hey, you can afford to buy a new market rate home, so we're going to collect some additional money from you -- $12,545 to be exact -- so that we can try and help those that aren't in the same position as you. We're also going to mandate additional affordable homes within your building and we'd like you to subsidize those too." This is one way to redistribute wealth.
But if the goal is to try and create more broad-based affordability, an alternative approach might be, "Hey, you already own a home and it has gone up a lot in value, so we're going to collect some additional money from you over time so that we can try and help those that aren't in the same position as you." This would be the property tax approach. It's probably not perfect, but might it be a more fair and equitable way to redistribute wealth?
The second interesting philosophical question has to do with whether this is consistent with the dogma that growth should pay for growth. The idea behind development charges (also known as impact fees in some parts of the world) is that they should pay for the cost of new development. This makes complete sense. When you build new housing you certainly need some additional stuff -- everything from additional school capacity to emergency services.
But the question here is whether the construction of new housing in and of itself creates a direct need for more affordable housing, and therefore should be charged for it. Asked in the opposite way, if you weren't building this new housing, would you then no longer need this affordable housing, just like you no longer need that additional school capacity?
This is definitely not the case. In fact, I would argue that the opposite is true. If you don't build any new housing in a growing city, you actually exacerbate the problem of affordability. So here's a provocative thought. Rather than a charge, should this affordable housing line item actually be a credit towards each new project given that it benefits affordability?
While it may not make any economic sense to build affordable housing, I think that many of us would agree that it makes a lot of social sense to build affordable housing. We know that our cities are at their best when they are both diverse and inclusive. The problem is that we can't agree on who should pay for it.
In the wake of Bill 23, there has been a lot of discussion and concern around development charges and parkland dedication revenues. At a high level, the concern is that the proposed changes will reduce the amount of money that cities are able to collect from developers, and that this will exacerbate any existing funding shortfalls and possibly force municipalities to do things like raise property taxes. In the case of Toronto, the estimated figure is about $230 million of lost revenue per year.
For all intents and purposes, this is objectively true. Bill 23 includes changes that will reduce the amount of revenue that cities are able to collect when new stuff is being built. Here is one such example:
New sections 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 provide, respectively, for exemptions from development charges for the creation of affordable residential units and attainable residential units, for non-profit housing developments and for inclusionary zoning residential units.
This makes for great headline fodder: "Bill 23 is bad, it is going to reduce city revenues by $X million, your property taxes may need to go up, so you should be deeply upset about this." Hmm. We should talk about this. I'm not going to suggest that Bill 23 is entirely perfect. But I do think it is important to consider two important facts when it comes to things like development charges.
Firstly, the above exemption (to use just one example) is specifically related to affordable and attainable housing. It is not a reduction in DCs for the sake of reducing DCs. It is an attempt to recognize that we need more affordable/attainable housing and so maybe we should do things that make it easier and less costly to build it. And this brings me back to a point that I frequently make on this blog, which is that we can talk all we want about the need for more affordable housing, but at the end of the day it comes back to this: Who is going to pay for it? There is no such thing as a free lunch.
The common rebuttal to exemptions like this is that developers will always profit maximize and price their housing at the most the market will bear. In other words, there is no evidence that developers will pass on any cost savings to the end consumer. But this is not entirely true. For developers, pricing a project is typically a cost-plus exercise: how much is this going to cost to build and what do I need in revenue in order to hit my required returns?
When costs go down, it reduces what you need to make a project feasible. This in turn reduces developer risk, because there is always a very real question of absorption. The more you push pricing, the more you slow market absorption. So you might actually be better off selling for less, more quickly. An example of this line of thinking is when condominium developers choose to sell 100% of their inventory upfront as opposed to holding some back with the expectation that prices will increase in the future. Doing this means that you value certainty over profit maximization.
Development charges are fees collected from developers at the time a building permit to help pay for the cost of infrastructure required to provide municipal services to new development, such as roads, transit, water and sewer infrastructure, community centres and fire and police facilities.
Put differently, development charges are based on the idea that growth should pay for growth. When you build something new you create additional servicing demands, and so developers should pay for whatever incremental needs their projects are creating. This is, of course, fair. However, it is not the intent that growth pays for existing services. i.e. Ones that would be required regardless of whether there was the presence of development.
So in theory, if new development were to shut off entirely and if development charge revenue were to go to $0, there shouldn't be any issues funding the existing services. And in theory, nobody should be complaining about this lost revenue, because there is actually no need for this additional revenue. There is no growth to fund and all existing services are being adequately funded by the residents who are already there and using them.
Of course, not all city services are self sustaining. Public transit, for instance, typically requires subsidies. Ridership fares aren't enough to pay for operations, and this shortfall got understandably a lot worse during the pandemic. But is this a growth-related problem or is it an existing-resident problem? I mean, technically the problem is notenough riders. So isn't that kind of the opposite of growth related? More people would be a benefit right now.
In any event, the point I am raising today is that there is a right way and a wrong way to complain about lost development charge revenue. The wrong way is thinking, "ah, this lost revenue is going to impact my quality of life and the existing city services that I enjoy. I may have to pay higher property taxes." The relevant points for this particular discussion should not be that there's an operating budget shortfall or that existing taxpayers maybe can't afford to pay.
The more valid way to complain would be to say, "hey, these reduced development charges are going to make it difficult to fund the growth-related upgrades needed to support new and more housing in my community. And we need more housing!" Because if the concern is not actually this second one, then the headlines are a great big red herring. We have a larger financial problem on our hands that we are not speaking about.
-- you'll see that under the current rates, every new 2 bedroom or larger apartment that is constructed must pay $3,727 toward affordable housing. Under the proposed rates, this will increase to $12,545 for every new large apartment. It's by far the largest proposed percentage increase (237%) and also one of the largest service items.
This raises two interesting philosophical questions.
One, should the buyers of new housing be responsible for contributing to affordable housing in this way? Because what we are in effect saying to these people is, "Hey, you can afford to buy a new market rate home, so we're going to collect some additional money from you -- $12,545 to be exact -- so that we can try and help those that aren't in the same position as you. We're also going to mandate additional affordable homes within your building and we'd like you to subsidize those too." This is one way to redistribute wealth.
But if the goal is to try and create more broad-based affordability, an alternative approach might be, "Hey, you already own a home and it has gone up a lot in value, so we're going to collect some additional money from you over time so that we can try and help those that aren't in the same position as you." This would be the property tax approach. It's probably not perfect, but might it be a more fair and equitable way to redistribute wealth?
The second interesting philosophical question has to do with whether this is consistent with the dogma that growth should pay for growth. The idea behind development charges (also known as impact fees in some parts of the world) is that they should pay for the cost of new development. This makes complete sense. When you build new housing you certainly need some additional stuff -- everything from additional school capacity to emergency services.
But the question here is whether the construction of new housing in and of itself creates a direct need for more affordable housing, and therefore should be charged for it. Asked in the opposite way, if you weren't building this new housing, would you then no longer need this affordable housing, just like you no longer need that additional school capacity?
This is definitely not the case. In fact, I would argue that the opposite is true. If you don't build any new housing in a growing city, you actually exacerbate the problem of affordability. So here's a provocative thought. Rather than a charge, should this affordable housing line item actually be a credit towards each new project given that it benefits affordability?
While it may not make any economic sense to build affordable housing, I think that many of us would agree that it makes a lot of social sense to build affordable housing. We know that our cities are at their best when they are both diverse and inclusive. The problem is that we can't agree on who should pay for it.
