One of the basic principles behind rent control policies is that you're trying to make housing more affordable for some, while at the same time more expensive for others. Economics is the study of choice, and this is a choice, whether it gets talked about or not. Previously, we spoke about a memo from Howard Marks where he describes the impact of rent control in New York City. In economic terms, that impact looks like this:

• Some people who couldn't afford to live in New York City if rents were set by the free market get the opportunity to live in the city (their housing is more affordable)

• Other people who would like to live in New York City and could afford higher rents can't because there are no available apartments (rent controls reduce housing supply)

• And lastly, landlords with unregulated apartments can command higher rents than would be the case if new housing supply were not being discouraged (their housing is more expensive)

Today, let's talk about a recent research paper (June 2025) published in the Journal of Housing Economics called, "Rent control and the supply of affordable housing." What the authors discovered was the following:

• Restrictive rent control reforms are associated with a 10% reduction in the total number of rental units available in a city

• Restrictive rent control reforms led to an increase in the availability of units affordable to extremely low-income households

• This was offset by a decline in the availability of units to other income groups, particularly those at slightly higher affordability thresholds

Once again, we see the economic trade-offs inherent in supply-side interventions like rent control. It's better for some and worse for others. However, governments tend to favor it because it's "free" to them; the costs are borne by landlords and renters at higher affordability thresholds. I'll let all of you comment on whether you think this is good or bad, but regardless, I think it's crucial that we acknowledge the trade-offs being made.

Cover photo by Benjamin Ashton on Unsplash

Recently, a few people have asked me about whether now is a good time to buy and/or invest in real estate in Toronto. Now obviously this is a general question and a thoughtful answer depends on the asset class, your strategy, and a myriad of other possible factors, but one of the things I've noticed is that many people are trying to be incredibly precise in determining an answer to this question right now.

They'll talk about how much prices have come down, whether the Bank of Canada is going to lower interest rates again this fall (which seems probable), and then question whether it may be more optimal to buy in, say, 4-6 months versus now. It is, of course, always beneficial to be analytical, precise, and thoughtful about risk when evaluating major financial decisions, but I find it interesting just how perfect people are trying to be about timing.

It's interesting because when things were exuberant, the amount of worry over optimal conditions was clearly less. More people just believed in the market, believed in Toronto, and believed that immigrants would continue to move here at a high rate. It felt right. Greed ruled over fear. But as these market cycles go, the opposite is true today. Fear is the more dominant emotion. Many people are scared about making a bad decision, which is expected, but arguably ironic at the same time.

It's expected because it is harder to make what feels like a high-conviction bet when the market is moving in the opposite direction, things are uncertain, and there are few people to follow. But it's ironic in that it's significantly easier to find value today than 3-4 years ago. The best opportunities exist where other capital is not flowing, and a lot less capital is flowing into Toronto real estate these days.

The one caution — and as a reminder, nothing in this post should be viewed as any sort of investment advice — is that just because an asset is cheaper than it was before, it doesn't mean you've found great value. Many assets are cheap because they deserve to be cheap. Be mindful of this risk. The trick is finding high-quality undervalued assets that the market may one day recognize at their true value.

In my view, it's an unnecessary distraction to worry about whether market conditions might become incrementally more ideal in the future. One, because it's pretty much impossible to time a market. And two, because down markets are a much more productive time to feel FOMO. So what might it mean in practice to not be a timer of markets?

I like how Howard Marks once put it (though keep in mind he is not a real estate guy). He described it in the following way. On the upside, it means he doesn't sell in expectation of a market decline. He might sell an asset because he thinks the investment case has deteriorated or because he's found something better, but he doesn't sell just because he thinks a crash is coming. He continues to play the long game.

He also argues that selling at the bottom is easily worse than buying at the top of a market. The reason being that the former locks in your losses and takes you out of the game, whereas in the latter case, you can just wait until the market rebounds. The next top is usually higher than the last. (The lesson for highly-levered assets like real estate is to be careful with leverage.)

On the downside, it means he doesn't say, "it's cheap today, but it'll be cheaper in six months, so we'll wait." If it's cheap, he buys. And if it gets cheaper, he buys more (assuming his thesis holds). That's not possible if you're just looking for a single home and aren't able to dollar-cost-average across multiple assets, but it doesn't change the fact that timing a market is essentially impossible and that a fearful market should be viewed as a feature, not as a bug that paralyzes decision making.

As Marks has written, "in extreme times, the secret to making money lies in contrarianism, not conformity."

Just in case you're looking for an opportunity to read some more about tariffs, Howard Marks has a new memo out titled "Nobody Knows (Yet Again)." In it, he talks about comparative advantage, how global trade has benefited Americans, and what this could mean for the future.

Here's an excerpt that I found interesting specifically because I've also been thinking about the parallels with Brexit:

I consider the tariff developments thus far to be what soccer fans call an “own goal” – a goal scored for the other side when a player accidentally puts the ball into his own team’s net. In this way, they’re highly analogous to Brexit, and we know how that turned out. Brexit cost the British mightily in terms of GDP, morale, and alliances, and it harmed their reputation for governance and stability. All of this damage was self-inflicted.

In the memo, he also provides an important history lesson:

To cite one more factor that has made the world a better place, I describe the behavior of the U.S. in the post-World War II period as “generosity toward the rest of the world stemming from enlightened self-interest.” Under the Marshall Plan, we gave (not loaned) billions of dollars with which Western Europe rebuilt. Likewise, between 1945 and 1952, General Douglas MacArthur oversaw the reconstruction of Japan and the strengthening of its economy. Since then, the U.S. has (a) distributed extensive foreign aid, (b) invested heavily in healthcare in developing nations, (c) created programs that bring foreign students to the U.S. and vice versa, and (d) beamed positive messages to people throughout the world. These are all instances of generosity. In each “transaction,” we gave more than we directly got, and a cynic might say we acted like suckers.

Yes, these things can be described as largesse, but as the National Archive puts it, the Marshall Plan “provided markets for American goods, created reliable trading partners, and supported the development of stable democratic governments in Western Europe.” That’s a pretty good payoff. People in other countries received lots of freebies, but certainly these programs helped the U.S. by restraining communism, bringing nations into defensive alignment with the U.S., and contributing to the U.S.’s position as the world’s most prosperous nation. I have no interest in seeing the U.S. turn isolationist.

Unfortunately, greater isolation will almost certainly be one of the consequences of Trump's tariffs. It doesn't matter that many of them have now been paused; the damage has been done. We've seen this spastic movie before. In fact, they could all go to zero tomorrow, and there would still be damage.

This is an enormous change to the world order.

Cover photo by taro ohtani on Unsplash