Brandon Donnelly
Daily insights for city builders. Published since 2013 by Toronto-based real estate developer Brandon Donnelly.
Brandon Donnelly
Daily insights for city builders. Published since 2013 by Toronto-based real estate developer Brandon Donnelly.
In the fourth quarter of last year, the average house price to earnings ratio in the UK was about 8.4x. Apparently this is about as high as it has been in the past 120 years. But interestingly enough, if you go back to the 19th century, this ratio was even higher. It was over 12x back in 1845, but then went on a steady decline until about the 1920s. What changed, according to some researchers, is three things: homes got smaller (making them more affordable), incomes rose, and supply increased.
So what's going on today? The obvious answer is perhaps that interest rates are low. But in this recent FT article by Martin Wolf, he argues that that's not really the primary driver. Part of his logic is that low interest rates are a global phenomenon. And so how is it that real home prices in the UK rose 93% between 2000 and 2020, but only 29% in Germany? There must be some other structural force(s) at work. (Germany has a lower homeownership rate for whatever that's worth.)
Wolf argues that it's a problem of housing supply. Very little housing was built during WW2, for obvious reasons, but housing delivery did really spike in the post-war period in the UK. Local authorities also played a major role. If completions from 2000 to 2019 had averaged the same rate seen between 1950 and 1970, the country would have 2.9 million more homes today, representing a 13% increase to total dwelling count.
This, Wolf argues, would be having an impact on house price dynamics.
Chart: Financial Times
Back in 2019, Lake Research Partners conducted a housing study for California YIMBY. One of the questions that California voters were asked was about whether or not they support or oppose having more housing built in their community. Here is how people responded (about 700 interviews were conducted by phone and about 500 people were asked online):
What this seems to suggest is that most people (61% of all voters) support more housing in their community, with 38% (the darker bar) feeling very strongly about it. These results also seem to suggest that if you're already a homeowner and/or if you're a Republican, that you are then less likely to support housing in your community (51% and 54%, respectively). Even still, one possible conclusion that you can draw from these findings is that, perhaps in all cases, a majority of people (>50%) support the idea of more housing in their community.
In the fourth quarter of last year, the average house price to earnings ratio in the UK was about 8.4x. Apparently this is about as high as it has been in the past 120 years. But interestingly enough, if you go back to the 19th century, this ratio was even higher. It was over 12x back in 1845, but then went on a steady decline until about the 1920s. What changed, according to some researchers, is three things: homes got smaller (making them more affordable), incomes rose, and supply increased.
So what's going on today? The obvious answer is perhaps that interest rates are low. But in this recent FT article by Martin Wolf, he argues that that's not really the primary driver. Part of his logic is that low interest rates are a global phenomenon. And so how is it that real home prices in the UK rose 93% between 2000 and 2020, but only 29% in Germany? There must be some other structural force(s) at work. (Germany has a lower homeownership rate for whatever that's worth.)
Wolf argues that it's a problem of housing supply. Very little housing was built during WW2, for obvious reasons, but housing delivery did really spike in the post-war period in the UK. Local authorities also played a major role. If completions from 2000 to 2019 had averaged the same rate seen between 1950 and 1970, the country would have 2.9 million more homes today, representing a 13% increase to total dwelling count.
This, Wolf argues, would be having an impact on house price dynamics.
Chart: Financial Times
Back in 2019, Lake Research Partners conducted a housing study for California YIMBY. One of the questions that California voters were asked was about whether or not they support or oppose having more housing built in their community. Here is how people responded (about 700 interviews were conducted by phone and about 500 people were asked online):
What this seems to suggest is that most people (61% of all voters) support more housing in their community, with 38% (the darker bar) feeling very strongly about it. These results also seem to suggest that if you're already a homeowner and/or if you're a Republican, that you are then less likely to support housing in your community (51% and 54%, respectively). Even still, one possible conclusion that you can draw from these findings is that, perhaps in all cases, a majority of people (>50%) support the idea of more housing in their community.
However, the problem with this approach is that you're ultimately asking a pretty generic and theoretical question about housing supply. I am presuming that this is a scenario where the rubber has not yet hit the road. Indeed, most people will say that they support new housing in their backyard, but is that actually how things will play it? It's pretty common, for example, to hear things like: "I support new development, but I think this project is simply too ___________."
So while I think that there are some interesting directional indicators that one could draw from these findings, I suspect that the numbers in the real world might be slightly less rosy.
Here are a few interesting stats from a brief report that New York City published this month about their supply of new housing units:
From January 1, 2010 to June 30, 2020, New York City delivered 205,994 net new housing units across the five boroughs.
This total includes 202,956 units from new construction and 29,161 units from the alteration/conversion of existing buildings. However, it also factors units that were lost as a result of demolition (-17,400) or alteration (-8,723).
Brooklyn saw the most supply, followed by Manhattan. The four highest-growth Community Districts were responsible for 1/3 of all new housing additions. These CDs are all formerly non-residential areas that were rezoned to allow living.
Manhattan saw the greatest loss in housing units as a result of alterations (people combining units). This was most prevalent in wealthy neighborhoods such as the Upper East Side, Upper West Side, and Greenwich Village.
What is interesting about this last point is that it shows you that cities are far from static. New York City lost 26,123 housing units during the above time period, with 8,723 units being lost to alterations and people combining units.
The orange areas on the above map are neighborhoods which actually became less dense over the last decade. And of course, this phenomenon is not unique to New York City. We are seeing the same thing play out in some/many neighborhoods in Toronto.
What this mean is that the role of new development is really twofold. It allows a city to grow (i.e. house new New Yorkers), but it also replaces lost housing and relieves some of the pressures on the existing housing stock. I don't think many people appreciate this dynamic -- or perhaps they don't care.
For a copy of the full report (it's only two pages), click here.
However, the problem with this approach is that you're ultimately asking a pretty generic and theoretical question about housing supply. I am presuming that this is a scenario where the rubber has not yet hit the road. Indeed, most people will say that they support new housing in their backyard, but is that actually how things will play it? It's pretty common, for example, to hear things like: "I support new development, but I think this project is simply too ___________."
So while I think that there are some interesting directional indicators that one could draw from these findings, I suspect that the numbers in the real world might be slightly less rosy.
Here are a few interesting stats from a brief report that New York City published this month about their supply of new housing units:
From January 1, 2010 to June 30, 2020, New York City delivered 205,994 net new housing units across the five boroughs.
This total includes 202,956 units from new construction and 29,161 units from the alteration/conversion of existing buildings. However, it also factors units that were lost as a result of demolition (-17,400) or alteration (-8,723).
Brooklyn saw the most supply, followed by Manhattan. The four highest-growth Community Districts were responsible for 1/3 of all new housing additions. These CDs are all formerly non-residential areas that were rezoned to allow living.
Manhattan saw the greatest loss in housing units as a result of alterations (people combining units). This was most prevalent in wealthy neighborhoods such as the Upper East Side, Upper West Side, and Greenwich Village.
What is interesting about this last point is that it shows you that cities are far from static. New York City lost 26,123 housing units during the above time period, with 8,723 units being lost to alterations and people combining units.
The orange areas on the above map are neighborhoods which actually became less dense over the last decade. And of course, this phenomenon is not unique to New York City. We are seeing the same thing play out in some/many neighborhoods in Toronto.
What this mean is that the role of new development is really twofold. It allows a city to grow (i.e. house new New Yorkers), but it also replaces lost housing and relieves some of the pressures on the existing housing stock. I don't think many people appreciate this dynamic -- or perhaps they don't care.
For a copy of the full report (it's only two pages), click here.
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