After this post, I promise to stop continually plugging the work and writing of Aziz Sunderji — at least for a few days. Over the weekend, I wrote about his recent post on happiness in America. Today, his latest post is about what happens to home prices after a particular grocery store opens. And for this, he looked at 32,000 store openings dating back to the mid-1970s and then compared them to ZIP-code-level home price data.
Here's what he found:
The average Walmart neighbourhood in this study has a median household income of $49,000, a college degree attainment rate of 23%, and a median home price of $144,000. And when a new Walmart opens, home prices have tended to underperform the national average by about 4% in the three years that follow.
On the flip side, the average Trader Joe's neighbourhood has a median household income of $82,000, a college degree attainment rate of 52%, and a median home value of $425,000.
Importantly, though, Trader Joe's isn't just picking neighbourhoods with obviously favourable demographics (retail is a lagging indicator — it generally comes once the demand is already there). It seems to be picking neighbourhoods that, in the words of Aziz, have "room to keep running." In the three years that follow a new Trader Joe's opening, homes in those ZIP codes have tended to outperform the national average by 6%!
One of the fascinating things about this finding is that it seems to perfectly support the company's target market. It has been said that Joe Coulombe (founder of the company) used to describe his target customer as "overeducated and underpaid." In other words, he actively targeted university graduates.
But being underpaid only lasts so long. We know that educational attainment is typically the single best predictor of household income. So, if you target this group, chances are that they'll eventually become fairly paid or maybe even overpaid. And when this happens, I guess it shows up in area home prices.
Cover photo by Karolina Bobek on Unsplash
Chart from Home Economics
Here is a chart from Residential Club showing home price changes in America's 50 largest metro areas.
The month-over-month figure is between August and September 2025. The year-over-year figure is between September 2024 and September 2025. And the "shift since 2022 peak" is the change in home prices since each market's respective 2022 peak (not always the same date apparently).
A number of things stand out.
The month-over-month figures do not look encouraging. The vast majority of markets have gone negative. Of course, one month does not make a trend. The year-over-year column (which is how this table is sorted) looks more balanced, but the national average is still at 0%.
The most prominent outliers in the negative direction are New Orleans (which has been uniquely flat since the start of the pandemic in March 2020), San Francisco and Phoenix (which have both seen a double digit percentage drop since the peak), and Austin (which is down over 25% since the peak).
Austin is a prime example of what happens when you bring a lot of new housing supply to a market — prices come down. Earlier this year we spoke about apartment rents being down 22% from their August 2023 peak. These effects are also being heightened by increased outmigration from the city (previously the fastest growing US metro area).
Back to the office, I guess.
Even with the declines since 2022, most markets remain up significantly, with many smaller markets like Buffalo and Hartford continuing to show strong year-over-year gains. It is interesting to me that over 5 years later, we are still working through the market distortions brought about by the pandemic. The market is searching for a new equilibrium.
After this post, I promise to stop continually plugging the work and writing of Aziz Sunderji — at least for a few days. Over the weekend, I wrote about his recent post on happiness in America. Today, his latest post is about what happens to home prices after a particular grocery store opens. And for this, he looked at 32,000 store openings dating back to the mid-1970s and then compared them to ZIP-code-level home price data.
Here's what he found:
The average Walmart neighbourhood in this study has a median household income of $49,000, a college degree attainment rate of 23%, and a median home price of $144,000. And when a new Walmart opens, home prices have tended to underperform the national average by about 4% in the three years that follow.
On the flip side, the average Trader Joe's neighbourhood has a median household income of $82,000, a college degree attainment rate of 52%, and a median home value of $425,000.
Importantly, though, Trader Joe's isn't just picking neighbourhoods with obviously favourable demographics (retail is a lagging indicator — it generally comes once the demand is already there). It seems to be picking neighbourhoods that, in the words of Aziz, have "room to keep running." In the three years that follow a new Trader Joe's opening, homes in those ZIP codes have tended to outperform the national average by 6%!
One of the fascinating things about this finding is that it seems to perfectly support the company's target market. It has been said that Joe Coulombe (founder of the company) used to describe his target customer as "overeducated and underpaid." In other words, he actively targeted university graduates.
But being underpaid only lasts so long. We know that educational attainment is typically the single best predictor of household income. So, if you target this group, chances are that they'll eventually become fairly paid or maybe even overpaid. And when this happens, I guess it shows up in area home prices.
Cover photo by Karolina Bobek on Unsplash
Chart from Home Economics
Here is a chart from Residential Club showing home price changes in America's 50 largest metro areas.
The month-over-month figure is between August and September 2025. The year-over-year figure is between September 2024 and September 2025. And the "shift since 2022 peak" is the change in home prices since each market's respective 2022 peak (not always the same date apparently).
A number of things stand out.
The month-over-month figures do not look encouraging. The vast majority of markets have gone negative. Of course, one month does not make a trend. The year-over-year column (which is how this table is sorted) looks more balanced, but the national average is still at 0%.
The most prominent outliers in the negative direction are New Orleans (which has been uniquely flat since the start of the pandemic in March 2020), San Francisco and Phoenix (which have both seen a double digit percentage drop since the peak), and Austin (which is down over 25% since the peak).
Austin is a prime example of what happens when you bring a lot of new housing supply to a market — prices come down. Earlier this year we spoke about apartment rents being down 22% from their August 2023 peak. These effects are also being heightened by increased outmigration from the city (previously the fastest growing US metro area).
Back to the office, I guess.
Even with the declines since 2022, most markets remain up significantly, with many smaller markets like Buffalo and Hartford continuing to show strong year-over-year gains. It is interesting to me that over 5 years later, we are still working through the market distortions brought about by the pandemic. The market is searching for a new equilibrium.
Deflation is bad for economies.
That is why the typical standard for most central banks is a target inflation rate of 2%. This leaves a factor of safety in case you miss your target. Because if you target 0% and end up with a negative number, then you're in trouble. A negative number is significantly worse than moderate inflation. The principal problem with deflation is that consumers start expecting goods and services to be cheaper next month and stop buying non-essential items, creating a vicious cycle with prices.
I think we are seeing this same psychology play out with real estate in Canada (though not in every local market). According to the above charts from the BIS, real residential property prices across Canada were down just over 5% year-over-year in Q3-2025. And since Q4-2019, they were cumulatively down 5.45% (but up ~45% since 2010 after the Great Financial Crisis). Right now, many buyers are waiting on the sidelines, just in case things get cheaper.
But I expect things to stabilize and feel better toward the end of 2026 and into 2027. And once that happens, a different buyer psychology will come to the fore.
Cover photo by Anthony Maw on Unsplash
Charts from BIS
Deflation is bad for economies.
That is why the typical standard for most central banks is a target inflation rate of 2%. This leaves a factor of safety in case you miss your target. Because if you target 0% and end up with a negative number, then you're in trouble. A negative number is significantly worse than moderate inflation. The principal problem with deflation is that consumers start expecting goods and services to be cheaper next month and stop buying non-essential items, creating a vicious cycle with prices.
I think we are seeing this same psychology play out with real estate in Canada (though not in every local market). According to the above charts from the BIS, real residential property prices across Canada were down just over 5% year-over-year in Q3-2025. And since Q4-2019, they were cumulatively down 5.45% (but up ~45% since 2010 after the Great Financial Crisis). Right now, many buyers are waiting on the sidelines, just in case things get cheaper.
But I expect things to stabilize and feel better toward the end of 2026 and into 2027. And once that happens, a different buyer psychology will come to the fore.
Cover photo by Anthony Maw on Unsplash
Charts from BIS
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