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Last year, 5 economists published a research paper called "The Gender Earnings Gap in the Gig Economy: Evidence from over a Million Rideshare Drivers." The authors are 2 economists employed by Uber; 2 professors at Stanford University; and the chairman of the University of Chicago's economics department.
The findings were widely discussed, including on Steven Levitt and Stephen Duber's Freakonomics podcast (Episode 317). What's interesting about Uber's ridesharing data is that their compensation algorithm is believed to be entirely gender-blind.
The formula is pretty simple. It takes into account distance, time, and sometimes a surge multiplier when demand is spiking. Gender does not factor. And the same goes for the actual dispatching of rides. The software doesn't know who is male and who is female.
What they discovered is that on average male Uber drives earn about 7% more per hour compared to females. And that 50% of this wage gap can be (apparently) explained by one variable: Men tend to drive a little faster than women. So they complete more rides per hour.
It's also worth noting that across the US, only about 27% of Uber drivers are female (at least at the time the report was published). Women also have a higher 6-month attrition rate; 76% compared to 63% for men. In other words, more female drivers drop off the platform.
If you're interested in this topic, you should probably have a listen to the Freakonomics podcast. They deliberate on the above in a lot more detail. You can also download a full copy of the research paper, here.
Photo by Luke Stackpoole on Unsplash
Benedict Evan's most recent blog post, called "Amazon as experiment," draws some interesting parallels between what Amazon is doing today (and experimenting with) and the beginning of mass retail, namely the invention of the department store. He also talks about some of the shortcomings of Amazon's model, which isn't at all focused on (or good at) things such as "pleasure" and product discovery. Here are a couple of excerpts:
On the other hand, it’s interesting that Amazon seems to be doing as much experimentation as possible around the logistics model—from stores to drones to warehouse robots of every kind—but much less around the buying experience, other than small-scale tests of the Four-Star stores. After all, historically, department stores were about pleasure as much as they were about convenience or price. They changed what it meant to "go shopping" and helped turn retail into a leisure activity.
This has always been the gap in the Amazon model. It’s ever more efficient at finding what you already know you want and shipping it to you, but bad at suggesting things you don’t already know about, and terrible whenever a product needs something specific—just try finding children’s shoes by size.
This is probably inherent in the model. For Amazon to scale indefinitely to unlimited kinds of products, it needs to have more or less the same commodity logistics model for all of them. That’s the line it’s never been willing to cross. Amazon doesn’t do "unscalable." And yet, while we now know there is nothing that people won’t happily buy online, not everything will fit that commodity model. So maybe that’s the real test of Amazon’s pride: can it work out how to let us shop, rather than just buy?
Emily Badger's recent piece on "how 'developer' became such a dirty word" has been getting passed around within the industry over the last few days. I had a chuckle when I read this bit:
The notion that development is inherently bad, or that developers are inherently bad actors, seems to ignore that the communities residents want to protect from developers were once developed, too, and often by people who made money at it. (That is, unless you believe in “immaculate construction.”)
The article hits on a number of points that are absolutely true. There's generally a lack of understanding around the economics behind new housing. And the cost structures, today, are dramatically different compared to the suburban-industrial complex.
To provide one example, our cost consultant, Finnegan Marshall, recently shared with me a chart (dated April 2019) that broke down the various government fees that typically make up every new condo suite in Toronto.
What it showed is that between 20-24% of the price of a new condo is generally compromised of government fees and taxes that span all three levels of government. This includes everything from development charges (impact fees) to parkland dedication.
Similarly, the article quotes one developer from Montgomery County who estimates that the impact fees alone for his projects are usually upwards of $60,000 per housing unit. (This is pretty cheap compared to Toronto.)
I raise this as an example because development charges/impact fees have become an important source of revenue for cities across both Canada and the US. They often offset lower property taxes. (Whether this is appropriate is an entirely other debate.)
And so I find it paradoxical that many homeowners would like to simultaneously see lower property taxes, no new development, and more public services and infrastructure.
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