It is very common for jurisdictions to mandate the use of a licensed architect when building homes and buildings above a certain size. This is true in Ontario, and it's true in places like France, though the thresholds can vary widely and change over time. Currently, the threshold is 150 m2 in France. Okay, so what? Well, it turns out this simple rule has second-order consequences, as they often do.
Here's a fascinating research paper by Antoine Levy titled Regulating Housing Quality: Evidence from France. One of the things he looks at is the distribution of floor area in new housing units over time, from before there was an architect requirement threshold (ART), to the moments where this threshold was gradually lowered:
Prior to there being a threshold (1976), the chart shows a positive skew, but with a clustering of homes somewhere around 100 m2. Importantly, the distribution shows a smooth progression. But once an ART is implemented, the distribution then starts to show a clear spike right before the threshold, followed by a cliff and a "missing mass."
This, of course, makes sense. The market is pushing up against the glass to avoid having to use and pay for an architect. And the "missing mass" is the market shifting supply to below the threshold, or sufficiently beyond it. I mean, if you're going to surpass the threshold, you may as well do it confidently.
Now here's where things start to get more interesting. Levy finds that this threshold acts as a focal point that segments the market. Households above the threshold tend to have higher incomes, and homes just past the limit were on average 8-10% more expensive to build. This additional cost cannot be justified by the addition of the architect's fee alone.
On the other side of the threshold, the concentration of demand "up against the glass" was shown to create economies of scale through more standardized home design and production. In other words, the threshold incentivizes the market to get really good at designing and building a certain scale of home.
It was also shown to unintentionally promote greater housing density, because what the threshold does is create a soft cap on housing consumption for a large segment of the market. As you can see in the bottom right chart above, it effectively pulls supply back and under the threshold, away from larger homes and larger lots.
It may seem fairly innocuous to mandate that people use an architect above a certain scale, and I will forever be a proponent of great design, but as Thomas Sowell once said, "there are no solutions, only trade-offs."
Cover photo by Alex Tyson on Unsplash
In the olden days here in Toronto, approved development land used to sell for a premium compared to unapproved land. This was true because approved land meant you could start construction much sooner. And since time has value, this was worth something.
Today, this is far less valuable to developers (if at all) because, in most cases, the market does not support new construction. So, the land may be approved, but what does one do with it?
Rather than speed, I would say that the most valuable feature right now is the ability to be patient. Developers need to be able to stay solvent long enough for the market to return. But this does not mean that there isn't a cost to permitting, approvals, and lengthy pre-construction periods.
Here is a recent paper (that I discovered via Thesis Driven) by economists Evan Soltas (Princeton) and Jonathan Gruber (MIT) that asks: "How Costly Is Permitting in Housing Development?" What they discovered in the Los Angeles market is the following:
Developers have been willing to pay roughly 50% more for pre-approved development land (averaging about $48 per square foot).
The permitting process in Los Angeles accounts for about 40% of the time required to develop and construct a new housing project.
Approximately one-third of the gap between home prices and construction costs can be explained by permitting costs and delays.
This last point is an interesting one to focus on because it tells you how much regulatory fat there is in the system. In a perfectly free and efficient market, the market price of a home should, in theory, be roughly equal to the cost of the land, construction costs, and the developer's margin.
When you have a massive gap between the cost of the physical materials and labour required to build the home and the price of the home, it means that there are other costs being shouldered. The paper refers to some of these as "pure wait" (time) and "capitalized hassle" (dealing with bullshit).
This is an important way to think about the efficiency of housing markets, because minimizing the gap is a clear way to make housing more affordable.
Cover photo by Josh Miller on Unsplash
This week, Statistics Canada reported that, for the first time in over 70 years, the country's population declined. Current estimates indicate a decline of around 102,000 people last year, leaving a total of 41,472,081 people in the country as of January 1, 2026.
Opinions on this are mixed. On the one hand, a declining population can help improve things like housing affordability and increase GDP per capita (total wealth becomes divided by fewer people). It can also help improve productivity by forcing a country to innovate in lieu of relying on physical labor.
But at the same time, there are consequences to a declining population. It can result in economic stagnation and it can topple the equilibrium of pension plans. Not enough young people paying into the system. Fewer savers. Fewer spenders. Fewer innovators.
It can also reduce the soft and hard powers of a country. According to the IMF: "...some historians attribute France’s 1871 defeat in the Franco-Prussian War to the low fertility and slow rate of population growth that stemmed from early and widespread use of contraception among married couples in France."
My own simplistic view is that growth is good. We want Canadians having babies and we want the absolute best and brightest and most ambitious from around the world clamouring to come here to innovate, start companies, and grow the total economy.
The good news is this continues to be our plan.
The leading factor in Canada's current population decline is fewer non-permanent residents. That is, temporary foreign workers, a great number of whom are/were international students. As many of you know, this policy is in response to a demographic shock that the country experienced between 2022 and 2024 that, among other things, lowered productivity levels.
Going forward, the federal plan is as follows:
Dramatically reduce the number of temporary residents (international students and low-skill temporary workers). Again, this specific policy is largely responsible for the current population correction.
Stabilize permanent immigration to 380,000 people per year from 2026 to 2028 (under 1% of the population).
Admit most permanent immigrants under the "economic" classification. The target is 64% of all permanent residents by 2027. This is a class of applicants who are scored based on age (younger is better), education (smarter is better), language proficiency, and relevant work experience, with the goal of having them immediately contribute to the Canadian economy.
Target 12% Francophone permanent resident admissions outside of Quebec by 2029. (As a self-proclaimed Francophile/Quebecophile and proponent of bilingualism, I laud this effort.)
What all of this should mean is that by the end of 2026, we are expected to "burn off" the wave of temporary residents leaving the country and, by 2027, we should return to steady and manageable population growth. This is one of the reasons why I believe that 2026-2027 will be a turning point for many of our housing markets, and hopefully the start of our next economic cycle.
Cover by Robbie Palmer on Unsplash
Chart from the Globe and Mail