London has an ambitious housing target of 88,000 new homes per year — yes, per year — over the next decade. This is part of a broader national goal to create upwards of 1.5 million homes in the UK. It's an admirable goal, but the city appears destined to fail. According to a recent FT article by John Burn-Murdoch (their chief data reporter), London saw just 5,891 housing starts last year, which is 94% below its annual target and which represents a 75% year-over-year decline. When compared to many other global cities, London now ranks at or near the bottom when it comes to new homes per 1,000 residents:
Burn-Murdoch cites a multitude of factors responsible for this suboptimal performance: onerous new safety standards following the horrific 2017 Grenfell Tower fire, more stringent environmental regulations (compared to other European countries), the disappearance of international buyers in the residential buy-to-let market, and increased demand for non-residential uses. What is obvious is that building safety is paramount and nothing like what happened with the Grenfell Tower should ever happen again. But with ~281,000 new homes approved but financially unviable, there does appear to be a desire to balance safety with supply.
His third point is an interesting one in that parallels have played out in Toronto's new condominium market. The pejorative narrative of "foreigners taking homes away from locals" is commonplace in cities all around the world, which is why Canada ultimately moved to temporarily ban foreign buyers. But what we start to see here is the impact on overall housing supply. Indeed, a 2017 study from LSE (cited in the above FT article) found that international capital and residential pre-sales are essential ingredients in de-risking high-density projects and promoting greater housing supply.
Tying this all together, what has happened is the creation of an interdependency: we have made new housing developments so complicated and onerous to construct that the only financially feasible way to build them is to amortize all of the required time and money across bigger projects. Then, given the scale and cost of these projects, they have become dependent on investors and international capital to provide financing. Raise interest rates, remove the capital source, and then all of a sudden you have far less housing than 88,000 new homes per year.
It is for reasons like these that I get frustrated when critics simply blame developers or investors for shortcomings in a housing market. Finding villains is a lot easier than doing the difficult work of unpacking what's really going on and coming up with solutions.
Cover photo by Gonzalo Sanchez on Unsplash
Chart from the Financial Times
Development density used to have significant value here in Toronto. Every square meter mattered. In fact, as many of you know, entire development businesses were centered around assembling sites, rezoning for the maximum amount of area, and then selling to another developer who would then build out the final project. The process of rezoning a site often takes years, and sometimes much longer, so there's a logic to splitting up these efforts.
But then demand waned and, all of a sudden, development density had much less value, if it was even liquid at all. This business model no longer works. On top of this, the City of Toronto is now in the process of updating its zoning by-laws to allow greater heights and densities across 120 major transit station areas and protected major transit station areas across the city. These updates are expected to be brought to City Council in the spring of this year.
The result is that these areas will have minimum heights and densities that may take a site's zoning from 4 storeys to 30 storeys. And the great irony will be that sites that spent years, and sometimes decades, battling for taller buildings, may soon receive as-of-right permissions that exceed their hard-fought zoning approvals. This is how much the planning and development landscape has changed in Toronto over the years.
And it further reinforces the point I made back in 2024 when I wrote that development value has shifted from land to the build. Density is now widely available. Execution is what matters most today.
A closed-end real estate fund is an investment vehicle with a finite life (call it anywhere from 5 to 12 years, plus extension options). These types of funds have a specific timeframe for raising capital, investing, harvesting the investments they have made, and then distributing proceeds to investors. This is in contrast to an open-ended fund, also known as an "evergreen" fund, which has an infinite life and can accept investments throughout its lifespan.
As a result of these differences, closed-end funds are often used for opportunistic or value-add opportunities where the defined strategy is to buy, fix/develop, and then sell, whereas open-ended funds are often used for core opportunities, where the assets are intended to be held indefinitely for income. Neither fund structure is inherently good or bad; each has its benefits and drawbacks.
However, the perceived weighting of these benefits and drawbacks shifts during market cycles. Since global real estate markets started to turn downward in 2022, the ability to be patient and think long-term has become a key ingredient for survival. You may have done everything you said you would do perfectly, but the market may not be there to grant you the liquidity you had originally planned for.
Now the question becomes: How patient can and should we be?
In my opinion, the greatest opportunities exist for (1) the larger firms that have a strong balance sheet and defensible income-producing properties and (2) the smaller, nimble firms that can capitalize on the dislocation in the market (and aren't overly burdened with legacy assets that are sucking up resources and capacity).
This perspective is true of other sectors as well. This weekend, venture capitalist Chris Dixon of a16z wrote a post titled, "
London has an ambitious housing target of 88,000 new homes per year — yes, per year — over the next decade. This is part of a broader national goal to create upwards of 1.5 million homes in the UK. It's an admirable goal, but the city appears destined to fail. According to a recent FT article by John Burn-Murdoch (their chief data reporter), London saw just 5,891 housing starts last year, which is 94% below its annual target and which represents a 75% year-over-year decline. When compared to many other global cities, London now ranks at or near the bottom when it comes to new homes per 1,000 residents:
Burn-Murdoch cites a multitude of factors responsible for this suboptimal performance: onerous new safety standards following the horrific 2017 Grenfell Tower fire, more stringent environmental regulations (compared to other European countries), the disappearance of international buyers in the residential buy-to-let market, and increased demand for non-residential uses. What is obvious is that building safety is paramount and nothing like what happened with the Grenfell Tower should ever happen again. But with ~281,000 new homes approved but financially unviable, there does appear to be a desire to balance safety with supply.
His third point is an interesting one in that parallels have played out in Toronto's new condominium market. The pejorative narrative of "foreigners taking homes away from locals" is commonplace in cities all around the world, which is why Canada ultimately moved to temporarily ban foreign buyers. But what we start to see here is the impact on overall housing supply. Indeed, a 2017 study from LSE (cited in the above FT article) found that international capital and residential pre-sales are essential ingredients in de-risking high-density projects and promoting greater housing supply.
Tying this all together, what has happened is the creation of an interdependency: we have made new housing developments so complicated and onerous to construct that the only financially feasible way to build them is to amortize all of the required time and money across bigger projects. Then, given the scale and cost of these projects, they have become dependent on investors and international capital to provide financing. Raise interest rates, remove the capital source, and then all of a sudden you have far less housing than 88,000 new homes per year.
It is for reasons like these that I get frustrated when critics simply blame developers or investors for shortcomings in a housing market. Finding villains is a lot easier than doing the difficult work of unpacking what's really going on and coming up with solutions.
Cover photo by Gonzalo Sanchez on Unsplash
Chart from the Financial Times
Development density used to have significant value here in Toronto. Every square meter mattered. In fact, as many of you know, entire development businesses were centered around assembling sites, rezoning for the maximum amount of area, and then selling to another developer who would then build out the final project. The process of rezoning a site often takes years, and sometimes much longer, so there's a logic to splitting up these efforts.
But then demand waned and, all of a sudden, development density had much less value, if it was even liquid at all. This business model no longer works. On top of this, the City of Toronto is now in the process of updating its zoning by-laws to allow greater heights and densities across 120 major transit station areas and protected major transit station areas across the city. These updates are expected to be brought to City Council in the spring of this year.
The result is that these areas will have minimum heights and densities that may take a site's zoning from 4 storeys to 30 storeys. And the great irony will be that sites that spent years, and sometimes decades, battling for taller buildings, may soon receive as-of-right permissions that exceed their hard-fought zoning approvals. This is how much the planning and development landscape has changed in Toronto over the years.
And it further reinforces the point I made back in 2024 when I wrote that development value has shifted from land to the build. Density is now widely available. Execution is what matters most today.
A closed-end real estate fund is an investment vehicle with a finite life (call it anywhere from 5 to 12 years, plus extension options). These types of funds have a specific timeframe for raising capital, investing, harvesting the investments they have made, and then distributing proceeds to investors. This is in contrast to an open-ended fund, also known as an "evergreen" fund, which has an infinite life and can accept investments throughout its lifespan.
As a result of these differences, closed-end funds are often used for opportunistic or value-add opportunities where the defined strategy is to buy, fix/develop, and then sell, whereas open-ended funds are often used for core opportunities, where the assets are intended to be held indefinitely for income. Neither fund structure is inherently good or bad; each has its benefits and drawbacks.
However, the perceived weighting of these benefits and drawbacks shifts during market cycles. Since global real estate markets started to turn downward in 2022, the ability to be patient and think long-term has become a key ingredient for survival. You may have done everything you said you would do perfectly, but the market may not be there to grant you the liquidity you had originally planned for.
Now the question becomes: How patient can and should we be?
In my opinion, the greatest opportunities exist for (1) the larger firms that have a strong balance sheet and defensible income-producing properties and (2) the smaller, nimble firms that can capitalize on the dislocation in the market (and aren't overly burdened with legacy assets that are sucking up resources and capacity).
This perspective is true of other sectors as well. This weekend, venture capitalist Chris Dixon of a16z wrote a post titled, "
The fact that he wrote this post says a lot, I think, about the psyche of investors today. The perceived weighting has changed, and people are now investing and building more for the future. As the late Charlie Munger once said, "The big money is not in the buying and the selling, but in the waiting."
Cover photo by KAi'S PHOTOGRAPHY on Unsplash
The fact that he wrote this post says a lot, I think, about the psyche of investors today. The perceived weighting has changed, and people are now investing and building more for the future. As the late Charlie Munger once said, "The big money is not in the buying and the selling, but in the waiting."
Cover photo by KAi'S PHOTOGRAPHY on Unsplash
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