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On July 1 of this year, a new California bill, called the "Affordable Housing and High Road Jobs Act of 2022", will go into effect. And the goal of this legislation is to significantly increase the supply of new homes in the state by allowing multi-family construction on lands that are currently zoned for commercial uses.
On some level, it is of course curious that there even needs to be this bill. Because what we are effectively saying is, "hey, we should allow people to build a mix of uses on our main streets and with high enough densities that we might actually be able to support transit." Why was this not always the case? (Rhetorical question.)
In the words of architect and planner Peter Calthorpe, who was recently interviewed here in ArchDaily, this is a "landmark piece of legislation" that has "received very little attention." So that's why we're talking about it today.
Calthorpe was actively involved in crafting this legislation, and his work apparently started with different scenario land-use models. The first experiment looked at a 43-mile stretch of El Camino running from San Francisco to San Jose (pictured below). And what they found was that this one strip alone could accommodate somewhere around 250,000 new infill homes.
To put this into context, the state of California is currently building about 140,000 new homes each year, through a roughly equal (1:1) split of multi-family and low-rise single-family. Already this represents a shift, as supply used to be slanted (3:1) toward low-rise. (I don't know when exactly this was the case, but Calthorpe mentions the figure in his interview.)
Moving on from El Camino, Calthorpe and his team then ran a similar exercise for the five-county inner Bay area. And here they found that some 700 miles of commercial land could produce up to 1.3 million multi-family homes at "reasonable densities." This was then expanded to the entire state of California and the number increased to 10 million new homes.
Of course, as we have talked about before on this blog, not all of this land might actually be feasible for development. Sometimes the math doesn't work even at a zero land cost; you might need a negative land cost in order to pencil a new development. Meaning, you might need to be paid, perhaps through some sort of subsidy.
So what Calthorpe and the team did was use MapCraft to quickly run development feasibilities on the above sites. They had it run 6 different pro formas using local rents, construction costs, city fees, and so on. And what they determined was that this 10 million number drops down to 2 million when you apply the economic realities of the world.
As a disclaimer, I'm not at all familiar with MapCraft. But I'm going to take this number at face value and say that this is still a lot of new homes. And this is what people are hoping for come July 1 of this year.
Image: HDR / Peter Calthorpe
Big Ben Myers of Bullpen Consulting doesn't usually have strong opinions on Twitter (obviously joking), but I did see him respond to this tweet this morning:
https://twitter.com/benmyers29/status/1632377162404712448?s=20
The assertion he is responding to is basically this: "developers are stupid because they tend to hold onto land during downturns, instead of building through them." On some level, I think I know where this line of thinking is coming from. It's the whole Warren Buffet philosophy of "being fearful when others are greedy, and greedy when others are fearful."
But what it ignores is development feasibility. Developers typically rely heavily on the availability of debt financing. First you need land financing in order to acquire the land, and then, once you have your entitlements, condominium pre-sales and/or any other requirements in place, you move onto a construction loan (which often "takes out" your land loan).
Maybe you have deep enough pockets to fund everything with cash, but most of the time that is not the case. And so if these debt facilities are not available to you, then you are not building.
The other part of this equation is that, during downturns, it can be harder to forecast your future revenues. What can I sell/rent this space for, and how long will it take to absorb? These are difficult questions in the best of times, but they're even more difficult when you don't have a lot of market activity/comparables to point to.
All of this contributes to debt being less available, especially for smaller developers. It also makes new sites difficult to underwrite. Because as we have talked about many times before on this blog, land should be the residual claimant in a development pro forma. Revenue minus development costs equals how much you can afford to pay for land.
If the math doesn't work and if you can't get financing, it almost certainly doesn't matter how much "leading" you feel like doing. You're not building.
Building on yesterday's post about inclusionary zoning, below is a telling diagram from the Urban Land Institute showing which areas of Portland can support new development and which areas cannot. To create this map, ULI looked at achievable rents in each US census block to determine, quite simply, where rents will cover the cost of new development (all types of construction).
On July 1 of this year, a new California bill, called the "Affordable Housing and High Road Jobs Act of 2022", will go into effect. And the goal of this legislation is to significantly increase the supply of new homes in the state by allowing multi-family construction on lands that are currently zoned for commercial uses.
On some level, it is of course curious that there even needs to be this bill. Because what we are effectively saying is, "hey, we should allow people to build a mix of uses on our main streets and with high enough densities that we might actually be able to support transit." Why was this not always the case? (Rhetorical question.)
In the words of architect and planner Peter Calthorpe, who was recently interviewed here in ArchDaily, this is a "landmark piece of legislation" that has "received very little attention." So that's why we're talking about it today.
Calthorpe was actively involved in crafting this legislation, and his work apparently started with different scenario land-use models. The first experiment looked at a 43-mile stretch of El Camino running from San Francisco to San Jose (pictured below). And what they found was that this one strip alone could accommodate somewhere around 250,000 new infill homes.
To put this into context, the state of California is currently building about 140,000 new homes each year, through a roughly equal (1:1) split of multi-family and low-rise single-family. Already this represents a shift, as supply used to be slanted (3:1) toward low-rise. (I don't know when exactly this was the case, but Calthorpe mentions the figure in his interview.)
Moving on from El Camino, Calthorpe and his team then ran a similar exercise for the five-county inner Bay area. And here they found that some 700 miles of commercial land could produce up to 1.3 million multi-family homes at "reasonable densities." This was then expanded to the entire state of California and the number increased to 10 million new homes.
Of course, as we have talked about before on this blog, not all of this land might actually be feasible for development. Sometimes the math doesn't work even at a zero land cost; you might need a negative land cost in order to pencil a new development. Meaning, you might need to be paid, perhaps through some sort of subsidy.
So what Calthorpe and the team did was use MapCraft to quickly run development feasibilities on the above sites. They had it run 6 different pro formas using local rents, construction costs, city fees, and so on. And what they determined was that this 10 million number drops down to 2 million when you apply the economic realities of the world.
As a disclaimer, I'm not at all familiar with MapCraft. But I'm going to take this number at face value and say that this is still a lot of new homes. And this is what people are hoping for come July 1 of this year.
Image: HDR / Peter Calthorpe
Big Ben Myers of Bullpen Consulting doesn't usually have strong opinions on Twitter (obviously joking), but I did see him respond to this tweet this morning:
https://twitter.com/benmyers29/status/1632377162404712448?s=20
The assertion he is responding to is basically this: "developers are stupid because they tend to hold onto land during downturns, instead of building through them." On some level, I think I know where this line of thinking is coming from. It's the whole Warren Buffet philosophy of "being fearful when others are greedy, and greedy when others are fearful."
But what it ignores is development feasibility. Developers typically rely heavily on the availability of debt financing. First you need land financing in order to acquire the land, and then, once you have your entitlements, condominium pre-sales and/or any other requirements in place, you move onto a construction loan (which often "takes out" your land loan).
Maybe you have deep enough pockets to fund everything with cash, but most of the time that is not the case. And so if these debt facilities are not available to you, then you are not building.
The other part of this equation is that, during downturns, it can be harder to forecast your future revenues. What can I sell/rent this space for, and how long will it take to absorb? These are difficult questions in the best of times, but they're even more difficult when you don't have a lot of market activity/comparables to point to.
All of this contributes to debt being less available, especially for smaller developers. It also makes new sites difficult to underwrite. Because as we have talked about many times before on this blog, land should be the residual claimant in a development pro forma. Revenue minus development costs equals how much you can afford to pay for land.
If the math doesn't work and if you can't get financing, it almost certainly doesn't matter how much "leading" you feel like doing. You're not building.
Building on yesterday's post about inclusionary zoning, below is a telling diagram from the Urban Land Institute showing which areas of Portland can support new development and which areas cannot. To create this map, ULI looked at achievable rents in each US census block to determine, quite simply, where rents will cover the cost of new development (all types of construction).
However, in their models they are also assuming a land value of $0. And typically people want you to pay them money when you buy their land. So in all likelihood, this map is overstating the amount of blue -- that being land where new development is feasible.
But it does tell you something about developer margins. A lot of people seem to assume that the margins on new developments are so great that things like inclusionary zoning can simply be "absorbed" without impacting overall feasibility. The reality is that there are large swaths in most cities where development is never going to happen even if you were to start handing out free land.
This map is also helpful at illustrating some of the impacts of IZ. If you assume that rents are the highest in the center of the city and that they fall off as you move outward, then the outer edge of the above blue area is going to be where development is only marginally feasible. And so any new cost imposed on development would naturally start to uniformly eat away at the blue feasible area -- that is, until rents rise enough to offset it.
Of course, this is a simplified mapping. Land usually costs money. Land values might also be highest in the center and fall off as you move outward, or there could be pockets of high-cost land. There may be more price elasticity in certain sub-markets compared to others. So the impacts of a new development cost may not play out as neatly as I outlined above.
Regardless, there will be impacts, which is why I find this map telling even if it isn't fully accurate or up to date. Maybe some of you will as well.
However, in their models they are also assuming a land value of $0. And typically people want you to pay them money when you buy their land. So in all likelihood, this map is overstating the amount of blue -- that being land where new development is feasible.
But it does tell you something about developer margins. A lot of people seem to assume that the margins on new developments are so great that things like inclusionary zoning can simply be "absorbed" without impacting overall feasibility. The reality is that there are large swaths in most cities where development is never going to happen even if you were to start handing out free land.
This map is also helpful at illustrating some of the impacts of IZ. If you assume that rents are the highest in the center of the city and that they fall off as you move outward, then the outer edge of the above blue area is going to be where development is only marginally feasible. And so any new cost imposed on development would naturally start to uniformly eat away at the blue feasible area -- that is, until rents rise enough to offset it.
Of course, this is a simplified mapping. Land usually costs money. Land values might also be highest in the center and fall off as you move outward, or there could be pockets of high-cost land. There may be more price elasticity in certain sub-markets compared to others. So the impacts of a new development cost may not play out as neatly as I outlined above.
Regardless, there will be impacts, which is why I find this map telling even if it isn't fully accurate or up to date. Maybe some of you will as well.
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