Oftentimes, it feels like there is a perception that developers price new housing with the fattest of margins. Meaning, if only developers were less greedy, housing could be more affordable. But as we have spoken about many times before, real estate development is a competitive industry; therefore, projects happen on the margin.

Ordinarily, the prices you see are the result of a cost-plus pricing strategy. Developers figure out what it will cost to build and develop, they add on a margin that they think their investors will accept, and then they determine what sticker prices they need to make the project financially feasible.

I've been writing about this approach for many years, but today it's even more obvious. According to Urbanation's Q1-2024 condominium report, new unsold condominium inventory in the GTA is currently sitting at approximately 23,815 units. This is up 30% YoY and is equal to about 23 months of supply. Two years ago in Q1-2022, this number had reached an 18-quarter low of 8,726 units.

Developers are highly motivated to sell and move their projects forward. Time is a killer, especially today. So the logical explanation for this rising inventory is simply that they can't sell it. Their cost-plus pricing doesn't overlap with what most buyers in the market are willing to pay. Like I said, development happens on the margin.

In theory, there is always a price where buyers would be willing to transact. If I listed a beautiful condominium for $100k today, many people would want to buy it. Supply would quickly run out. The problem is that no developer can build for this. There is always a very real price floor and, right now, that floor doesn't seem to be low enough for many buyers.

Approving new housing is one thing. And it is an important one thing. But you also need to sell/lease and finance the project. And that is a lot more challenging in today's environment compared to a few years ago. I think a lot of people look at our cities, see a shortage of housing, and wonder why developers don't just build more of it. But it's not that simple:

“Our industry is now taking a second look at our [calculations] and saying it’s costing more to build, it’s costing more to lend,” he said. “And there is a threshold in regards to what a purchase price or sale price can be. So there’s a bit of a pause in the market right now in regards to starting construction.”

Throughout this last development cycle and, in particular, during the pandemic, development costs increased dramatically. But the revenue side was also increasing -- meaning you could sell and/or lease space for more. That kept development going. You could still successfully underwrite new projects.

But now the cost of debt has increased and the revenue side has expectedly slowed both in terms of pricing and velocity. This dramatically changes the feasibility of new projects, which means the market is going to need time to adjust to this new environment. This, of course, will happen. But in the interim (i.e. right now), it is going to mean a lot less new housing.

This should not come as a surprise.

The stated policy goal of inclusionary zoning is to to produce more affordable housing. We can debate who ultimately pays for this below-market housing, and we have many times before on the blog, but for the purposes of this post let's just focus on its stated goal.

Given this ambition, it makes sense to carefully measure the number of affordable homes produced. And that is ordinarily what is done: "We implemented this new policy on this date, and since then we have produced X amount of new affordable housing."

It is then likely that we will take X and form opinions on whether it was a successful policy or not. If X seems like a lot, then maybe we think it's a good policy. And if X doesn't seem like a lot, then maybe we think it was a bad policy, or perhaps just an ineffective one.

But what is largely impossible to measure with any real precision is the number of new market-rate homes that are now not being built as a result of a policy. Let's call this number Y. It is, of course, possible to come up with an estimate by looking broadly at rents across the city, plugging in some development costs, and seeing what pencils. But this is a rough approximation.

It does not capture the countless times that a developer has looked at a possible housing site, only to come to the conclusion that it is not feasible to build. There is no official Y figure. And any amorphous estimates of Y are going to be easy to ignore by the general public anyway. Unbuilt homes? Opportunity costs? What?

I am saying (okay repeating) all of this because I continue to feel like most people believe that development will just happen no matter what is thrown at it. There is a housing shortage, right? So developers should just do what they do best and build today. Surely they could if they were genuinely nice people and really wanted to. Hmm.

What many people seem to ignore (or not know) is that development, and in turn new housing supply, operates under this very simple decision tree:

• Find development site

• Underwrite said site

• If math works, seek capital/investors and then build

• If math does not work, do not build

• If math works, but capital doesn't like it, also do not build (most can't in this scenario)

• Repeat

Just because you aren't seeing or noticing something, it does not mean that it doesn't exist and that it's not happening behind the scenes.