On March 25, 2026, the Ontario government announced that it would be expanding the HST rebate to lower the cost of new homes. Here's the full media briefing PDF. Since then, every developer, lawyer, and sales team in the city has been scrambling to figure it all out and incorporate it into their projects. This includes us.
Today on the blog, I thought it might be useful to do the following: (1) explain how I understand the proposed rebate program works (or will work, to be exact), (2) talk about how I'm seeing the industry respond to the announcement (naturally, there's been some criticism), and (3) shamelessly plug one of our HST rebate-eligible homes at Junction House.
First, I need to caveat this post by saying that, oh boy, I'm not an accountant or lawyer, and that this proposal is still subject to regulatory enactment. So, I could be wrong about something, the proposal might not get passed, or maybe something outrageous happens, potentially precipitated by a post on Truth Social. Do your own research. Talk to your advisors. Having said all this, the industry fully expects this to pass, and developers are already relying on the fact that it will, perhaps by this summer.
Second, it's helpful to understand how new homes are typically priced in the market and how the existing new home HST rebate works. Developers in the Toronto market typically price their homes inclusive of HST, but net of the current new home HST rebate. As it stands today, this rebate caps out at $24,000, translating to an effective HST rate that is lower than the current rate of 13%, depending on the price of the home.
Let me explain:
Price on the purchase agreement: $925,000 (again, this is inclusive of HST but net of the $24k rebate)
Base price excluding any HST = ($925,000 + $24,000) / 1.13 = $839,823.01
HST payable to government = $925,000 - $839,823.01 = $85,176.99
Effective HST rate = $85,176.99 / $839,823.01 = 10.1% (which is less than 13% because of the $24k rebate)
In practice, the way this typically works is that the buyer, who is assumed to qualify for the rebate, assigns it to the developer as part of the closing process. The developer receives the benefit of this rebate, and so they only need to remit the remaining 10.1% to the government. Importantly, this particular rebate is meant for people intending to move into the new home. If they are not doing this, then a separate rebate process applies.
Now, here's what's proposed for the new HST program, which is available only for purchases made between April 1, 2026 and March 31, 2027, and applicable to homes used as a primary place of residence or as a residential rental property:
Up to $1,000,000: Full 13% HST rebate (up to $130,000).
$1,000,001 to $1,500,000: Flat maximum rebate of $130,000.
$1,500,001 to $1,850,000: The rebate phases down proportionally from $130,000 to $24,000.
Over $1,850,000: The rebate is capped at the standard Ontario maximum of $24,000 (same as today).
Given that most developers have been pricing inclusive of HST, but net of the current rebate, there's some math involved to figure out what purchasers will ultimately be paying for a new home bought over the next 12 months. But for homes under $1,850,000, the answer is less than before! (More on this below.)
Another important question is how this will work given that the eligibility time period has started, but the proposal hasn't passed and isn't in force yet. The way we are thinking about it is generally in the following two ways.
If a purchaser is buying a new home and closing on it today, they will have to pay the HST as has been customary in the past, but then the expectation is that, once the proposal is enacted, the purchaser will get it refunded (as per the above). Going back to our $925k example above, the $85k would still get paid up front, and then remitted to the government, but then the purchaser would get it back, bringing their net price down to $839k.
If a purchaser is buying a new home today and expecting to close on it after the proposal is enacted, one reasonable assumption is that the proper protocols will be in place such that the purchaser isn't paying the HST upfront only to get it back later. In our example, they would instead be paying the $839k up front. Developers are contracting for this scenario today, but how exactly the paperwork will flow in the future remains TBD.
One of the unexpected benefits of this proposal, at least for me, is that it has me thinking more in terms of net prices, excluding any HST. And I like this better. I think it's a more transparent way to communicate with purchasers. We as an industry should use this moment as an opportunity to move toward this practice.
In fact, what I would like to be able to do is enumerate the following to buyers: "Here is the price of your new home. Now let's add the HST, development charges, education development charges, parkland dedication fees, community benefit charges, and so on." Because I think, only then, would it become clear to the general public how much we tax new housing.
Now let's talk more broadly about how the market is responding to this proposal.
One of the criticisms of this proposal is that it will only serve to increase developer margins. And indeed, this proposal does represent a cost reduction in development pro formas. But what I will say is that every single developer that I have spoken to is using this as an opportunity to reduce their pricing and pass along the savings (typically 1:1) to new home buyers. The reality is that the market is too soft to do anything else.
This is a perfect example of the cost-plus pricing model that we often talk about on this blog. Developers typically price based on their costs. Now that costs have come down (because of this proposal), they are lowering their prices accordingly. And those who do not follow suit will no longer be competitive in the market.
The market froze out in recent years because, suddenly, the price people were willing to pay for new homes was less than developers' costs. The floor had been reached. But now the floor has been lowered in a direct effort to clear out inventory and reset the market. It's a good time to be a new home buyer, and I have already started to feel a change in sentiment across the industry.
On that note, I would like to turn your attention to a penthouse suite at Junction House that we just listed for sale. It's a two-bedroom and two-bath home and, yes, it's HST rebate-eligible! It's one of my favourite suites in the building. If you'd like to learn more, reach out to Paul Johnston at Unique Urban Homes (paul@pauljohnston.com).
High Art Capital recently announced the launch of a new fund called the Greater Toronto Area (GTA) Rental and Affordable Housing Initiative. It has been anchored by a $300 million mezzanine debt commitment (and a "nominal equity investment") from the Building Ontario Fund (BOF) and is expected to be capitalized in total with a minimum of $1.3 billion.
The objective is to acquire approximately 2,200 rental homes in blocks within newly completed, unsold condominiums across the GTA and convert them into long-term rental housing. Included within this will be approximately 550 affordable rental homes that are expected to be title-protected at rents set at the lower of 25% below local market rent or 30% of median gross household income.
This is interesting, but it's certainly not the first example of investors buying, or wanting to buy, excess condominium inventory. However, it may become the largest in Toronto and, as far as I know, it's the only one to partner with the public sector (BOF is a provincial Crown agency).
The way it is intended to work is as follows:
Condominium developers are sitting on unsold inventory and maybe on inventory they took back after purchasers defaulted (and which may be subject to legal action). What High Art will do is say to developers, "Hey, if you give me a really awesome deal, I'll take 50 of those condominium units off your hands." And if the developer is desperate enough, they will say, "Sure, that sounds good. Let's do a deal and then go for a nice closing dinner."
But at what price?
As we've talked about many times before on the blog, developer pricing is typically based on a cost-plus model. We take our costs, add a margin, and there's the final sticker price. The reason prices haven't fallen as much as one might expect on unsold units is because they're hitting the "cost floor"; developers don't want to lose money, unless they are given no other option.
But for this rental fund model to work at reasonable costs of debt, I suspect that, in many/most cases, deals will need to be struck below a developer's cost basis. So, it'll be very interesting to watch how this fund deploys capital and who the winners and losers are in this market.
Regardless, I think it is good that we are seeing this sort of activity. The faster we deal with the pain, the faster we'll get to the other side.
Cover photo by Patrick Boucher on Unsplash
Rental apartment completions in the Greater Toronto & Hamilton Area (GTHA) are expected to exceed condo completions for the first time in a very long time starting in 2028. But what does this mean for the overall market, and is it actually going to be enough new housing? Let's look at some of the numbers.
Last year, the GTHA recorded 29,671 new condo completions. This was some sort of a record. This year, condo completions are projected to total around 31,396 homes. Even higher. But then completions start to fall off, with 17,487 homes scheduled for completion in 2026. By 2029, this number is expected to be close to 1,000. So let's call it zero for argument's sake.
If we are to crudely assume that 50% of these new condominiums ultimately make it to the secondary condo rental market, then we are expecting nearly 16,000 condo rentals this year, just under 9,000 condo rentals in 2026, and ultimately no new condo rentals by around 2029 (or some number close to it).
Now let's consider the purpose-built rental side of the equation.
The 10-year average for purpose-built rental apartment starts in the GTHA is only 2,819 homes. This is a far cry from the volume of rental housing that we delivered in the 60s and 70s. Of course, with the new condominium market largely shut off, there's renewed interest in building purpose-built rentals.
In 2024, purpose-built rental apartment completions totalled 5,537 homes. And in the first half of this year, 3,156 homes reached the occupancy stage. Extrapolating out, I'm guessing that puts us somewhere around 6,000 new purpose-built rental apartment homes by the end of 2025.
If we pause and think about only 2025, we're on track to deliver roughly 37,000 new condo/rental apartments and ~22,000 new rental homes (again assuming 50% of the new condominiums become secondary rentals). I view this as our peak supply year for this cycle.
There's a lot of talk about a "record" number of purpose-built rental apartments now under construction, and while it is true that the numbers are elevated compared to the latest 10-year average, it is not a long-term record compared to the 60s and 70s and, more importantly, it is not enough to offset our dwindling new condominium supply.
Even if purpose-built rental completions spiked to 8,000 or even 10,000 new homes next year, we are still going to see a drop in new rentals and new housing overall in the GTHA. 2026 is the turning point year where new supply turns south. And it's going to keep going south until probably 2029, which is when I believe we will see supply bottom out.
Nothing in this post should be construed as investment or development advice, but here's the way I'm thinking about it:
2025: ~37,000 new condominium/apartment homes (peak supply year resulting from the pandemic boom)
2026: ~25,000 new homes (supply begins its decline)
2027: ~18,000 new homes
2028: ~10,000 to 13,000 new homes
2029: ~8,000 to 10,000 new homes (supply bottom)
I have no idea what will happen with interest rates, immigration, investor sentiment, and the countless other factors that impact a housing market, but even if things started to turn around next year, it would be mostly impossible to avoid the housing supply bottom that I believe we have coming in 2029. Buildings take a long time to build.
Conclusion: I think that 2026 will prove to be an excellent year to buy assets (land, unsold inventory, IPP, and so on), and that 2028 onward will be an excellent time to be delivering new homes. By then, we should be dramatically undersupplying the market. It doesn't feel that way today, but eventually the bill from our frozen development market will come due.
Cover photo by Adam Vradenburg on Unsplash