Brandon Donnelly
Daily insights for city builders. Published since 2013 by Toronto-based real estate developer Brandon Donnelly.
Brandon Donnelly
Daily insights for city builders. Published since 2013 by Toronto-based real estate developer Brandon Donnelly.
It is worth reiterating that one of the main reasons the majority of people live in cities is because they would like to make money and improve their economic status. There are, of course, other reasons too, but making money is an enduring attractor. In Alain Bertaud's book, Order Without Design: How Markets Shape Cities, he famously argued that cities are, first and foremost, labour markets.
Because of this, the success of cities depends on their ability to harness talent and turn it into economic progress. New York City, for example, is the city it is today because it was the largest port of entry for immigrants. And because transportation costs were high at the time, people arrived in New York and stayed in New York to work and create businesses.
The same thing is generally true today in the San Francisco Bay Area. It is estimated that roughly 50% of all tech startups and 59 of the top 100 highest-valued unicorns have a foreign-born founder. (I'd love to know what percentage are Canadian graduates of the University of Waterloo.) These are immigrants looking for money and economic opportunity, and the local ecosystem is providing the right preconditions.
But if the preconditions for success disappear, people will start to both leave and not come in the first place. So, it's also worth reiterating that the fortunes of cities have always risen and fallen over a long enough time horizon. Here's a great excerpt from a recent Bloomberg article by Richard Frost and Mary Hui, talking about what "war-rattled Dubai can learn from Hong Kong's expat exodus."
Financial centers rise and fall with the tides of geopolitics. From the mid-1500s, the tiny Portuguese enclave of Macau served as the primary intermediary for trade between Europe, Japan and China. In the mid-1800s, it was displaced by Hong Kong, which Britain secured by defeating the Qing dynasty. Hong Kong, in turn, was overtaken by Shanghai in the 1920s, when its more glamorous though still Western-run rival became the wealthiest city in East Asia. Both were occupied by Japanese forces during World War II, and their expatriate elite were interned in camps.
Shanghai never regained its prewar status. After their 1949 victory in China’s civil war, the Communists seized foreign-owned assets, bringing an end to the dominance of one of Asia’s most prominent business dynasties — the Baghdadi-Jewish Sassoon family, known as the “Rothschilds of the East.” The exodus of wealthy Shanghainese to Hong Kong helped lay the foundations for the city’s modern-day revival as Asia’s leading financial hub.
But between the protests of the 2010s, the 2020 national security law, and the draconian pandemic lockdowns, in recent years, it did feel like Hong Kong might be at risk of losing at least some of its status as a global financial hub. According to the latest Global Financial Centres Index, Hong Kong is still ranked third, behind New York and London, respectively. But Singapore is nipping at its heels in fourth position.

Today, some are arguing that the current turmoil in the Middle East has broken the promise of Dubai as a stable, global financial capital where influencers roam freely on the beach. People are, not surprisingly, leaving in the immediate term, but will it be lasting? I think it's too early to be calling the fall of Dubai, but there's no question that this is a meaningful exogenous shock. Its real estate index fell 30% in two weeks.
History shows us that there are no guarantees. Preeminence exists until something happens, and then it doesn't. If this war becomes protracted, it will be a major problem for Dubai. Capital and talent want openness, stability, opportunity, and a favourable business environment (keep taxes reasonable and get out of the way). After all, it's arguably the main reason why people come to cities in the first place.
Cover photo by Sepehr Moradian on Unsplash
Chart via the Global Financial Centres Index

It is well known that the majority of Singaporeans live in public housing (that is, housing provided by the Housing and Development Board, or HDB). However, what you may not know is that the majority of residents obtain their housing through a model that shares some high-level similarities with the way we deliver new condominiums in Toronto.
In 2001, the HDB introduced a program known as Build-to-Order (BTO). The way it works is fairly straightforward: the HDB announces a new project, prospective buyers apply and are assigned a queue number, and then, if they're selected, they get to buy. Once a sufficient number of "pre-sales" have been obtained, the project begins construction, and buyers get a brand-new, subsidized apartment in 3 to 5 years.
Singapore also mandates that the apartments must be owner-occupied and so, in this carefully controlled delivery model, supply very closely mirrors demand. This is different from traditional condominium pre-sales where some buyers might be end users, some might be planning to rent out the home, and some might want to sell immediately upon completion. In those markets, the risk of overbuilding and speculative volatility is greater.


After this post, I promise to stop continually plugging the work and writing of Aziz Sunderji — at least for a few days. Over the weekend, I wrote about his recent post on happiness in America. Today, his latest post is about what happens to home prices after a particular grocery store opens. And for this, he looked at 32,000 store openings dating back to the mid-1970s and then compared them to ZIP-code-level home price data.
Here's what he found:

It is worth reiterating that one of the main reasons the majority of people live in cities is because they would like to make money and improve their economic status. There are, of course, other reasons too, but making money is an enduring attractor. In Alain Bertaud's book, Order Without Design: How Markets Shape Cities, he famously argued that cities are, first and foremost, labour markets.
Because of this, the success of cities depends on their ability to harness talent and turn it into economic progress. New York City, for example, is the city it is today because it was the largest port of entry for immigrants. And because transportation costs were high at the time, people arrived in New York and stayed in New York to work and create businesses.
The same thing is generally true today in the San Francisco Bay Area. It is estimated that roughly 50% of all tech startups and 59 of the top 100 highest-valued unicorns have a foreign-born founder. (I'd love to know what percentage are Canadian graduates of the University of Waterloo.) These are immigrants looking for money and economic opportunity, and the local ecosystem is providing the right preconditions.
But if the preconditions for success disappear, people will start to both leave and not come in the first place. So, it's also worth reiterating that the fortunes of cities have always risen and fallen over a long enough time horizon. Here's a great excerpt from a recent Bloomberg article by Richard Frost and Mary Hui, talking about what "war-rattled Dubai can learn from Hong Kong's expat exodus."
Financial centers rise and fall with the tides of geopolitics. From the mid-1500s, the tiny Portuguese enclave of Macau served as the primary intermediary for trade between Europe, Japan and China. In the mid-1800s, it was displaced by Hong Kong, which Britain secured by defeating the Qing dynasty. Hong Kong, in turn, was overtaken by Shanghai in the 1920s, when its more glamorous though still Western-run rival became the wealthiest city in East Asia. Both were occupied by Japanese forces during World War II, and their expatriate elite were interned in camps.
Shanghai never regained its prewar status. After their 1949 victory in China’s civil war, the Communists seized foreign-owned assets, bringing an end to the dominance of one of Asia’s most prominent business dynasties — the Baghdadi-Jewish Sassoon family, known as the “Rothschilds of the East.” The exodus of wealthy Shanghainese to Hong Kong helped lay the foundations for the city’s modern-day revival as Asia’s leading financial hub.
But between the protests of the 2010s, the 2020 national security law, and the draconian pandemic lockdowns, in recent years, it did feel like Hong Kong might be at risk of losing at least some of its status as a global financial hub. According to the latest Global Financial Centres Index, Hong Kong is still ranked third, behind New York and London, respectively. But Singapore is nipping at its heels in fourth position.

Today, some are arguing that the current turmoil in the Middle East has broken the promise of Dubai as a stable, global financial capital where influencers roam freely on the beach. People are, not surprisingly, leaving in the immediate term, but will it be lasting? I think it's too early to be calling the fall of Dubai, but there's no question that this is a meaningful exogenous shock. Its real estate index fell 30% in two weeks.
History shows us that there are no guarantees. Preeminence exists until something happens, and then it doesn't. If this war becomes protracted, it will be a major problem for Dubai. Capital and talent want openness, stability, opportunity, and a favourable business environment (keep taxes reasonable and get out of the way). After all, it's arguably the main reason why people come to cities in the first place.
Cover photo by Sepehr Moradian on Unsplash
Chart via the Global Financial Centres Index

It is well known that the majority of Singaporeans live in public housing (that is, housing provided by the Housing and Development Board, or HDB). However, what you may not know is that the majority of residents obtain their housing through a model that shares some high-level similarities with the way we deliver new condominiums in Toronto.
In 2001, the HDB introduced a program known as Build-to-Order (BTO). The way it works is fairly straightforward: the HDB announces a new project, prospective buyers apply and are assigned a queue number, and then, if they're selected, they get to buy. Once a sufficient number of "pre-sales" have been obtained, the project begins construction, and buyers get a brand-new, subsidized apartment in 3 to 5 years.
Singapore also mandates that the apartments must be owner-occupied and so, in this carefully controlled delivery model, supply very closely mirrors demand. This is different from traditional condominium pre-sales where some buyers might be end users, some might be planning to rent out the home, and some might want to sell immediately upon completion. In those markets, the risk of overbuilding and speculative volatility is greater.


After this post, I promise to stop continually plugging the work and writing of Aziz Sunderji — at least for a few days. Over the weekend, I wrote about his recent post on happiness in America. Today, his latest post is about what happens to home prices after a particular grocery store opens. And for this, he looked at 32,000 store openings dating back to the mid-1970s and then compared them to ZIP-code-level home price data.
Here's what he found:

HDB classifies the apartments themselves into three groups: Standard, Plus, and Prime. This classification is meant to reflect the locational value of certain projects; but importantly, the intent is that they're all equally attainable to citizens. The difference is that "choicer" locations (their vocabulary — now you have a new Scrabble word) require greater subsidies to make them affordable, and so they come with additional obligations.
For example, in the case of Prime flats, there is a subsidy recovery upon any future sale (I'm told it's between 6-9% of the first resale price), the minimum occupation period (MOP) is 10 years (versus 5 for the Standard class), and you can never ever rent out the whole home, even once the MOP has lapsed. Once again, this is about strictly matching new supply to end-user demand.
It's a lot of rules. But in Singapore, the majority of people accept them in exchange for affordability.
Cover photo: Tengah, Singapore via Monocle
The average Walmart neighbourhood in this study has a median household income of $49,000, a college degree attainment rate of 23%, and a median home price of $144,000. And when a new Walmart opens, home prices have tended to underperform the national average by about 4% in the three years that follow.
On the flip side, the average Trader Joe's neighbourhood has a median household income of $82,000, a college degree attainment rate of 52%, and a median home value of $425,000.
Importantly, though, Trader Joe's isn't just picking neighbourhoods with obviously favourable demographics (retail is a lagging indicator — it generally comes once the demand is already there). It seems to be picking neighbourhoods that, in the words of Aziz, have "room to keep running." In the three years that follow a new Trader Joe's opening, homes in those ZIP codes have tended to outperform the national average by 6%!
One of the fascinating things about this finding is that it seems to perfectly support the company's target market. It has been said that Joe Coulombe (founder of the company) used to describe his target customer as "overeducated and underpaid." In other words, he actively targeted university graduates.
But being underpaid only lasts so long. We know that educational attainment is typically the single best predictor of household income. So, if you target this group, chances are that they'll eventually become fairly paid or maybe even overpaid. And when this happens, I guess it shows up in area home prices.
Cover photo by Karolina Bobek on Unsplash
Chart from Home Economics
HDB classifies the apartments themselves into three groups: Standard, Plus, and Prime. This classification is meant to reflect the locational value of certain projects; but importantly, the intent is that they're all equally attainable to citizens. The difference is that "choicer" locations (their vocabulary — now you have a new Scrabble word) require greater subsidies to make them affordable, and so they come with additional obligations.
For example, in the case of Prime flats, there is a subsidy recovery upon any future sale (I'm told it's between 6-9% of the first resale price), the minimum occupation period (MOP) is 10 years (versus 5 for the Standard class), and you can never ever rent out the whole home, even once the MOP has lapsed. Once again, this is about strictly matching new supply to end-user demand.
It's a lot of rules. But in Singapore, the majority of people accept them in exchange for affordability.
Cover photo: Tengah, Singapore via Monocle
The average Walmart neighbourhood in this study has a median household income of $49,000, a college degree attainment rate of 23%, and a median home price of $144,000. And when a new Walmart opens, home prices have tended to underperform the national average by about 4% in the three years that follow.
On the flip side, the average Trader Joe's neighbourhood has a median household income of $82,000, a college degree attainment rate of 52%, and a median home value of $425,000.
Importantly, though, Trader Joe's isn't just picking neighbourhoods with obviously favourable demographics (retail is a lagging indicator — it generally comes once the demand is already there). It seems to be picking neighbourhoods that, in the words of Aziz, have "room to keep running." In the three years that follow a new Trader Joe's opening, homes in those ZIP codes have tended to outperform the national average by 6%!
One of the fascinating things about this finding is that it seems to perfectly support the company's target market. It has been said that Joe Coulombe (founder of the company) used to describe his target customer as "overeducated and underpaid." In other words, he actively targeted university graduates.
But being underpaid only lasts so long. We know that educational attainment is typically the single best predictor of household income. So, if you target this group, chances are that they'll eventually become fairly paid or maybe even overpaid. And when this happens, I guess it shows up in area home prices.
Cover photo by Karolina Bobek on Unsplash
Chart from Home Economics
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