Daily insights for city builders, delivered every morning at 6 AM ET. I’m Brandon Donnelly — a Toronto-based real estate developer and founder of Globizen. I’ve been writing here since 2013.
Harvard economist Edward Glaeser has a new paper out talking about “urbanization and its discontents.” In it, he argues that while cities today are working remarkably well for highly skilled people, they don’t seem to be delivering the same upward mobility to lower skilled people. The “urban wage premium” for this segment of the population has seemingly disappeared.
The posited causes of this discontent will likely resonate with many of you:
Urban resurgence represents private sector success, and the public sector typically only catches up to urban change with a considerable lag. Moreover, as urban machines have been replaced by governments that are more accountable to empowered residents, urban governments do more to protect insiders and less to enable growth. The power of insiders can be seen in the regulatory limits on new construction and new businesses, the slow pace of school reform and the unwillingness to embrace congestion pricing.
Unfortunately, this paper isn’t available for free online. If you’re interested, you’ll need to purchase a copy, here.
Yesterday I made a comment on Twitter about most people not understanding to what extent government bureaucracy inhibits the delivery of new housing in this city. It received a number of responses, including remarks about how development charges have also recently doubled and how this statement applies to pretty much every city out there. But there was also a comment about developers not being transparent and not properly explaining the impact to the public. In other words: please demystify the development pro forma. I thought that was a fair remark, and so this post is going to be a response to that comment.
Before I begin, it’s important to keep in mind that most developers have investors. These investors put up most of the money required for a project and in turn they take most of the profits. However, there is typically a “promote” in place, which is just an incentive structure that pays the developer more of the profits (disproportionate to the cash they invested in the project) if they perform and hit certain return benchmarks. All of this is to say that developers aren’t usually the ones holding all of the cash (which is what a lot of the public seems to think) and they are accountable to their investors to do what they said they would do.
Now let’s run through the costs that make up a “typical” development pro forma. For this example, I am going to assume that we’re talking about a 100,000 square foot mid-rise building; the kind that you might build and find along any one of Toronto’s Avenues. If we were doing this in real life, we would get more precise with the areas and consider gross construction area, gross floor area (city definition), and the net saleable/rentable areas. But to keep the math simple, we will ignore these differences. That’s the approach I’m going to take overall in the post. What you need to know, though, is that you have to pay to build the entire building, but you only get to collect revenue on a portion of it. That’s why the “efficiency” of a building matters.
Land
The value of development land is a function of what you can build and the revenue you can ultimately collect. So location matters a great deal. Based on the latest high-density land report from Bullpen and Batory, the average price of an unzoned mid-rise site in the City of Toronto is about $231 psf. So let’s assume a land cost for our project of $23.1 million. Assuming we can get land financing at 60% of the value of the land (loan-to-value), that would mean we’re putting up $9.24 million of cash (plus a loan guarantee!) and borrowing $13.86 million to start our project. At 5.25% per annum (interest-only loan), our annual interest charges would be about $727,650. From now on forward, we’re going to pay ~$60k in additional interest charges for every month that our project is delayed. Buckle up.
You should now begin to see why time is so valuable and why government bureaucracy can be so frustrating. As a developer, you’re heavily incentivized to move things forward, whereas it can often feel like everyone around you is trying to deliberately erect roadblocks in order to slow you down and make your project more expensive to build. Oftentimes, it is because it is less risky for them to punt things down the road and not make a decision. That is not the case for us and our project.
Hard Costs
Onto construction (or hard) costs. As many of you know, these have risen dramatically over the last 4 to 5 years. On some of our projects, we have added over $100 psf in hard costs alone. Part of this has to do with a busy construction market and part of this has to do with new building requirements: watertight undergrounds, new Green Standards, and so on. For our project, which is on the small side, let’s assume $360 psf for a total of $36 million. This would include our direct construction costs and our construction manager’s overhead (general conditions). We should also prepare for some of the trades to decline to bid on our project because it is too small and not worth their time.
Soft Costs
Soft costs include everything from consultant costs and interest charges to government levies and management fees. Like everything in your pro forma, these absolutely need to be broken out line by line. Don’t be lazy here. But for the purposes of this simplistic example, we’re going to use 75% of hard costs, which works out to be $27 million (or $270 psf). When I first started out in the development business, the rule of thumb was closer to 25% of hard costs. But times have changed. Government fees, alone, can make up about 1/4 of the price of a new condo in Toronto.
Adding up all of these costs, we’re at $861 psf or $86.1 million in costs. It’s now time to consider the revenue side. $1,000 psf seems like a nice round number, so let’s start there and assume we’re going to sell our condos for that. Typically in Toronto, the price you pay is inclusive of HST, so that liability will need to be deducted from our revenue line. It’s not a straight 13% because of the new home rebate, but the rebate also hasn’t been properly indexed since it was introduced and so the liability could still be upwards of 10%. (This is worthy of a separate blog post.) The result is $900 psf in revenue and a margin on costs that is less than 5%. No sensible developer would want to do this project. One misstep (or development charge increase) and you’re dead.
So let’s increase our condo prices to $1,100 psf. Maybe that will work. In doing that, we get to a margin on costs that is nearly 15%. Okay, now we’re in the range. But let’s say we just got delayed by 6 months (boom, interest charges) and our hard costs turned out to be off by $15. They’re actually working out to be $375 psf because of some new tariff and because the formworkers in the city are all tied up on bigger projects and couldn’t give a shit about our cute little infill project. Now we’re offside again in terms of our margin on costs. No problem, let’s try and push condo prices a bit more. Is $1,150 achievable? Perhaps. But ideally, given the above, we would want to be at $1,200 psf just to be safe.
This is an overly simplistic example of the math that goes into a development pro forma. But hopefully it begins to show you (1) just how many moving parts there are in a development project and (2) the kind of pricing that is required in today’s cost environment. Developers are reacting to the costs that they are being thrown and it is creating upward pressure on home prices. (See related post: Cost-plus pricing.) So far there has been enough elasticity in the market to absorb these price increases, but that may not always be the case. If you have questions about this post or disagree with any of my assumptions, feel free to leave a searing comment below.
This past week, San Francisco’s Proposition E was approved by 55% of voters. The measure works by limiting new office development if (or when) the city falls short of its affordable housing target for the year.
If the city only builds 25% of its housing target (currently set at 2,042 affordable units per year), then only 25% of its annual allocation of office space can be built the following year. (I just learned that large scale office development in San Francisco has been limited to 875,000 sf per year as a result of a Proposition dating back to 1986.)
So at the moment, San Francisco looks destined to start building a lot less office space. And considering that new office space actually helps to fund affordable housing, I am struggling to understand why the goal seems to be to constrain job growth.
California State Senator Scott Wiener called Prop E a dumpster fire:
Prop E’s passage is perhaps the worst institutional political failure I’ve seen in my 23 years in SF.
Prop E is a dumpster fire.
It‘ll reduce $ for affordable housing/transit, cost SF’s general fund billions, push out start-ups/nonprofits & fuel office sprawl (w increased VMT). https://t.co/97p2RZNAPO
— Senator Scott Wiener (@Scott_Wiener) March 4, 2020
Call me old fashioned, but I tend to think that if the goal is to build more affordable housing, you should do things that, you know, encourage the actual construction of affordable housing.
The City of Toronto is currently studying ways to increase housing options/supply and planning permissions in areas of the city that are designated as Neighbourhoods in the Official Plan.
These are areas that are sometimes referred to as the “Yellowbelt”, because they are seeing very little intensification and, in a number of cases, actually losing population. (They’re also colored yellow in Toronto’s land use map.)
Ultimately, the goal is to encourage more “missing middle” type housing forms; housing that is denser than single-family homes but smaller in scale than say mid-rise housing like Junction House.
Here are a couple of interesting charts from the City. Based on Toronto’s Official Plan, “Neighbourhoods” make up 35.4% of the city’s land area.
In Toronto’s Zoning By-law, the “Residential” category makes up 47.1% of the city’s land area.
Digging deeper, 31.3% of Toronto’s total area is zoned for only detached houses — which would mean no missing middle type housing. But 15.8% of the city’s total area is already zoned to permit other types of low-rise residential buildings, such as duplexes and triplexes.
So why isn’t more of that happening?
As we’ve talked about before on the blog, the problem is that it is exceedingly difficult to make the math work on projects of this scale, which is why most developers don’t want to do them. The web of bureaucracy that you need to navigate in order to build anything in the city is also imposing for non-developers (and developers really).
But to be a developer, I think you need to be an optimist. So I am going to remain hopeful that this study — and the pilot they want to do in Ward 19 — will result in a streamlined solution for housing of this scale.
A new 280 acre park is currently under construction in an old quarry on the westside of Atlanta. It’s called Westside Park. When it opens this spring (that’s at least the target), it will be by far the largest park in the city. But already there are concerns that this investment in new public space could be triggering “rapid gentrification” in the surrounding area.
So earlier this month, the mayor’s office issued an executive order that put in place a 6-month moratorium on all new construction permits in the communities surrounding the park. The order read like this: “…refuse to accept new applications for rezonings, building permits for new construction, land disturbance permits, special use permits, special administrative permits, subdivisions, replattings, and lot consolidations for non-public projects.”
The objective is to avoid displacement. And since new development means change, this is a way to stop change. (Don’t you just hate when things go and change?) The problem, of course, is that a moratorium on new housing doesn’t stop change and it does nothing to address the desire to live next to this new amenity. It only stymies the supply of new housing to meet this demand. (It’s also incongruent with the park investment being marketed as a “catalyst for new development.”)
In fact, Joe Cortright (of City Observatory) and Jenny Schuetz (of the Brookings Institution) have both argued — either directly or indirectly — that the above move could actually increase displacement in the surrounding area; because the moratorium on new housing could simply redirect demand toward the existing housing stock. The order does seem to suggest that you can still renovate an existing property.
I wonder if any studies have been done on the externalities associated with temporary housing supply moratoriums. If so, I would be interested in reading them.
Aaron Renn’s latest article in the Manhattan Institute is about how America’s top cities can “grow to new heights.” Usually when we talk about urban problems, it is because of failures. But in this case, it is about problems of success (though I suppose you could argue these are still failures).
Cities such as New York and San Francisco have, in his view, stopped thinking like growth cities and that is leading to high home prices and overburdened infrastructure. But we all know that these problems are not unique to only “superstar cities.”
Not surprisingly, Aaron argues that we need to stop implementing land use policies that only exacerbate our housing supply problems. Things like rent control and inclusionary zoning. And in some cases, it may be time for states to start intervening in local planning decisions.
I don’t love how this WSJ article starts. It seems to place the blame on technology companies for “pumping the west coast full of choking traffic and expensive homes.”
But I do really like these charts:
They show the gap between the increase in labor force and the increase in housing supply across the various cities in Silicon Valley.
The solid line is the percentage increase in labor force since 2010 and the dotted (bottom) line is the percentage increase in housing units since 2010.
The darker the color, the bigger the gap.
Many new jobs. Lots of wealth created. Not nearly enough housing. And yes, there have also been a number of negative externalities.
The full article is definitely worth a read. It’s about Google’s development plans for downtown San Jose.
Last year, the city of Berlin agreed to a five year rent freeze for some 1.5 million flats constructed before 2014. The way it was initially approved is that it would freeze rents at mid-2019 levels and allow for only 1.3% inflationary increases. All of this is being challenged in the courts, but the Financial Times is suggesting that it could still come into force by March 2020. Here is an excerpt from a recent article. (Guy Chazan isn’t holding back about the kind of people that he believes Berlin attracts.)
The legislation, which should come into force by March this year, is City Hall’s response to a lingering housing crisis that shows no sign of easing. Packed out with Brexit refugees, international party people and wannabe tech entrepreneurs, Berlin is in expansion mode, its population growing by 40,000 a year. Yet affordable housing remains scarce. Rents have doubled over the past decade, as new residential construction fails to keep up with soaring demand.
As I mentioned before on the blog, these policies are not intended to apply to new buildings. That would surely choke off new construction, which would only exacerbate the underlying supply issue that Berlin is facing. But not surprisingly, this move has also put a freeze on capital expenditures, according to the same FT article. Local trades are complaining that, “It’s as if someone’s just turned out the lights.”
Zoning, as practiced in much of the nation, gravely misallocates resources. Some distortions are micro, such as the mediocre siting of Anton Menlo housing [a project by Facebook], and the lack of walkable neighborhoods in New Haven suburbs. Others are macro. If Silicon Valley were more populous, it would be a world tech center even more attractive to IT workers. The misuse of zoning squanders land, adds to the nation’s carbon footprint, warps interstate migrants’ choices about where to reside, and helps price poor households out of wealthier neighborhoods that would offer better life prospects for their children.
The paper focuses on three metropolitan areas: Austin, Silicon Valley, and New Haven. Of these three, Austin is the most permissive in terms of allowing new and denser housing. Silicon Valley and New Haven, by contrast, have done a great deal to limit intensification by adopting exclusionary policies.
In 1970, home prices in Silicon Valley were only slightly above the national average. Today, they are by far the highest in the United States, which is, of course, partially a result of high demand (tech salaries) and low supply (zoning ordinances). Ellickson’s paper examines the effects of the latter.
This week Bloomberg reported that Dubai is facing a “housing disaster” as a result of overbuilding. There’s simply too much supply coming onto the market. About 30,000 units are expected to be completed this year, which the industry believes is about 2x actual demand. As a result, the industry — yes, the development industry — is calling for a 1-2 year pause on all new construction in the city so that the excess units can be absorbed and demand can catch up.
I’m not an expert on the Dubai market. And I’ve only been to the city once. But my sense is that there are relatively few barriers to new supply, especially compared to markets like Toronto and San Francisco. And so it’s not surprising to hear that supply is and has been outstripping demand. According to Bloomberg, the market peaked about 5 years ago.
For the industry to call for a moratorium on new construction it must mean that there’s concern of a prolonged housing slump and perhaps even some sort of systemic collapse. But if the objective is more affordable housing, than you might argue that Dubai has been doing a pretty good job of that. Here is a global city with a “housing crisis” on the opposite end of the spectrum. So what is it that makes Dubai different than, say, London or San Francisco?
