Tag: developer

• Los Angeles approves new “mansion tax”

  If you’re looking to pass a new ordinance and/or create a new tax, it’s important to have the right name. Take, for example, Los Angeles’ new “mansion tax.” The majority of people do not have a so-called “mansion.” And so signaling to people that you’re going to tax this thing and then redistribute the funds to help others with better housing is, not surprisingly, attractive to many. Here’s how the new tax works:

  Known as Measure ULA — for “United to House LA” — the ordinance marketed as a “mansion tax” will impose a 4% tax on property sales above $5 million, rising to 5.5% on sales above $10 million. So a $5-million sale would include a $200,000 tax, and a $10-million sale would include a $550,000 tax, which is typically paid by the seller.

  Of course, if you’re a rich person with a mansion, your first thought is going to be, “how do I avoid having to pay this?” Here are two unproven and possibly illegal options that I am not condoning in any way:

  For example, if a homeowner is selling a mansion for $15 million, they’d be slapped with a $825,000 tax bill. But if they split up the property into three parts owned by three different entities and sold all three pieces for $4.999 million each, they would hypothetically elude the tax since it only kicks in at $5 million.

  Another strategy might be to hatch deals off the books to keep a sale under $5 million. For example, if a seller wanted $7 million for their house, they could reach a deal with a buyer to sell it for $4.999 million, thus avoiding the tax, but then sell the furniture in the home for $2 million.

  I don’t have a mansion, so I’m fortunate enough not to have to worry about such things. But I do think about the impact on things like new rental supply. My understanding of the ordinance is that if you’re a developer of rental housing, and you buy a lot for $4.99 million, build a mid-market apartment, and then turn around and sell it to a pension fund for $10.01 million, you would be subject to this new tax.

  Hmm. I wouldn’t call this a mansion.

  2022.12.16

• Use-it-or-lose-it entitlements

  One of the things that cities often try and stamp out is speculation. Homes should not sit empty (enter vacant home tax). Storefronts should not sit empty (enter vacant commercial tax). And development land should not sit undeveloped. To correct this latter problem, one idea that is sometimes floated around is “use-it-or-lose-it” zoning.

  The way it works today in, I believe, most cities, is that if you do a site-specific rezoning on a property — and secure additional density — you get those special permissions forever. If you want to wait 100 years before starting construction, you are technically entitled to do that. Of course, in the interim, no new housing is actually being created. It’s all just on paper.

  The idea with “use-it-or-lose-it” entitlements is that — instead of these permissions lasting forever — they would expire after a certain period of time, which would mean that the entire rezoning process would need to be done all over again. These take time (at least a few years) and cost money (it’s in the millions). And so it has been suggested that this would incentivize developers to not sit on entitled land.

  While I do understand where this line of thinking is coming from, let me make a few points:

  • Generally speaking, most developers don’t just sit on entitled land for fun. They need things to happen, and to happen quickly, so that value can be realized. If there is a problem of too many developers not actually building, it could be a sign that there are other market factors impacting feasibility.
  • There is nothing wrong with rezoning a property and then “flipping it out” to another developer. This is often viewed negatively. But some developers only rezone properties and some developers only buy zoned sites. These can be different phases of the value chain. A rezoning can take years and millions of dollars, and so sometimes developers don’t have the wherewithal or desire to do both.
  • A use-it-or-lose-it approach unfairly punishes developers during market cycles and bear markets, like the one we are experiencing right now. There is no way to predict when the next global pandemic will hit, when construction costs might surge 40%, and when the fed could start rapidly increasing rates to calm inflation. Maybe waiting out the storm is all you can do.
  • If you’re building condominium housing in our market, you generally need pre-sales in order to secure a construction loan. Let’s call it 70% pre-sold. What happens if this takes longer than expected? And what happens if you sell 50%, your site-specific rezoning expires, and then you have to restart the entire process? At this point and in this current market environment, you would likely have to cancel the entire project and reboot it.
  • Timing is important. To give a specific project example, we had planned to launch condominium pre-sales for our One Delisle project in the fall of 2020. And we were ready to do that. But sentiment didn’t feel right. Too pandemic-y still, and so we waited until the spring of 2021. This turned out to be the right decision. But what would have happened had we had this timing gun to our head? (Truthfully, it always feels like there’s a timing gun to our head.)
  • I have written about this before, but go-to-market strategies are changing in this current environment. It is taking longer to start sales and construction because, among other things, developers are spending more time trying to pin down their construction costs. Would rezoning expiries take all of this into consideration and adjust accordingly?
  • Finally, if one is going to do something like force developers to pull all of their building permits within X months of receiving zoning approvals — or else suffer the consequences — then everything required to get there should also have a maximum timeline associated with it. In other words, cities would also need to do things like commit to issuing permits within Y months of receiving a submission — or else. It’s only fair that this cuts both ways. But just to be very, very clear, I do not think this is a good idea.

  What I am broadly saying is that (1) development is a pain in the ass and (2) developers are already heavily incentivized to move quickly and make things happen. It is not uncommon for projects to take 5-10 years from site acquisition to completion. And a lot of unexpected things can happen during that time period. Hopefully losing your entitlements doesn’t become one of them.

  2022.10.10

• Two perplexing development narratives

  

  There are many development narratives that I don’t quite understand. (I’m thinking of Toronto, but you can probably replace Toronto with any number of global cities for this discussion.) One is the belief that our transit network is full and so no new development should be allowed in certain locations, next to certain transit stations. The thrust of this argument is that additional transit capacity must be added before any new development is allowed to occur. This might sound logical, except it ignores the fact that the need for new housing doesn’t magically disappear because subway cars are thought to be too busy during the morning rush.

  Transit systems are also a network, and so does this mean that no more development should be allowed to happen anywhere in the city/region? Or is the goal to simply move development off of higher order transit and into lower-density areas so that the future residents in these new buildings can either take buses to the transit stations that were previously deemed to be at capacity or drive their cars everywhere? (Our highways have excess capacity during the morning rush, right?)

  

  The second narrative that I find perplexing is that new developments don’t give back in any way. Above is a chart showing residential development charges in the City of Toronto, as of November 1, 2020. This chart outlines the fees that every developer must pay when building new residential, though it is important to keep in mind that there are many other government fees and charges that form part of almost every new development. These are things like parkland dedication and separately negotiated community benefits. But for the purposes of this post, let’s just focus on development charges (aka impact fees).

  Assume you’re building a 400 unit apartment building, consisting of 240 one bedroom suites (60%) and 160 two and three bedroom suites (40%). Based on the above chart, your development charge bill would be:

  240 one bedroom suites x $33,358 per unit = $8,005,920

  160 two and three bedroom suites x $51,103 per unit = $8,176,480

  For a total of $16,182,400.

  But it’s important to keep in mind that these are the rates as of November 1, 2020. They will almost certainly go up by the time these charges become payable for your 400 unit apartment building. By how much you ask? Well according to Urban Capital’s most recent issue of Site Magazine, which compared a development pro forma from 2005 to 2020, development charges in the City of Toronto have increased by about 3,244% during this time period. (The S&P 500 was up about 220% during this same time.) These are obligatory fees that contribute to everything from transit and parks to subsidized housing and municipal services. (The line items above.)

  So it strikes me that there are other more productive questions that we could and should be asking ourselves. Such as, why is it that our transit/mobility infrastructure hasn’t kept pace with new development and new housing demand? What are we going to do to fix that immediately? Why are we not taxing the things we don’t want (like traffic congestion) so that we have more resources for the things we do want (like transit and housing)? And most importantly, what is the best way for all of us to work together so that we can create the absolute greatest global city in the world?

  Photo by Mimi Di Cianni on Unsplash

  2021.01.30

• The war on beauty

  A recent essay by The School of Life asks: “Why is the Modern World So Ugly?” Here’s how it opens:

  “One of the great generalisations we can make about the modern world is that it is, to an extraordinary degree, an ugly world. If we were to show an ancestor from 250 years ago around our cities and suburbs, they would be amazed at our technology, impressed by our wealth, stunned by our medical advances – and shocked and disbelieving at the horrors we had managed to build. Societies that are, in most respects, hugely more advanced than those of the past have managed to construct urban environments more dispiriting, chaotic and distasteful than anything humanity has ever known.“

  Naturally, it turns out that this is, at least partially, the fault of greedy and unscrupulous real estate developers:

  “When property developers heard that the artistic avant-garde was now promoting a concept of functionalism, they rejoiced. From the most high brow quarters, the most mean minded motives had been given a seal of approval. No longer would these developers have to spend any money on anything to do with beauty. Out could go the symmetry, the flowers, the nice but slightly more expensive materials. It could all be as quick, ugly and cheap as possible; after all, isn’t that what the great minds of architecture had advised?“

  The author goes on:

  “Yet this nuance was lost on the property developers who came after them. Their constructions weren’t elegantly pared down with grace. They were something far worse: sloppy, mean-minded and ugly. Except that now, because of the words of the modernist masters, there was apparently nothing one could do to charge them with a dereliction of duty. The concept of beauty had been rendered old-fashioned, it smelt elitist and woolly. No one could any more complain that beauty was missing from the world without sounding soft-headed.“

  To be fair, the essay doesn’t entirely blame developers. It, more specifically, outlines six possible reasons for the ugliness of the modern world. And I do agree with some of them.

  Click here for the full essay.

  2021.01.21

• The housing supply narrative is a sham

  

  That is the argument that Joshua Gordon, who is an assistant professor in the Simon Fraser University School of Public Policy, recently made in this opinion piece in the Globe and Mail. In his view, there’s no evidence to suggest that housing supply can actually help housing affordability. It’s just something that developers throw around to “stymie action on the demand-side” and to help with their rezoning efforts. Really, the housing problem is due to intense demand from foreign buyers, investors, and from “high rental demand.”

  Now, as many of you know, I am a developer, and not a professor. So you can take this post however you would like. But I do have a few thoughts.

  One, I think it’s an oversimplification to argue that there have been no regulatory changes over the last decade that have meaningfully and negatively impacted the supply of new housing. To give you one example, this fall, development levies in Toronto will complete a phase-in that has seen them double over the last couple of years. Almost a quarter of the price of a new residential condominium now goes to pay government fees and taxes. This has an impact on supply, even if the “regulatory environment” hasn’t necessarily changed.

  Two, I don’t buy the argument that, “surrounding cities have also seen rapid price appreciation and it’s easier to build there, so housing supply mustn’t be the problem.” Building outside of cities like Toronto and Vancouver isn’t necessarily easier. In fact, in some cases it can be more difficult if they’re not accustomed to more progressive urban infill-type developments.

  Three, it’s important to keep in mind that we have a financing structure in place that biases the types of homes (specifically residential condominiums) that get built. This approach is designed to mitigate financial risk, but it also means that investors serve an important function in the delivery of new housing. I’m not saying that the system is perfect; but I am saying that things are maybe not as simple as they may seem.

  Four, just because there are cities with lots of single-detached homes and relatively affordable housing, I don’t think we can safely assume that single-family land use policies have no impact on supply and pricing in cities like Toronto and Vancouver. In fact, I would argue the opposite. This probably goes to show you the importance of an elastic housing supply. Indeed, some of the most affordable housing markets are dominated by low-rise houses precisely because it is a typology that is quicker and cheaper to build than most urban infill housing.

  Finally, I’m not sure why anyone would consider high rental demand and a strong labor market to be symptomatic of a problem. Isn’t that what you usually want out of cities? You want there to be an abundance of good jobs that pay people money so that they can, you know, have a life and consume things like housing. But maybe that’s just the way that I look at things. I am a developer after all.

  Photo by Wiktor Karkocha on Unsplash

  2020.09.14

• A few thoughts about housing supply

  Here are a few things to consider.

  One, the home you live in was likely built by a person or company that was trying to make a profit.

  Two, when your home was being developed and built, it probably upset a bunch of people. Both because something new was coming and because construction can be annoying.

  Three, your home was built using materials and construction techniques that were readily available at the time. Some of those materials and techniques may no longer be practical.

  Four, when your home was complete, somebody probably thought, “boy, they don’t build them like they used to.”

  Five, the need for new housing doesn’t stop just because you now have a home.

  2020.08.27

• What will our customers think? Condo vs. rental.

  Condo developers are merchant builders. They build a project and then move on. Because of this, there’s a belief that there’s little incentive to build for durability, in comparison to say purpose-built rental buildings where the developer might continue to own over an extended period of time. While it is true that putting on an operations hat will make you hyper-focused on everything from garbage collection to how you’re going to manage all of your suite keys, there are a few things to consider in this debate.

  One, as developers we certainly think and care a lot about our brand and our reputation, both with our customers and with Tarion (warranty program). We ask ourselves: “What will our customers think if we do this?” Irrespective of the tenure we’re building, we want our projects to be carefully considered. And in the case of condominium projects, we would like our customers to feel excited and comfortable about buying in one of our future projects. That’s the goal. This is no different than any other product that you might buy that doesn’t come along with some sort of ongoing subscription.

  Two, there’s often a spread between condominium and rental values. For example, let’s consider a brand new 550 square foot condominium in a central neighborhood of Toronto and let’s say it would cost you $1,300 psf to buy it today. (Obviously it could be more or it could be less depending on the area and the building.) Now let’s start with a rent and back into a value, using some basic assumptions.

  Unit Size (SF)	550
  Monthly Rent	$2,400
  Rent PSF – Monthly	$4.36
  Rent PSF – Annual	$52.36
  NOI Margin	72%
  NOI	$37.70
  Exit Cap	3.75%
  Value PSF	$1,005

  Here I’m assuming that same suite would rent for $2,400 per month. I’m converting that to an annual PSF rent. And then I’m assuming that if you were managing a whole building of these kinds of units, your operating costs might be somewhere around 28%. Crude back-of-the-napkin math to get to a Net Operating Income (psf). Finally, I’m capping this NOI at 3.75%. We can debate my assumptions and if this were in a development pro forma you might “trend” the rents. But I find this comparison helpful. Here we are getting to a value of around $1,005 per square foot. Less than our $1,300 psf above.

  The point is that the margins are tighter, which helps to explain why for a long time we saw very few purpose-built rentals being constructed in this city. So even though you might argue that the incentives are in place to build for durability, you do have to weigh that against the realities of what you can actually afford to build. Development is filled with all sorts of these tradeoffs. But if you and/or your investors really want a consistent yield, this strategy can work just fine. Personally, I’m a fan of the long-term approach.

  Three, rent control policies can have an impact both on the feasibility of new projects and on people’s ability to actually perform maintenance. If you have a scenario where your operating costs — everything from taxes to utilities — are rising faster than your allowable rent increases, then you’re in a bad situation and you have zero incentive or financial ability to actually invest in the building, despite being a long-term owner.

  Finally, there is nothing stopping a purpose-built rental developer from also being a merchant builder. i.e. Selling the entire rental building once it is done and it has been stabilized. So you could argue that we’re right back at my first point. Whether you’re selling to individual condominium owners or the entire building to one entity, you as the developer have to sit back and ask yourself: “What will our customer(s) think if we do this?”

  2020.07.11

• Where developers won’t build even with $0 land

  Building on yesterday’s post about inclusionary zoning, below is a telling diagram from the Urban Land Institute showing which areas of Portland can support new development and which areas cannot. To create this map, ULI looked at achievable rents in each US census block to determine, quite simply, where rents will cover the cost of new development (all types of construction).

  

  However, in their models they are also assuming a land value of $0. And typically people want you to pay them money when you buy their land. So in all likelihood, this map is overstating the amount of blue — that being land where new development is feasible.

  But it does tell you something about developer margins. A lot of people seem to assume that the margins on new developments are so great that things like inclusionary zoning can simply be “absorbed” without impacting overall feasibility. The reality is that there are large swaths in most cities where development is never going to happen even if you were to start handing out free land.

  This map is also helpful at illustrating some of the impacts of IZ. If you assume that rents are the highest in the center of the city and that they fall off as you move outward, then the outer edge of the above blue area is going to be where development is only marginally feasible. And so any new cost imposed on development would naturally start to uniformly eat away at the blue feasible area — that is, until rents rise enough to offset it.

  Of course, this is a simplified mapping. Land usually costs money. Land values might also be highest in the center and fall off as you move outward, or there could be pockets of high-cost land. There may be more price elasticity in certain sub-markets compared to others. So the impacts of a new development cost may not play out as neatly as I outlined above.

  Regardless, there will be impacts, which is why I find this map telling even if it isn’t fully accurate or up to date. Maybe some of you will as well.

  2020.07.05

• What would you like to know about real estate development? (Also, inclusionary zoning)

  What would you like to know about real estate development?

  — Brandon Donnelly (@donnelly_b) July 4, 2020

  I asked this question on Twitter this morning because I am planning to write more development-related posts. It’s a topic that seems to be of interest to a lot of people. One question that I received was about the kind of profit margins that Toronto developers have been making over the past few decades. More specifically: How much have they increased? My response was that they haven’t increased. In fact, if anything, they’ve been compressing as a result of rising/additional costs. (I’ve touched on this before in posts like this one about cost-plus pricing.) I think a lot of developers are actually wondering how much elasticity is left in the market to continue absorbing these cost increases.

  Follow-up question to my response: Why then does this report by Steve Pomeroy claim that developers could still make a 15% margin even if they earmarked 30-40% of their units as affordable? Well, this was news to me so I went through the report and committed to responding on this blog. To be more precise, the report finds that there’s room in as-of-right developments to dedicate 10% affordable in medium-cost areas and 25% affordable in high-cost areas. For rezoned sites, the numbers are 30% affordable in high-cost areas and 15% affordable in medium-cost areas. These are a potentially dangerous set of takeaways for a few reasons.

  Very little mid-rise and high-rise development happens as-of-right in the City of Toronto. I don’t know what the exact percentage is, but I suspect it’s low. It would be very difficult to buy land if you were valuing it on this basis. And when you are valuing it — that is, running a development pro forma — it’s not enough to pull averages from a cost guide and run high-level numbers. You can start there, but ultimately you’re going to have to get more granular. Are you factoring the hundreds of thousands of dollars (more for bigger projects) that the City will charge you to occupy any public right-of-ways? What about your public contribution monies? This has historically been hard to estimate because the math that is used is akin to a secret recipe.

  In this particular report, they assume a 100-unit building with 88,750 square feet of gross floor area. Since GFA typically factors some allowable deductions, the gross construction area for the project is going to be greater. Let’s assume it’s 5% more — so about 93,190 square feet. This is how your construction manager will think about and do take-offs for the project. In the report, they peg total construction costs at $23,208,480. That works out to just shy of $250 per square foot (costs divided by above grade GCA). You cannot build a reinforced concrete residential building with below-grade parking for this number in Toronto. In today’s market, and at this small of a scale, you might be looking at $350 to 400 psf.

  On the low end of this range, that would mean your costs have just gone up by $9.4 million — which just so happens to be the expected developer/builder profit in this model. Except now you’re underwater and you won’t be able to finance and build your project. It’s probably time to look at your revenues and see if you can increase your projected rents at all. This is what I was getting at with cost-plus pricing. I would also add that I/we typically shy away from projects of this scale. There isn’t a lot of margin for error. One or two surprises and you might be cooked. So with or without inclusionary zoning, these can be challenging projects that many developers won’t even look at.

  My point with all of this is twofold: development pro formas are delicate and margins aren’t as generous and locked-in as most people seem to think. More often than not we end up passing on sites because we simply can’t make the numbers work. The land is just too expensive. Development happens on the margin. So talking about developers “absorbing” the costs of inclusionary zoning is perhaps the wrong way to frame this discussion. A more appropriate set of questions might be: Who is going to pay for the cost of inclusionary zoning? Are landowners going to suddenly drop their prices? Is the City going to reduce their development charges/impact fees? Or will developers wait until market prices and rents increase so that they can cover these new costs? This latter scenario is how it has worked so far.

  If you have other questions about development that you would like me to take a stab at answering, please leave a comment below or tweet at me.

  2020.07.04

• Uncreative and greedy

  There’s a narrative out there that all developers are uncreative and greedy, and if only they would start being more creative and generous, we could solve the housing affordability problem that is plaguing many (if not all) global cities. In other words, the solution to increasing the supply of low and middle incoming housing is simply a psychological reframing on the part of developers.

  The problem with this mental model is that it ignores reality. Development happens on the margin. The market is competitive. It’s difficult to find developable sites. And it’s a challenge to make projects work. More often than not, you have to say no as a developer. No I can’t buy this land. No I can’t build housing here. And no the market will not support new office space here. Sorry, but no. (See cost-plus pricing.)

  Development needs to give back. On the blog we usually call this city building. And that’s because it implies a greater sense of civic responsibility. Developers aren’t just building one-off buildings, they’re building a city. I believe wholeheartedly in this. But the belief that projects can be saddled with an endless array of government fees and civic contributions is a problematic one. There are limits — because markets have limits.

  If only city building were that easy.

  2019.11.27