Brandon Donnelly

Daily insights for city builders, delivered every morning at 6 AM ET. I’m Brandon Donnelly — a Toronto-based real estate developer and founder of Globizen. I’ve been writing here since 2013.

Subscribe

Search results for: “inclusionary zoning”

  • Developer sues City of Cambridge over its inclusionary zoning policy

    February 8, 2026 · View original

    Cambridge, Massachusetts, requires that 20% of the new space in larger housing developments include affordable homes. This, as we have talked about many times before on this blog, is known as inclusionary zoning (IZ). According to the Pioneer Institute, there are more than 141 communities in the state that have some sort of IZ policy.

    But now, what is happening is that the numbers don’t work on new housing projects. In the 30 years since the ordinance was enacted, it is reported that it helped create 1,603 affordable homes. However, since 2017 — the year the city increased the affordable requirement to 20% — only 200 new affordable homes have been created. That’s approximately 20-22 new affordable homes per year — not much.

    These numbers also don’t speak to the number of new housing projects that could have been built, but weren’t feasible precisely because of the IZ policy. This is the greater risk, because even new “luxury” projects help to relieve housing pressures within a market.

    It is for this reason, along with others, I’m sure, that a developer is now suing the City of Cambridge, arguing that inclusionary zoning is unconstitutional on the grounds that it infringes upon people’s property rights. To quote the developer, “I [would] have to build at a loss. Eventually, you just throw your hands up and say it doesn’t work.”

    If successful, this case could help to change how cities tax new housing and how they aim to create new affordable housing, though I should mention that there have already been prior rulings on this issue.

    Customarily, the way municipalities try to offset the burden of inclusionary zoning is to allow additional density and/or waive certain development levies. However, to accomplish this, you ideally need a planning framework where it’s perfectly clear what maximum density would have been permitted without IZ.

    For example, if 100,000 square feet is the maximum permitted density without IZ, and an additional 20% is permitted with IZ (+20,000 square feet) you can now calculate whether this additional density is enough to perfectly offset the IZ tax. If it is not, well then, you could maybe have a situation where it’s deemed as an unconstitutional “taking” of private land (oh boy, please don’t take this as any sort of planning legal advice).

    I think most of us would agree that cities are better when they are diverse and attainable to more people. The problem with IZ policies is that they run the risk of selectively taxing only certain people in an effort to create this outcome.

    Cover photo by Brett Wharton on Unsplash

  • Ontario proposes to pause Inclusionary Zoning policy in three municipalities

    January 13, 2026 · View original

    Oh boy, have we spoken a lot about inclusionary zoning over the years (see here, here, and the full list of 43 posts that I have tagged with “inclusionary zoning” here). Politicians tend to like this policy because they can present it as no-cost or “free” affordable housing. Few people have much sympathy for real estate developers, so it’s easy to just say, “Don’t worry, we’ll just get the developers to pay for it.”

    But the reality of inclusionary zoning is that you need a robust housing market that can absorb the additional cost burden of delivering affordable homes. There’s no such thing as a free lunch in economics, which is why when you read IZ reports and policy documents, you’ll typically find language to the effect that it only works in a strong economy and a strong housing market.

    These two descriptors do not generally apply in Ontario today, and so the province has just proposed an amendment that will pause the inclusionary zoning by-law. More specifically: developments with a complete application for a zoning by-law amendment, site plan approval, or a building permit on or before July 1, 2027, will not be subject to IZ in the cities of Toronto, Mississauga, and Kitchener.

    Why?

    Because IZ is deemed unviable under the current market conditions. In other words, there’s nobody to whom the cost of building affordable housing can be passed. If you’d like to comment on this proposal, you can do that here, and you have until January 19, 2026.

    Cover photo by Gleb Kozenko on Unsplash

  • Burnaby backtracks on inclusionary zoning

    The City of Burnaby recently passed an amendment to its inclusionary rental requirements. It has now been removed from the southeast portion of the city, which, according to Burnaby Now, has one of the lowest median incomes in the city.

    Here’s an excerpt from the staff recommendation report that was approved in early October:

    The analysis explored the impacts of increasing the density of developments in the Edmonds Town Centre area to try and improve revenues. However, the results showed that at current values, additional density is not able to offset the costs of providing the non-market housing, and that the equity needed to pursue large developments became prohibitive. As such, it is recommended that inclusionary rental requirements apply city-wide, with a delayed effective date for the Southeast Burnaby CMHC rental zone (the “SE Burnaby CMHC Zone”), until such time that inclusionary rental requirements become financially viable.

    What’s noteworthy about this amendment is that it acknowledges the real costs associated with non-market housing and shows how important high market rents are to subsidizing them. There’s no such thing as no-cost affordable housing. In the end, somebody always has to pay.

  • Remember unfunded inclusionary zoning?

    Over the weekend, we spoke about how the “GTA condo market is in a state of economic lockdown.” What this generally means is that the math isn’t making sense to build new condominiums. And so the market is necessarily pausing.

    We spoke about what this will likely mean for supply in the coming years, but I think it’s also interesting to talk about this in the context of something else: unfunded inclusionary zoning.

    As a reminder, inclusionary zoning is, in its most basic form, a requirement to build a certain amount of affordable housing as part of new housing developments. And what I mean by “unfunded” is that there are no subsidies or other incentives being provided to the project.

    This means that the cost of providing this housing — and there is an additional cost — needs to be shouldered by the project, which ultimately means the market-rate units need to pay for it.

    Which is why if you look at most policy studies, you’ll often find recognition that, because of this economic reality, IZ tends to work better in areas where home prices/rents are higher. And again, that’s because the market-rate homes need to shoulder the cost.

    We have questioned, many times, on this blog, whether this is the right approach to delivering affordable housing, but I think this question becomes even more critical in our current market environment.

    If the entire market is, for the most part, in a state of economic lockdown, should we really be layering on additional costs and making it broadly more difficult to build any sort of new housing? It seems counterintuitive.

    For more on this topic, check out this recent Sightline article by Dan Bertolet.

  • The inclusionary zoning paradox

    What do you get when you have some of the most stringent affordable housing requirements in the United States? You might think that you get lots and lots of affordable housing, but that is not the case in San Francisco. Paradoxically, you still get some of the most expensive housing in the United States. And part of the reason for this — according to this inclusionary zoning review committee — is as follows:

    Of all 40 scenarios, only four, all of them ownership-based, penciled out while satisfying the inclusionary program. Many of the projects that were designated as feasible, or came close to it, were smaller. That could be because larger structures use more expensive union labor and tend to contain advanced safety systems, like elevators that can operate during fires, said Strachan Forgan, principal at SCB, an architecture and design firm.

    Among the 20 that were rental projects, only one was shown to be feasible, but it did not satisfy the city’s mandatory inclusionary policy. While not yet ready to make recommendations, the committee members accepted the findings as accurate. Multiple development experts who reviewed the analysis for The Chronicle said it appeared to be well done.

    What is often missing from analyses about inclusionary zoning is how many projects it makes infeasible as a result of the requirement. It is not no-cost affordable housing. There are real costs and real impacts. But we like to tell ourselves that this isn’t the case because, at the end of the day, we’re not really that serious about building more housing and building more affordable housing. Too inconvenient. Too disruptive.

  • Rent control and inclusionary zoning

    I received an email from a reader over the weekend saying that my comments around rent control have been too critical, and that they are not doing proper justice to the challenges that renters face in today’s cities. I thought this was a fair comment and so I’d like to respond to it publicly on the blog.

    But before I get into that, it’s worth saying that housing issues are incredibly complex. And I am certainly not professing to have all of the answers. In fact, part of the reason I write this blog is so that I can think critically about these topics and hear what other people have to say.

    It is obvious that wages have not kept pace with home prices in many cities around the world. This is a problem. And so we can all agree that we need more economic opportunities, we need more housing, and we need more attainable housing. The question is how best to go about this.

    Mechanisms like rent control and inclusionary zoning might seem like obvious solutions. Just cap rents and force developers to build affordable housing. Problem solved at no cost to anyone, right? It’s not that simple. Every intervention creates distortions in the market.

    To give just one example, studies suggest that rent controls end up creating a misallocation of housing. Because if you are living in a rent controlled home and your rent is well below market, you are now heavily incentivized never to move. Even if you have an empty nest with 5 bedrooms, why would you?

    Of course, there are other possible repercussions. Residential contracts are typically gross leases (though some utilities might be sub-metered and paid for by the tenant). This is in contrast to commercial leases where net leases are common and most, if not all, of the operating costs are passed through to the tenant.

    Why this matters is that if your rents are capped but your utility costs, taxes, and other operating expenses are continuing to rise, you may run into a situation as a landlord where you can no longer afford to upkeep your building. And you’re certainly not going to invest in any new improvements if this is your situation.

    Rent controls could also impact the supply of new housing by making it no longer feasible to build. This is similar to what we have seen with policies like inclusionary zoning. Just last month San Francisco went on the record saying that it’s going to rethink its inclusionary zoning policies because of a view that it is now choking off new housing supply.

    And so herein lies one of our great housing challenges. We want more housing and we want more affordable housing. But depending on how we approach the latter, it could hurt the former, which ends up creating a viscous cycle.

    Building new rental housing is very challenging in Toronto (and elsewhere). Typically the way the process goes for a developer is that you start by preparing a detailed development pro forma. This pro forma will then tell you that your new rental development is infeasible. And so you go back, convert it to a condominium development, and then it magically becomes feasible.

    I am exaggerating, but only slightly. The point is that there are lots of developers out there who would love to build more rental housing — they just can’t make the math worth.

    My goal with this post was to explain where I have been coming from with some of my past comments. I also used the opportunity to link to a number of my related posts. But I haven’t really put forward any possible solutions. I plan to do that in a follow-up post, and I think I’m going to call it “the definitive but crazy guide to creating more affordable housing.”

    So if any of you have any crazy ideas, please send them over.

  • Philadelphia readies new inclusionary zoning policy

    When I was living in Philadelphia as a graduate student, new development was seen as a bit of a gift. I remember developers telling me that it costs the same to build in Philly as it does in New York, except that the rents are obviously a fraction in the former relative to the latter. So it was tough to make projects pencil.

    At the same time, Philadelphia had a 10-year residential tax abatement program in place. I think it’s still in place, but it may have been modified since I was there. Either way, it was essentially an incentive to develop or redevelop existing residential properties. In the case of a renovation, the taxes associated with any improvements were what got abated for the 10 years.

    Put differently, it was an invitation to gentrify. Come buy an old row home, fix it up, and then don’t pay any additional property taxes on those improvements. This was the way things felt at the time. So it was interesting to learn today that Philly’s current development boom is about to get throttled down with a new mandatory inclusionary zoning policy that will take effect later this year. Gentrification, it would now seem, is a problem.

    The policy requires that 20% of the units in any new housing development (with 10 or more units) must be affordable for at least a 50-year period. For rental households, affordability means 40% of the area median income (AMI). And for owner-occupied households, it means 60% of AMI.

    I have already said pretty much everything I can say about inclusionary zoning. But one of the unique things about Philly’s policy is that it is only going to apply to two of its Council Districts. It is not a citywide policy. This is going to create a strong disincentive to develop in these areas, and will likely force new development into surrounding ones. But maybe that’s part of the point.

    Photo by Dan Mall on Unsplash

  • Density bonus as inclusionary zoning offset

    Somebody on Twitter responded to my recent post about inclusionary zoning and asked: Aren’t all the upzonings that the City is already doing a kind of density bonus? In other words, and this is me elaborating here, why is there an economic “shortfall?” Why does there need to be any other sort of subsidy in order to mitigate the economic impacts of inclusionary zoning?

    A density bonus can mean and can be used in a number of different contexts. Sometimes it is used as an incentive with landowners, whereby they get a bonus on top of their sale price if the developer manages to achieve a certain amount of density on the site. But in this particular case — IZ subsidies — we’re talking about something else.

    We’re talking about density above and beyond what you might normally achieve on a particular site in order to directly offset — maybe partially or maybe entirely — the economic shortfall brought about by inclusionary zoning. The fact that upzonings are happening all over the city doesn’t necessarily qualify them as bonuses. In the case of Toronto, the market is just responding to out-of-date zoning.

    Here’s a specific example.

    Let’s say you have a development site with in-place zoning that would allow you to build 20,000 sf of density. This is the as-of-right or by-right density. No need to rezone the site. Just file your building permits and you’re off making things. If this is the most you could build, then the market would value the land based on this density. As we have talked about before, land is the residual claimant in a development pro forma.

    However, if the zoning was out of date and it was fairly clear that one could rezone the site and build up to 100,000 sf, then the market would no longer value the site based on its in-place zoning. It would instead value it based on its future expected density. Again, because land is the residual claimant, more density = higher land value.

    In this second scenario, the additional 80,000 sf is, in my view, not a density bonus. Give or take a bit here and there, it is the density that everyone is generally expecting. The market has already priced it in. A true bonus / subsidy, would be something above and beyond the base of 100,000 sf. Something that is only available to developers if they do X — which could be build affordable housing.

    Maybe the bonus is perfectly tuned to exactly offset the economic drag of doing X, or maybe the bonus is designed to serve as an incentive to do X. In this latter case, the bonus would more than offset the drag and be accretive to the pro forma, which would mean that every sensible developer would now want to do X. More carrot, less stick.

    One of the challenges with this hypothetical scenario is that, for such a bonus structure to work, you need to know the baseline that you’re bonusing against and you need to ensure that nobody gets the bonus unless they do the thing — the X. Using the above example, that means that the 100,000 sf needs to be fairly firm and that anything above that number only happens with the delivery of affordable housing.

  • The inclusionary zoning shortfall

    Colliers recently hosted a webinar about inclusionary zoning here in Toronto. On the panel was Jeremiah Shamess (SVP at Colliers / moderator), David Bronskill (partner at Goodmans), Giulio Cescato (senior planner at IBI Group), and Richard Witt (principal at BDP Quadrangle). I wasn’t able to attend (either because of a critical meeting or because I was off attending to a gluttonous lunch burrito), but the slides are now available online. I was going through them this morning and I came across this chart from NBLC:

    What you are seeing here is a comparison between a typical market development before IZ and a development after IZ. As you can see, soft costs remain the same, hard costs remain the same, and the profit margin remains the same. What changes is the overall revenue. Market revenue goes down because you now have fewer market-rate units and a new IZ revenue is added, which is the revenue generated from the addition of affordable units to the project.

    But when you add up the market revenue and the IZ revenue, you don’t get back to the same economic equilibrium. In other words, there has been a destruction of value, and so something is going to have to give in order for this project to pencil and remain financeable. Otherwise, no development will take place. This shortfall is the red box area in the above graph that says, “impact of inclusionary zoning.”

    We have discussed this red box gap a lot on the blog, because how you think this gap gets filled might determine how you think of inclusionary zoning as a policy tool. In this particular instance/graph, the gap is filled by a reduction in the value of the land. Everything else remains static. So what is effectively happening in this model is that the landowner, who has decided to sell their land to the above developer, is now the one who has to indirectly pay for this new affordable housing.

    This may seem like a sensible way to go about it. I mean, people who own land must be rich. Let’s make them pay. But is this actually what is going to happen in practice and over extended periods of time? Soft costs — things like development charges — are always going up. Why aren’t land values perpetually declining in order to offset these additional costs? It is largely because market revenues have also been increasing. Housing keeps getting more expensive. And that is what has been keeping the market going.

    I suspect that over an extended period of time, the same thing will happen here.

  • Case studies on inclusionary zoning

    Back in 2017, Portland, Oregon enacted new inclusionary zoning policies mandating that all new residential projects with 20 or more units must deliver a specified amount of affordable housing. Early accounts, by people like Joe Cortright of City Observatory, suggested that the market was reacting to this new requirement as you might expect. Developers rushed to get new applications onto the books and then there was a drop off in new housing supply.

    Now that it’s been a couple more years, it is perhaps worth checking in on Portland. Cortright did that in the fall of last year and the housing numbers are continuing to fall. From 2019 to 2020, new multi-unit housing permits in Portland fell by more than 60%. I really don’t know the Portland market and so it’s hard for me to comment on whether it is solely the fault of IZ, but there was a peak in 2017 and now housing permits are down significantly. However, they were also down significantly during the financial crisis. It’ll of course be interesting to see how this plays out over a longer time horizon.

    That said, a similar market response was recently reported in another Portland — Portland, Maine. In 2020, the city implemented a “Green New Deal” that stipulated, among other things, that all new residential developments with 10+ units would be subject to their new IZ policies. It has only been just over a year, but according to the city’s planning department, there were 756 new housing units on the books in 2020 prior to the new IZ policies. And since then, that figure has dropped to 139 new housing units. This is admittedly a small market and a relatively short time horizon, but it is still a data point.

    As many of you know, I struggle with inclusionary zoning. Maybe it’s confirmation bias, but I just haven’t been able to find much data suggesting that it can meaningfully increase overall housing supply and the supply of new affordable units. So if any of you are aware of some good case studies outlining successful examples, please share them in the comment section below.