I've been thinking more about yesterday's post and what it might mean for cities, and I'd like to add some additional thoughts. The report that I linked to looks at what the fiscal implications of WFH have been on a number of US cities (at least so far). That is the chart that I shared summarizing New York City's "agglomeration losses."

But along with this, there is an important assumption that we have not yet reached a new equilibrium. In other words, we are still in a period of adjustment, which feels right, especially if you talk to anyone in the commercial real estate industry. And that means that there are alternative and largely unknowable scenarios for the future.

In the report, they study the following three:

• Doom loop prevails (current state where city finances get worse)

• Recovery (cities regain their pre-pandemic levels of agglomeration economies)

• Virtuous boom loop arises

Obviously the objective with their recommendations is to help cities achieve this last one. This is the scenario where cities regain prosperity because firms are able to simultaneously increase their concentration of high-value in-person workers (who benefit from agglomeration economies) and shift all the other stuff to WFH (which allows firms to save money and drive efficiencies).

More specifically, this scenario assumes that agglomeration economies start to grow again; that wages increase because of it; and that firms, overall, become 10% more productive. It also assumes that office real estate values recover to pre-pandemic levels.

The future is, of course, notoriously difficult to predict. But I am optimistic that the best and most desirable cities will figure out how to create a new virtuous boom loop. History has shown us that cities are remarkably resilient.

However, implicit to this discussion seems to be the creation of two classes of workers: workers who are expected to show up in-person and do innovative things with their colleagues, and workers who are encouraged to stay at home and do the tasks that do not benefit from co-location. Of course, lots of people do both of these things. But for the purposes of this post, let's just compare and contrast these two.

Importantly, these two types of workers are expected to have different wage outcomes (in the above report). For WFH workers, wages are initially modeled to fall because of the loss in agglomeration-related productivity. But interestingly enough, before this wage decline happens, WFH workers are unambiguously better off -- they have the same salary and none of the direct costs of going into the office.

On the other hand, in-person workers are modeled to have their wages increase because of the gains in agglomeration-related productivity. The authors of the report have calibrated their models so that these two types of workers eventually become equally well off, once you adjust for changes in wages and things like the direct costs of commuting. But what would this really mean in practice?

To oversimplify, we're talking about two different types of workers:

• An in-person worker who is expected to have higher wages, be more productive, and live closer to a city center because of their need to be physically present

• A WFH worker who is expected to have lower wages, be less productive, and live further out (or in a different city) in order to equalize their lower earnings by way of less expensive real estate

If this is how our labor markets evolve, then it strikes me that there could be far-reaching socio-economic implications. What I worry about is further segregation within our cities. The above scenario means doubling down on the role of big cities as centers for innovation and agglomeration economies. But in doing this, how do we ensure that we don't exclude everyone else?

Once again, I suspect that a good place to start would be lowering the cost of new housing and increasing the pace of production.

Photo by Lerone Pieters on Unsplash

One of the interesting things about return-to-office trends is that there's a meaningful difference between smaller and larger cities. In smaller cities, most people have returned to working in their offices. But in larger cities, this hasn't been the case. This makes intuitive sense. Larger cities tend to have more expensive real estate (which forces people to decentralize) and, in turn, longer and more punishing commutes. So in a larger city, the individual benefits of WFH (i.e. having zero commute costs) tend to be far greater.

However, in-person interactions are critical to what are known as agglomeration economies. This is why we have things like financial districts -- because there are real economic benefits to even competing firms locating proximate to each other. WFH arguably reduces these benefits. And in this recent report called, Doom Loop or Boom Loop: Work from Home and the Challenges Facing America's Big Cities, the authors, Richard Voith, David Stanek, and Hyojin Lee, have tried to estimate what these agglomeration losses might be for cities like New York, San Francisco, and Philadelphia.

Here's New York City:

If you agree with their assumptions, then you might also agree with their policy recommendations. Among other things, the report argues that larger cities, like New York City, should be focused on promoting themselves to industries/jobs that benefit the most from in-person interactions, recognizing that WFH isn't going away. At the same time, cities should understand that reducing the cost and increasing the pace of housing production also helps to reduce agglomeration losses. It keeps more people centralizing around a particular place.

To download the full report, click here. It's an interesting read.

Building on yesterday's post about inclusionary zoning, below is a telling diagram from the Urban Land Institute showing which areas of Portland can support new development and which areas cannot. To create this map, ULI looked at achievable rents in each US census block to determine, quite simply, where rents will cover the cost of new development (all types of construction).

However, in their models they are also assuming a land value of $0. And typically people want you to pay them money when you buy their land. So in all likelihood, this map is overstating the amount of blue -- that being land where new development is feasible.

But it does tell you something about developer margins. A lot of people seem to assume that the margins on new developments are so great that things like inclusionary zoning can simply be "absorbed" without impacting overall feasibility. The reality is that there are large swaths in most cities where development is never going to happen even if you were to start handing out free land.

This map is also helpful at illustrating some of the impacts of IZ. If you assume that rents are the highest in the center of the city and that they fall off as you move outward, then the outer edge of the above blue area is going to be where development is only marginally feasible. And so any new cost imposed on development would naturally start to uniformly eat away at the blue feasible area -- that is, until rents rise enough to offset it.

Of course, this is a simplified mapping. Land usually costs money. Land values might also be highest in the center and fall off as you move outward, or there could be pockets of high-cost land. There may be more price elasticity in certain sub-markets compared to others. So the impacts of a new development cost may not play out as neatly as I outlined above.

Regardless, there will be impacts, which is why I find this map telling even if it isn't fully accurate or up to date. Maybe some of you will as well.

I've been thinking more about yesterday's post and what it might mean for cities, and I'd like to add some additional thoughts. The report that I linked to looks at what the fiscal implications of WFH have been on a number of US cities (at least so far). That is the chart that I shared summarizing New York City's "agglomeration losses."

But along with this, there is an important assumption that we have not yet reached a new equilibrium. In other words, we are still in a period of adjustment, which feels right, especially if you talk to anyone in the commercial real estate industry. And that means that there are alternative and largely unknowable scenarios for the future.

In the report, they study the following three:

• Doom loop prevails (current state where city finances get worse)

• Recovery (cities regain their pre-pandemic levels of agglomeration economies)

• Virtuous boom loop arises

Obviously the objective with their recommendations is to help cities achieve this last one. This is the scenario where cities regain prosperity because firms are able to simultaneously increase their concentration of high-value in-person workers (who benefit from agglomeration economies) and shift all the other stuff to WFH (which allows firms to save money and drive efficiencies).

More specifically, this scenario assumes that agglomeration economies start to grow again; that wages increase because of it; and that firms, overall, become 10% more productive. It also assumes that office real estate values recover to pre-pandemic levels.

The future is, of course, notoriously difficult to predict. But I am optimistic that the best and most desirable cities will figure out how to create a new virtuous boom loop. History has shown us that cities are remarkably resilient.

However, implicit to this discussion seems to be the creation of two classes of workers: workers who are expected to show up in-person and do innovative things with their colleagues, and workers who are encouraged to stay at home and do the tasks that do not benefit from co-location. Of course, lots of people do both of these things. But for the purposes of this post, let's just compare and contrast these two.

Importantly, these two types of workers are expected to have different wage outcomes (in the above report). For WFH workers, wages are initially modeled to fall because of the loss in agglomeration-related productivity. But interestingly enough, before this wage decline happens, WFH workers are unambiguously better off -- they have the same salary and none of the direct costs of going into the office.

On the other hand, in-person workers are modeled to have their wages increase because of the gains in agglomeration-related productivity. The authors of the report have calibrated their models so that these two types of workers eventually become equally well off, once you adjust for changes in wages and things like the direct costs of commuting. But what would this really mean in practice?

To oversimplify, we're talking about two different types of workers:

• An in-person worker who is expected to have higher wages, be more productive, and live closer to a city center because of their need to be physically present

• A WFH worker who is expected to have lower wages, be less productive, and live further out (or in a different city) in order to equalize their lower earnings by way of less expensive real estate

If this is how our labor markets evolve, then it strikes me that there could be far-reaching socio-economic implications. What I worry about is further segregation within our cities. The above scenario means doubling down on the role of big cities as centers for innovation and agglomeration economies. But in doing this, how do we ensure that we don't exclude everyone else?

Once again, I suspect that a good place to start would be lowering the cost of new housing and increasing the pace of production.

Photo by Lerone Pieters on Unsplash

One of the interesting things about return-to-office trends is that there's a meaningful difference between smaller and larger cities. In smaller cities, most people have returned to working in their offices. But in larger cities, this hasn't been the case. This makes intuitive sense. Larger cities tend to have more expensive real estate (which forces people to decentralize) and, in turn, longer and more punishing commutes. So in a larger city, the individual benefits of WFH (i.e. having zero commute costs) tend to be far greater.

However, in-person interactions are critical to what are known as agglomeration economies. This is why we have things like financial districts -- because there are real economic benefits to even competing firms locating proximate to each other. WFH arguably reduces these benefits. And in this recent report called, Doom Loop or Boom Loop: Work from Home and the Challenges Facing America's Big Cities, the authors, Richard Voith, David Stanek, and Hyojin Lee, have tried to estimate what these agglomeration losses might be for cities like New York, San Francisco, and Philadelphia.

Here's New York City:

If you agree with their assumptions, then you might also agree with their policy recommendations. Among other things, the report argues that larger cities, like New York City, should be focused on promoting themselves to industries/jobs that benefit the most from in-person interactions, recognizing that WFH isn't going away. At the same time, cities should understand that reducing the cost and increasing the pace of housing production also helps to reduce agglomeration losses. It keeps more people centralizing around a particular place.

To download the full report, click here. It's an interesting read.

Building on yesterday's post about inclusionary zoning, below is a telling diagram from the Urban Land Institute showing which areas of Portland can support new development and which areas cannot. To create this map, ULI looked at achievable rents in each US census block to determine, quite simply, where rents will cover the cost of new development (all types of construction).

However, in their models they are also assuming a land value of $0. And typically people want you to pay them money when you buy their land. So in all likelihood, this map is overstating the amount of blue -- that being land where new development is feasible.

But it does tell you something about developer margins. A lot of people seem to assume that the margins on new developments are so great that things like inclusionary zoning can simply be "absorbed" without impacting overall feasibility. The reality is that there are large swaths in most cities where development is never going to happen even if you were to start handing out free land.

This map is also helpful at illustrating some of the impacts of IZ. If you assume that rents are the highest in the center of the city and that they fall off as you move outward, then the outer edge of the above blue area is going to be where development is only marginally feasible. And so any new cost imposed on development would naturally start to uniformly eat away at the blue feasible area -- that is, until rents rise enough to offset it.

Of course, this is a simplified mapping. Land usually costs money. Land values might also be highest in the center and fall off as you move outward, or there could be pockets of high-cost land. There may be more price elasticity in certain sub-markets compared to others. So the impacts of a new development cost may not play out as neatly as I outlined above.

Regardless, there will be impacts, which is why I find this map telling even if it isn't fully accurate or up to date. Maybe some of you will as well.