Back in 2006, Paul Graham penned an essay about how to be Silicon Valley. Since then, it seems like every city on the planet has tried to replicate the successes of the Valley. At the time, his argument was pretty simple. Geography used to be destiny when it came to cities. New York City, for example, is arguably what it is today because of its geography and its deep harbor, which created a natural competitive advantage compared to other east coast cities such as Boston and Philadelphia. But this, he argues, has become far less relevant. Now, you can create a great city pretty much anywhere. So what are the necessary ingredients?

Paul argued that you only really need two kinds of people to create a technology hub: rich people and nerds. You need people creating new things and you need rich people to fund those new ideas. That's it. So in theory, if you could just dump a bunch of these kinds of people in one place -- Nunavut? -- you'd perhaps get unicorns coming out the other end. He goes on to say that Miami is a perfect example of a city that has lots of the former, but very few of the latter. It has lots of rich people, but, in his words, it's not the kind of place that nerds like. So it is/was not a good startup city. (I'm a nerd and I like Miami.)

But the year is now 2021 and a global pandemic seems to be helping to change this dynamic. Every tech entrepreneur and/or investor now seems to want to move to either Austin or Miami. To that end, SoftBank recently announced that it has earmarked $100 million for startups that are based in Miami or that plan to be based in Miami in the near future. It's perhaps a good testament to the momentum that seems to be developing around the startup scene in the city, which is something that their mayor has been incredibly vocal about.

But here's something to consider. Was Paul right about the two requisite ingredients for a successful startup hub? And if so, does Miami now have enough nerds? Maybe this recent influx of people was just what it was missing.

Photo by Cody Board on Unsplash

On Monday it was reported -- by the Wall Street Journal, Tech Crunch, and others -- that Uber will be laying off another 3,000 employees and closing 45 of its offices around the world. Here is a quote from TechCrunch:

“I knew that I had to make a hard decision, not because we are a public company, or to protect or stock price, or to please our Board or investors,” Uber CEO Dara Khosrowshahi wrote to employees today in a memo, viewed by TechCrunch. “I had to make this decision because our very future as an essential service for the cities of the world — our being there for millions of people and businesses who rely on us — demands it. We must establish ourselves as a self-sustaining enterprise that no longer relies on new capital or investors to keep growing, expanding, and innovating.”

According to this SEC filing, the company expects to pay approximately $110 million to $140 million in severance and other termination benefits, and somewhere between $65 million to $80 million in costs related to closing its offices.

All of this is, of course, being driven by a steep decline in ride bookings, which is about 70% of the company's revenue. Ride bookings were down 80% in April from a year earlier. For Q1 2020, they were down about 5% compared to 2019.

Uber Eats has seen a spike in demand with people staying at home. Bookings were up 52% in Q1 2020 from a year earlier. The problem is that, unlike its rides business, their food delivery business is far from profitable. That's the point of the possible merger with Grubhub.

The company has said that they are seeing some signs of a recovery in markets that have begun to reopen. But it's too early to predict what that will really look like. The hole is pretty deep.

Pre-COVID, ride hailing demand tended to surge on the weekends as people went out to restaurants, bars, and clubs. So presumably those activities will need to return for its revenue to return. But I also think we could see a spike because of people being nervous to take public transit.

Either way, the company is making some really tough decisions right now. But it seems to be doing what it needs to do in order to get to the other side of this and become a self-sustaining and profitable business. Full disclosure: I own some $UBER.

Chart: Uber Q1 2020 results

I have been writing about the startup Opendoor.com for over 2 years now. And I continue to believe that they are the most promising disruptor in the residential real estate space. 

Here is the first post that I wrote back in July 2014 after they raised their first round of funding. Here is the second post that I wrote after they launched in Phoenix. And here is another post that I wrote 6 months ago where I argued, once again, that they are doing something worth paying attention to. (This last post explains how the platform works.)

Well, about a week ago it was announced that they have raised another round of funding: a $210 million Series D. In all likelihood, the company’s valuation is now over $1 billion. Here’s the Techcrunch announcement where the message was: huge ass number; risky business model.

In response to this, Ben Thompson wrote a terrific and widely shared blog post called, Opendoor: A Startup Worth Emulating. I love his post because he says what I have firmly believed and argued for many years: Zillow and Redfin are not disruptive real estate startups.

This is what he says about Zillow:

“And yet, the most successful real estate startup, Zillow (which acquired its largest competitor Trulia a couple of years ago), is little more than a glorified marketing tool: the company makes most of its revenue by getting real estate agents — the ones collecting 6% of fees, split between the buying and selling agents — to pay to advertise their houses on the site. Certainly a free tool that makes it easier to find houses in a more intuitive way is valuable — Zillow has acquired the sort of userbase that allow it to build an advertising business for a reason — but at the end of the day the company is a tax on a system that hasn’t really changed in decades.”

And though very risky, he argues that Opendoor is far better positioned to shake up the status quo. 

Here are two of his key points:

“Sellers are uniquely disadvantaged under the current system, which is another way of saying they are an underserved market with unmet needs.” [Sellers are the side of the market that Opendoor is specifically targeting.]

“Opendoor has a new business model: taking advantage of a theoretical arbitrage opportunity (earning fees on houses sold at a slight mark-up) by leveraging technology in pursuit of previously impossible scale that should, in theory, ameliorate risk.”

And here’s what that could ultimately mean for the industry:

“Opendoor has many more reasons why it might fail than Zillow or Redfin, but its potential upside is far greater as a result. First is the immediate opportunity: sellers who can’t wait. However, as Opendoor grows its seller base, especially geographically, its risk will start to decrease thanks to diversification and sheer size; that will allow it to lower its “market risk” charge which will lead to more sellers. More sellers means both less risk and an increasingly compelling product for buyers to access, first with a real estate agent and eventually directly. More buyers will mean lower marketing costs and faster sell-through, which will lower risk further and thus lower prices, pushing the cycle forward. It’s even possible to envision a future where Opendoor actually does uproot the anachronistic real estate agent system that is a relic of the pre-Internet era, and they will have done so with realtors not only not fighting them but, on the buying side, helping them.”

I’m with Ben on this.