

This, it turns out, is an important question, because there's a strong correlation between trust in government and overall prosperity (the above chart is via NZZ). The extreme examples of distrust are somewhat intuitive. If, for example, you don't believe that your government will uphold property rights, why would you ever want to risk investing in property?
But it can be even more subtle and insidious:
Trust is central to both stability and development. If citizens have trust in their system, they will be more likely to push for growth-promoting reforms. Moreover, they will be more confident that politicians will actually implement such reforms, and that sacrifices made today will pay off in the future. If this trust is lost, democracies become unstable, and autocratic tendencies are more likely to prevail. However, trust is also important for the transition from an autocracy geared solely toward the extraction of resources and wealth into a progressive democracy. A politically dominant class that governs autocratically will make concessions voluntarily and refrain from repression only if it trusts that it too will benefit from the institutional changes over the long term, and that it will not later be deprived of all opportunities.
All of this forms part of the work of economists Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson and James A. Robinson, who were awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics earlier this year. Their research explains why wealth is so unevenly distributed across the world. It's a problem of institutions. But it's also highly relevant to countries that are already rich.
Distrust is on the rise in countries like the UK (57%), France, (51%), Germany (49%), and Italy (47%). The outliers among OECD countries are places like Luxembourg and Switzerland. Only 25% of Swiss people express distrust in the government. That's a good thing for overall prosperity and it shows in their GDP. So how can we be more like the Swiss?
Radical transparency when it comes to decision making and more of a direct democracy (versus a representative democracy) are two places to start, according to the research. People, it seems, trust their government more when they themselves make more of the decisions.
Here's the full NZZ article. It's an illuminating read.
One of the first things that I noticed when I visited Rio de Janeiro a few years ago was the clear fixation on safety and security. There are gates and cameras everywhere. And the guidance you tend to receive from the locals usually resolves around how to stay safe. Don't wander around at night. Be careful when you take out your phone. Be mindful of certain areas. You know, those sorts of things.
Of course, you never really know how dangerous a city is because it's one of those things that's impractical to test. You're not going to wander around dark places just to see what the probability of being robbed is. The more sensible thing to do is simply believe what people are telling you and you observe the cues scattered around the built environment.
The result is a general sense of anxiety. You're not quite sure if all the gates and cameras are truly necessary, but their mere presence makes you believe that they might be. I mean, why else would they be so pervasive? Or, could it be that people are overshooting with their investments in safety and security because, well, fear and paranoia are strong motivators?
I was reminded of all of this as I read through Ed Chartlon's recent book review of, Panic City: Crime and Fear Industries in Johannesburg. The title of his review is Anxious Urbanisms, and I think that's a good way of describing some of these phenomenons. It's an urbanism of uncertainty. I haven't read the book (yet), but it's an interesting topic.
So I will leave you all with this excerpt from the review:
Ultimately, what we might take from Panic City, then, is less a comprehensive sociology of crime in the city and more a method of affective analysis. What the book provides is a sense of the ways in which the emotional sphere organises space, how feelings like anxiety or fear or panic, currently widely distributed across the world, materialise themselves, architecturally and politically. If immunity is anything like security, Murray offers us a cautionary tale. For wherever uncertainty thrives, so does the tendency towards paranoid thinking—which is to say, a contagion of a different sort, one that licences regimes of suspicion, self-protection and individual security, and all at the eventual cost of collective wellbeing and interdependence.

This is a city metric I haven't seen before. City Observatory recently looked at the number of police officers (public) and security guards (private) per capita across American cities. They also ask a bunch of interesting questions. Why do some cities have far fewer police officers? Is high security an indicator for "anti-social capital?" (Social norms aren't encouraging people to behave.) And do some cities simply have more cops because it is perceived to be necessary?
Here is what they found:

The average is about 3.3 police officers per 1,000. And in each case, city is defined as the metro area. The study relies on census data and, if we're being precise, the data represents where people live as opposed to where they work. So some cities could be reporting a lower number simply because police officers tend to live outside of the metro area -- perhaps because of housing costs. Either way, it's interesting to consider why some cities spend a lot more on security than others and why Miami has so many security guards.
Chart: City Observatory