In 2020, Berlin implemented a rent cap that applied city-wide to both new and existing rental housing contracts. The policy was later found to be unconstitutional and so as of April 2021 this is no longer in place. But for a brief period of time, and for better or for worse, Berlin had a blanket rent control policy. Berlin is, of course, not alone when it comes to rent caps. They are seen by some as a solution to rising home prices, gentrification, and displacement. But do they actually work?
This recent working paper argues that the answer is no. And that there are other better tools available. Yes, overall rents do tend to decline. But when you have a city-wide policy, it means that rents also decline for high-income households. And in this paper, the economists argue that this tends to benefit the rich more than the poor. Rent caps also tend to decrease overall housing supply, which, as we all know, is counterproductive when you're trying to make something more affordable/accessible.
But perhaps the key argument is this one here: Rent controls create a misallocation of housing that can actually decrease overall welfare for lower-income households. The reason behind this is that homes stop getting allocated to those who value it and need it the most. Instead, you get people who may be overhoused or underhoused, but who remain firmly put because of what are below-market rents.
There are a number of ways in which this distortion might play out. But it could involve someone with a very large older apartment who now no longer needs a large apartment, but is staying put because of their favorable and irreplaceable rent structure. This in turn precludes someone who desperately needs a large apartment from finding a suitable place. And since overall supply has also decreased because of the controls, the problem is exacerbated.
In 2020, Berlin implemented a rent cap that applied city-wide to both new and existing rental housing contracts. The policy was later found to be unconstitutional and so as of April 2021 this is no longer in place. But for a brief period of time, and for better or for worse, Berlin had a blanket rent control policy. Berlin is, of course, not alone when it comes to rent caps. They are seen by some as a solution to rising home prices, gentrification, and displacement. But do they actually work?
This recent working paper argues that the answer is no. And that there are other better tools available. Yes, overall rents do tend to decline. But when you have a city-wide policy, it means that rents also decline for high-income households. And in this paper, the economists argue that this tends to benefit the rich more than the poor. Rent caps also tend to decrease overall housing supply, which, as we all know, is counterproductive when you're trying to make something more affordable/accessible.
But perhaps the key argument is this one here: Rent controls create a misallocation of housing that can actually decrease overall welfare for lower-income households. The reason behind this is that homes stop getting allocated to those who value it and need it the most. Instead, you get people who may be overhoused or underhoused, but who remain firmly put because of what are below-market rents.
There are a number of ways in which this distortion might play out. But it could involve someone with a very large older apartment who now no longer needs a large apartment, but is staying put because of their favorable and irreplaceable rent structure. This in turn precludes someone who desperately needs a large apartment from finding a suitable place. And since overall supply has also decreased because of the controls, the problem is exacerbated.
It can all get a bit complicated, but if you're interested in this topic, here is another technical research paper from Edward Glaeser and Erzo Luttmer that deals specifically with the misallocation of housing under rent controls.
We know that innovation and economic growth tends to be unevenly distributed. This is the bull case for living in cities and, more particularly, for living in certain cities. But of course, the big question these days is whether or not our little work from home experiment has proven that, for the first time ever, work can now decentralize.
Well here is a unique study that looked at 29 disruptive technologies over the last two decades in the United States. Using three main sources -- patents, job postings, and hundreds of thousands of earnings calls -- the team traced where new innovations/technologies have tended to emerge and then how they spread (or didn't spread) across the rest of the US.
Their initial findings won't surprise regular readers of this blog. There are indeed a certain number of pioneering superstar cities. Within their list of new disruptive innovations, the team found that about 40.2% of them came from California. The next "super-cluster" was along the Boston-Washington corridor in the northeast with ~21.2%. By narrowing down their list to "disruptive patents", as opposed to all patents, innovation looks even spikier.
It can all get a bit complicated, but if you're interested in this topic, here is another technical research paper from Edward Glaeser and Erzo Luttmer that deals specifically with the misallocation of housing under rent controls.
We know that innovation and economic growth tends to be unevenly distributed. This is the bull case for living in cities and, more particularly, for living in certain cities. But of course, the big question these days is whether or not our little work from home experiment has proven that, for the first time ever, work can now decentralize.
Well here is a unique study that looked at 29 disruptive technologies over the last two decades in the United States. Using three main sources -- patents, job postings, and hundreds of thousands of earnings calls -- the team traced where new innovations/technologies have tended to emerge and then how they spread (or didn't spread) across the rest of the US.
Their initial findings won't surprise regular readers of this blog. There are indeed a certain number of pioneering superstar cities. Within their list of new disruptive innovations, the team found that about 40.2% of them came from California. The next "super-cluster" was along the Boston-Washington corridor in the northeast with ~21.2%. By narrowing down their list to "disruptive patents", as opposed to all patents, innovation looks even spikier.
this research paper
looking at the effect of high-tech clusters on productivity and innovation. (I am unclear if there is any relationship to the Italian brewing company Birra Moretti.)
One of the things he looks at in the paper is the decline of Kodak. Headquartered in Rochester, New York, Kodak famously missed the transition to digital photography. And so by the late 1990s, they were forced to start letting people go. The result was an almost 50% decline in the size of the entire "high-tech cluster" in Rochester.
But what Moretti goes on to test in his paper is the impact that this employment decline had on productivity and innovation outside of Kodak and outside of the photography sector (but within Rochester). And what he found was that between 1996 and 2007, the productivity of non-Kodak inventors dropped by about 20%!
This, of course, is one of the great features of cities. Even if you're not working at some big company with lots of smart people, just being in the same city, on the same block, or within the same office building, can make you more productive. It turns out that business ecosystems are pretty interconnected. Spillovers are important.
For more on this topic, check out this recent Wired article by Viviane Callier. In it she makes the case that remote work is going to negatively impact productivity and innovation over the long run.
Next the team looked at how these disruptive technologies tend to diffuse across the country. This is where job postings and earnings calls come into play. New technology gets created in California garage. Cool. But at what point do CEOs across the country start talking about it and hiring people who are capable of doing things with it? This next figure shows that diffusion at various time intervals.
Now here are the important takeaways. New disruptive technologies clearly take time to spread. However, high-skilled hiring tends to spread much more slowly than low-skilled hiring. This kind of makes sense as you've got a built up and entrenched knowledge base in these pioneering locations.
But what this also means is that pioneering locations tend to maintain their hegemony for quite some time -- decades. The high-paying jobs stick closer to home for much longer, presumably because geography makes it harder to transfer knowledge. This is, of course, based on historical data. But I remain highly suspect that Zoom calls can really disrupt the importance of our superstar cities.
looking at the effect of high-tech clusters on productivity and innovation. (I am unclear if there is any relationship to the Italian brewing company Birra Moretti.)
One of the things he looks at in the paper is the decline of Kodak. Headquartered in Rochester, New York, Kodak famously missed the transition to digital photography. And so by the late 1990s, they were forced to start letting people go. The result was an almost 50% decline in the size of the entire "high-tech cluster" in Rochester.
But what Moretti goes on to test in his paper is the impact that this employment decline had on productivity and innovation outside of Kodak and outside of the photography sector (but within Rochester). And what he found was that between 1996 and 2007, the productivity of non-Kodak inventors dropped by about 20%!
This, of course, is one of the great features of cities. Even if you're not working at some big company with lots of smart people, just being in the same city, on the same block, or within the same office building, can make you more productive. It turns out that business ecosystems are pretty interconnected. Spillovers are important.
For more on this topic, check out this recent Wired article by Viviane Callier. In it she makes the case that remote work is going to negatively impact productivity and innovation over the long run.
Next the team looked at how these disruptive technologies tend to diffuse across the country. This is where job postings and earnings calls come into play. New technology gets created in California garage. Cool. But at what point do CEOs across the country start talking about it and hiring people who are capable of doing things with it? This next figure shows that diffusion at various time intervals.
Now here are the important takeaways. New disruptive technologies clearly take time to spread. However, high-skilled hiring tends to spread much more slowly than low-skilled hiring. This kind of makes sense as you've got a built up and entrenched knowledge base in these pioneering locations.
But what this also means is that pioneering locations tend to maintain their hegemony for quite some time -- decades. The high-paying jobs stick closer to home for much longer, presumably because geography makes it harder to transfer knowledge. This is, of course, based on historical data. But I remain highly suspect that Zoom calls can really disrupt the importance of our superstar cities.
