There's a lot of debate within urbanist circles about whether or not supply alone can solve or at least mitigate housing affordability concerns. Richard Florida and others will say that, while beneficial, increasing supply isn't the be all end all. We need to be building affordable housing.
Edward Glaeser, Joseph Gyourko, and others have, on the other hand, argued that middle-income housing is a supply problem and that low-income housing is quite simply a demand-side problem, which could be solved through things like a housing voucher program.
In other words, the cost of housing isn't necessarily the problem, it's the low income levels. One of the benefits of supplementing people's incomes is that it empowers mobility. People can then move to where there are jobs, as opposed to being tied to a specific neighborhood or city.
But this debate is arguably just about the extent of the supply benefits. Intuitively, it makes sense to try and match new housing supply with demand and economic growth. But how far can that take us, particularly in high demand and high productivity cities?
Glaeser (Harvard) and Gyourko (Penn) have a relatively recent paper out called, The Economic Implications of Housing Supply, which looks at, among other things, the "implicit tax" imposed on development as a result of land use restrictions and other supply constraints.
Here are two excerpts:
We will argue that the rise in housing wealth is concentrated in the major coastal markets that have high prices relative to minimum production costs, and it is concentrated among the richest members of the older cohorts—that is, on those who already owned homes several decades ago, before binding constraints on new housing construction were imposed.
But in a democratic system where the rules for building and land use are largely determined by existing homeowners, development projects face a considerable disadvantage, especially since many of the potential beneficiaries of a new project do not have a place to live in the jurisdiction when possibilities for reducing regulation and expanding the supply of housing are debated.
If you're interested in this topic (and sufficiently nerdy), you can download a PDF copy of the paper here.
Photo by chuttersnap on Unsplash
This morning BILD and Altus Group released their January 2019 new home sales figures for the Greater Toronto Area.
Here are the highlights:
1,362 new homes sold in January 2019 across the GTA. This is up 14% compared to last January.
Of these, 942 (~69%) were condominiums (includes low, mid, and high-rise, as well as townhouses). And 420 (~31%) were single-family homes (includes detached, semi-detached, and freehold townhouses).
Condominium sales volume is sitting only about 5% below the 10-year average and the benchmark price increased this month to $803,638, which represents a 12.5% year-over-year increase.
On the other hand, single-family home sales are down about 53% from the 10-year average and the benchmark price decreased by about 8.1% compared to last year. It is sitting at $1,130,046.
While there continues to be a bifurcation in the new home market, we are seeing improvements across the board and the data is consistent with Altus' prediction that 2019 will see an increase in overall sales.
It is also important to consider how geography might factor into the above numbers. Here are the January sales numbers for the last three years broken down by region within the GTA:
Just under 80% of the new condominiums sold last month took place in Toronto, whereas only about 1.2% of the single-family homes sold last month took place in the city. You can count them on one hand. There were only 5.
So rather than just look at this in terms of housing type, I think the other way to interpret the data is that it could suggest strong and continued demand for centrally located and transit-oriented communities.
And that just so happens to translate into a condominium.
Photo by Eugene Aikimov on Unsplash
Bloomberg recently published a good summary of Zillow's business and their move into algorithm home buying and flipping. (They are trying to avoid the "flipping" moniker because of the negative connotations associated with it.) Zillow started buying homes directly from owners last spring. They charge the seller between 6-9%, so more than using a typical agent, but inline with their competitors. There's clearly a segment of the market willing to pay a premium for the added convenience. The thinking used to be that discount brokerages were the way to disrupt the housing market. This is the opposite strategy. Interestingly enough, Zillow felt that they needed to make this pivot with their business model. It used to be about selling ads. They were definitive in that they were not a disruptor of real estate agents. But now:
If getting an offer from an iBuyer became a crucial step in the selling process, they worried, Zillow could lose its audience and its advertising base. What’s more, market researchers kept finding that consumers said they’d pay a modest premium to get a cash offer. “People expect to press a button and have magic happen,” says Rascoff, a 43-year-old former Expedia executive who’d earlier started the travel search engine Hotwire, which he sold to Expedia for $700 million. Getting into the business of buying homes directly, Rascoff says, was “the only way to remain in a leadership position.”
Here is a map of the companies in this particular space and the cities in which they operate:
Some investors aren't sold on this strategy and have begun short selling Zillow (according to the Bloomberg article). I keep getting the sense that there's a greater end game in the cards here. It is about building up A (algorithmic home buying and flipping) in order to unlock B. But what's B -- a new end-to-end transactional model for the housing market?
There's a lot of debate within urbanist circles about whether or not supply alone can solve or at least mitigate housing affordability concerns. Richard Florida and others will say that, while beneficial, increasing supply isn't the be all end all. We need to be building affordable housing.
Edward Glaeser, Joseph Gyourko, and others have, on the other hand, argued that middle-income housing is a supply problem and that low-income housing is quite simply a demand-side problem, which could be solved through things like a housing voucher program.
In other words, the cost of housing isn't necessarily the problem, it's the low income levels. One of the benefits of supplementing people's incomes is that it empowers mobility. People can then move to where there are jobs, as opposed to being tied to a specific neighborhood or city.
But this debate is arguably just about the extent of the supply benefits. Intuitively, it makes sense to try and match new housing supply with demand and economic growth. But how far can that take us, particularly in high demand and high productivity cities?
Glaeser (Harvard) and Gyourko (Penn) have a relatively recent paper out called, The Economic Implications of Housing Supply, which looks at, among other things, the "implicit tax" imposed on development as a result of land use restrictions and other supply constraints.
Here are two excerpts:
We will argue that the rise in housing wealth is concentrated in the major coastal markets that have high prices relative to minimum production costs, and it is concentrated among the richest members of the older cohorts—that is, on those who already owned homes several decades ago, before binding constraints on new housing construction were imposed.
But in a democratic system where the rules for building and land use are largely determined by existing homeowners, development projects face a considerable disadvantage, especially since many of the potential beneficiaries of a new project do not have a place to live in the jurisdiction when possibilities for reducing regulation and expanding the supply of housing are debated.
If you're interested in this topic (and sufficiently nerdy), you can download a PDF copy of the paper here.
Photo by chuttersnap on Unsplash
This morning BILD and Altus Group released their January 2019 new home sales figures for the Greater Toronto Area.
Here are the highlights:
1,362 new homes sold in January 2019 across the GTA. This is up 14% compared to last January.
Of these, 942 (~69%) were condominiums (includes low, mid, and high-rise, as well as townhouses). And 420 (~31%) were single-family homes (includes detached, semi-detached, and freehold townhouses).
Condominium sales volume is sitting only about 5% below the 10-year average and the benchmark price increased this month to $803,638, which represents a 12.5% year-over-year increase.
On the other hand, single-family home sales are down about 53% from the 10-year average and the benchmark price decreased by about 8.1% compared to last year. It is sitting at $1,130,046.
While there continues to be a bifurcation in the new home market, we are seeing improvements across the board and the data is consistent with Altus' prediction that 2019 will see an increase in overall sales.
It is also important to consider how geography might factor into the above numbers. Here are the January sales numbers for the last three years broken down by region within the GTA:
Just under 80% of the new condominiums sold last month took place in Toronto, whereas only about 1.2% of the single-family homes sold last month took place in the city. You can count them on one hand. There were only 5.
So rather than just look at this in terms of housing type, I think the other way to interpret the data is that it could suggest strong and continued demand for centrally located and transit-oriented communities.
And that just so happens to translate into a condominium.
Photo by Eugene Aikimov on Unsplash
Bloomberg recently published a good summary of Zillow's business and their move into algorithm home buying and flipping. (They are trying to avoid the "flipping" moniker because of the negative connotations associated with it.) Zillow started buying homes directly from owners last spring. They charge the seller between 6-9%, so more than using a typical agent, but inline with their competitors. There's clearly a segment of the market willing to pay a premium for the added convenience. The thinking used to be that discount brokerages were the way to disrupt the housing market. This is the opposite strategy. Interestingly enough, Zillow felt that they needed to make this pivot with their business model. It used to be about selling ads. They were definitive in that they were not a disruptor of real estate agents. But now:
If getting an offer from an iBuyer became a crucial step in the selling process, they worried, Zillow could lose its audience and its advertising base. What’s more, market researchers kept finding that consumers said they’d pay a modest premium to get a cash offer. “People expect to press a button and have magic happen,” says Rascoff, a 43-year-old former Expedia executive who’d earlier started the travel search engine Hotwire, which he sold to Expedia for $700 million. Getting into the business of buying homes directly, Rascoff says, was “the only way to remain in a leadership position.”
Here is a map of the companies in this particular space and the cities in which they operate:
Some investors aren't sold on this strategy and have begun short selling Zillow (according to the Bloomberg article). I keep getting the sense that there's a greater end game in the cards here. It is about building up A (algorithmic home buying and flipping) in order to unlock B. But what's B -- a new end-to-end transactional model for the housing market?
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