In an effort to curb the much talked-about and much debated empty home situation in Vancouver (supposedly the number is ~20k vacant homes), the city, as many of you know, implemented an Empty Homes Tax.
To enforce this, the City of Vancouver now requires that every year, every owner of residential property must file a status declaration. If you don’t file this by the deadline, the property is automatically deemed vacant and the tax (1% of assessed taxable value) and a penalty ($250) are applied.
Last month, 11 days before the 2017 deadline, the city published the below heat map showing the concentration of Vancouver property owners who hadn’t yet made their declaration. There were just under 4,000 undeclared properties.

But as Jens von Bergmann points out on his blog, Mountain Doodles (great data-driven blog), this was really just a map of where people live. Because if you also create a map of residential properties subject to the tax, which he did, it looks pretty similar to above.
Yesterday I wrote about a new book that was just released called The Next Urban Renaissance.
The first essay in the book, written by Ingrid Gould Ellen of New York University, is centered around three ideas to help cities deal with the affordable housing problem. This is something that successful cities all around the world are grappling with.
The first idea is land-value taxation, which is also known as a “split-rate” tax. I’ve touched on land-value taxation before on ATC, but I never really dug into it. So this was a good reminder to do that.
The idea behind land-value taxation is to split property taxes into a land tax and an improvements tax (i.e. the building), and then shift more of the burden over to the land side. Economists tend to really like this model because taxing buildings/improvements can discourage property investment and development, whereas taxing land doesn’t impact supply. The supply of land is fixed.
So in the context of affordable housing, land-value taxation is thought to be a way to encourage more development and to increase the supply of new housing – which is usually a good way to keep home prices in check.
Here’s how Ingrid Gould Ellen described it:
…a land tax would discourage speculators from hoarding undeveloped land and incentivize them to develop their parcels to the full extent allowable. Regardless of whether a parcel sits vacant, houses a partially occupied, one-story retail strip, or holds a 30-story apartment tower, the annual tax bill would be the same. By switching to a land tax, a city could therefore increase the supply of housing and, by doing so, reduce prices across the board.
But I can’t help but wonder if this isn’t more applicable to cities or areas that are currently struggling to encourage development. For instance, would boom town Toronto really benefit (in terms of affordable housing) from a tax change that ends up encouraging more high-rise development?
It also strikes me as being exceptionally difficult to implement, particularly in city like Toronto that is growing and changing so quickly. Is it reasonable to ask the owner of a small downtown parking lot to being paying property taxes as if a 90 storey supertall had been built on top of it? Because that is the reality in some parts of this city.
And if we opted to phase in this new land tax, would it then become a game of arbitrage where developers look for properties with the lowest land taxes but the highest achievable densities?
Finally, I wonder if it wouldn’t exacerbate some of the problems that already exist in rapidly growing cities, one of which is the preservation of smaller heritage buildings in centrally located neighborhoods:
In the case of a split-rate tax, the losers will be owners of parcels with high land-to-building value ratios, or owners of small buildings on valuable, centrally located parcels, who will likely see an increase in their tax bills after the switch to a split-rate tax.
Land-value taxation is something that I’ve been thinking about for a number of months now. But I am struggling to come up with a decisive position. If you have any thoughts on this, it would be great to hear from you in the comments.
In an effort to curb the much talked-about and much debated empty home situation in Vancouver (supposedly the number is ~20k vacant homes), the city, as many of you know, implemented an Empty Homes Tax.
To enforce this, the City of Vancouver now requires that every year, every owner of residential property must file a status declaration. If you don’t file this by the deadline, the property is automatically deemed vacant and the tax (1% of assessed taxable value) and a penalty ($250) are applied.
Last month, 11 days before the 2017 deadline, the city published the below heat map showing the concentration of Vancouver property owners who hadn’t yet made their declaration. There were just under 4,000 undeclared properties.

But as Jens von Bergmann points out on his blog, Mountain Doodles (great data-driven blog), this was really just a map of where people live. Because if you also create a map of residential properties subject to the tax, which he did, it looks pretty similar to above.
Yesterday I wrote about a new book that was just released called The Next Urban Renaissance.
The first essay in the book, written by Ingrid Gould Ellen of New York University, is centered around three ideas to help cities deal with the affordable housing problem. This is something that successful cities all around the world are grappling with.
The first idea is land-value taxation, which is also known as a “split-rate” tax. I’ve touched on land-value taxation before on ATC, but I never really dug into it. So this was a good reminder to do that.
The idea behind land-value taxation is to split property taxes into a land tax and an improvements tax (i.e. the building), and then shift more of the burden over to the land side. Economists tend to really like this model because taxing buildings/improvements can discourage property investment and development, whereas taxing land doesn’t impact supply. The supply of land is fixed.
So in the context of affordable housing, land-value taxation is thought to be a way to encourage more development and to increase the supply of new housing – which is usually a good way to keep home prices in check.
Here’s how Ingrid Gould Ellen described it:
…a land tax would discourage speculators from hoarding undeveloped land and incentivize them to develop their parcels to the full extent allowable. Regardless of whether a parcel sits vacant, houses a partially occupied, one-story retail strip, or holds a 30-story apartment tower, the annual tax bill would be the same. By switching to a land tax, a city could therefore increase the supply of housing and, by doing so, reduce prices across the board.
But I can’t help but wonder if this isn’t more applicable to cities or areas that are currently struggling to encourage development. For instance, would boom town Toronto really benefit (in terms of affordable housing) from a tax change that ends up encouraging more high-rise development?
It also strikes me as being exceptionally difficult to implement, particularly in city like Toronto that is growing and changing so quickly. Is it reasonable to ask the owner of a small downtown parking lot to being paying property taxes as if a 90 storey supertall had been built on top of it? Because that is the reality in some parts of this city.
And if we opted to phase in this new land tax, would it then become a game of arbitrage where developers look for properties with the lowest land taxes but the highest achievable densities?
Finally, I wonder if it wouldn’t exacerbate some of the problems that already exist in rapidly growing cities, one of which is the preservation of smaller heritage buildings in centrally located neighborhoods:
In the case of a split-rate tax, the losers will be owners of parcels with high land-to-building value ratios, or owners of small buildings on valuable, centrally located parcels, who will likely see an increase in their tax bills after the switch to a split-rate tax.
Land-value taxation is something that I’ve been thinking about for a number of months now. But I am struggling to come up with a decisive position. If you have any thoughts on this, it would be great to hear from you in the comments.
I’m late to his podcast, Revisionist History, so in case some of you are as well, I would encourage you to check it out. Every episode reexamines something from the past and questions: Did we get it right the first time? It’s very Gladwell. It’s a must listen.
The episodes span a secret research project setup by the Pentagon in downtown Saigon during the Vietnam War to why rich people are obsessed with the game of golf. Spoiler: He hates golf.
The golf episode will be of particular interest to many of you because it deals with real estate. Malcolm wades into something known as California Proposition 13, which is a constitutional exemption that keeps property taxes artificially low.
It is what has allowed these “vast, gorgeous, and private” golf courses to continue to exist in expensive cities like Los Angeles. Otherwise they would have long ago drowned under the property taxes following reassessment.
This also leads to a philosophical debate about what constitutes a change in ownership, since many clubs are member owned and Proposition 13 requires that there not be a change in more than 50% of the ownership.
But I’ll stop there. Give it a listen. Malcolm is just excellent.
Photo by Rémi Müller on Unsplash
I’m late to his podcast, Revisionist History, so in case some of you are as well, I would encourage you to check it out. Every episode reexamines something from the past and questions: Did we get it right the first time? It’s very Gladwell. It’s a must listen.
The episodes span a secret research project setup by the Pentagon in downtown Saigon during the Vietnam War to why rich people are obsessed with the game of golf. Spoiler: He hates golf.
The golf episode will be of particular interest to many of you because it deals with real estate. Malcolm wades into something known as California Proposition 13, which is a constitutional exemption that keeps property taxes artificially low.
It is what has allowed these “vast, gorgeous, and private” golf courses to continue to exist in expensive cities like Los Angeles. Otherwise they would have long ago drowned under the property taxes following reassessment.
This also leads to a philosophical debate about what constitutes a change in ownership, since many clubs are member owned and Proposition 13 requires that there not be a change in more than 50% of the ownership.
But I’ll stop there. Give it a listen. Malcolm is just excellent.
Photo by Rémi Müller on Unsplash
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