Farhad Manjoo of the New York Times published an article this morning about Opendoor – a startup that I have written about multiple times on this blog – called, The Rise of the Fat Start-Up. (His definition of “fat” is that the startup owns lots of hard assets, which considered atypical in tech.)
Below are a couple of interesting tidbits from the article:
Opendoor has raised over $300 million in equity and over $500 million in debt since inception.
Opendoor plans to be in 10 cities by the end of this year.
Average commission charged on Opendoor is 7.5%, which is higher than a traditional real estate agent and higher than what was quoted before in the press. The higher % is because of certainty and convenience.
Opendoor offers a leaseback option if you’d like to stay in your house for a period of time after you’ve sold it.
Their conversion rate (offers made to closings) is about 30%.
Other startups are now in the market with similar models, including Offerpad and Knock. Zillow is working with Offerpad on a pilot. Someone is starting to feel threatened.
The article also quotes a blogger and real estate analyst named Mike Delprete. Heads-up: His blog is called “Adventures in Real Estate Tech.” I’m sure this will appeal to many of you. I obviously just subscribed.
Mike dug into MLS records in order to figure out Opendoor’s transaction volumes, since the company is not releasing this information. Here’s what he found (the chart is up to March 2017):

The trend line is certainly moving in the right direction. But Mike also believes that Opendoor is only netting around $8,320 in profit per home and that much of it is driven by appreciation. There’s also substantial risk in owning so many homes – each one is usually held for a few months.
But you can be sure they’re thinking well beyond where they are at today. Expect many more updates on this blog.
I have been writing about the startup Opendoor.com for over 2 years now. And I continue to believe that they are the most promising disruptor in the residential real estate space.
Here is the first post that I wrote back in July 2014 after they raised their first round of funding. Here is the second post that I wrote after they launched in Phoenix. And here is another post that I wrote 6 months ago where I argued, once again, that they are doing something worth paying attention to. (This last post explains how the platform works.)
Well, about a week ago it was announced that they have raised another round of funding: a $210 million Series D. In all likelihood, the company’s valuation is now over $1 billion. Here’s the Techcrunch announcement where the message was: huge ass number; risky business model.
In response to this, Ben Thompson wrote a terrific and widely shared blog post called, Opendoor: A Startup Worth Emulating. I love his post because he says what I have firmly believed and argued for many years: Zillow and Redfin are not disruptive real estate startups.
This is what he says about Zillow:
“And yet, the most successful real estate startup, Zillow (which acquired its largest competitor Trulia a couple of years ago), is little more than a glorified marketing tool: the company makes most of its revenue by getting real estate agents — the ones collecting 6% of fees, split between the buying and selling agents — to pay to advertise their houses on the site. Certainly a free tool that makes it easier to find houses in a more intuitive way is valuable — Zillow has acquired the sort of userbase that allow it to build an advertising business for a reason — but at the end of the day the company is a tax on a system that hasn’t really changed in decades.”
And though very risky, he argues that Opendoor is far better positioned to shake up the status quo.
Here are two of his key points:
“Sellers are uniquely disadvantaged under the current system, which is another way of saying they are an underserved market with unmet needs.” [Sellers are the side of the market that Opendoor is specifically targeting.]
“Opendoor has a new business model: taking advantage of a theoretical arbitrage opportunity (earning fees on houses sold at a slight mark-up) by leveraging technology in pursuit of previously impossible scale that should, in theory, ameliorate risk.”
And here’s what that could ultimately mean for the industry:
“Opendoor has many more reasons why it might fail than Zillow or Redfin, but its potential upside is far greater as a result. First is the immediate opportunity: sellers who can’t wait. However, as Opendoor grows its seller base, especially geographically, its risk will start to decrease thanks to diversification and sheer size; that will allow it to lower its “market risk” charge which will lead to more sellers. More sellers means both less risk and an increasingly compelling product for buyers to access, first with a real estate agent and eventually directly. More buyers will mean lower marketing costs and faster sell-through, which will lower risk further and thus lower prices, pushing the cycle forward. It’s even possible to envision a future where Opendoor actually does uproot the anachronistic real estate agent system that is a relic of the pre-Internet era, and they will have done so with realtors not only not fighting them but, on the buying side, helping them.”
I’m with Ben on this.
I’ve written about Opendoor.com a few times. As far as I can tell, they are the furthest ahead in terms of disrupting the residential real estate market. So I like to follow them quite closely.
They’ve recently launched some new features, so I figured it would be a good time to check-in on what they’re up to. But first – for those of you might not be familiar with Opendoor – here’s what they do.
Opendoor offers instant liquidity to homeowners by buying homes site unseen. The fee they charge seems to amount to less than 10% of the value of the home.
They also say that they typically offer prices that are about 1-3% less than the market value of the home 3 months into the future. (Apparently 3 months is the average time-on-market for the cities in which they operate.)
Once they’ve bought the home, they then make improvements and put it back on the market. As of today, they are buying about 10 homes a day in the two markets in which they operate (Phoenix and Dallas). They are spending about $75 million a month buying homes.
To mitigate their risk, they won’t buy a home built before 1960, a home that was pre-fabricated, a home with a solar lease, and so on. They also stick to values that are between $100,000 to $600,000. But apparently this covers off about 90% of homes in the United States. (You can read their full FAQ here.)
To accomplish all of this, they have raised about $110 million in venture capital.
What’s fascinating about all of this is that they are starting to create a seamless marketplace. As they continue to buy more homes (and aggregate supply), more buyers are starting to come to their marketplace. They also allow people to easily find local contractors.
Over time as they gain scale and as their algorithms improve, one could imagine their pricing becoming more competitive, them taking more of the market, and them bearing much less market risk as homes quickly trade.
They liken their model to car trade-ins. Apparently 60% of people who buy a new car are trading in an old one. That’s an interesting comparison that I hadn’t thought about before.
So what’s new?
First, they are offering a 30 day full refund on new home purchases. In other words, if you buy a home through their platform and, for whatever reason, you end up not liking it, they’ll buy it back (minus some transaction costs and so on).
Second, they are providing a 180-point inspection report to buyers and if anything breaks in the first two years of ownership (presumably it is something that contravenes the inspection), they’ll come and fix it.
These additions are helpful because it starts to target buyers, which will help them fill out the other side of their marketplace. It also promotes greater transparency because now they’re partially on the hook for the home’s performance.
I like what they are doing and, again, I can’t think of any other company making such big bets in this space.
Farhad Manjoo of the New York Times published an article this morning about Opendoor – a startup that I have written about multiple times on this blog – called, The Rise of the Fat Start-Up. (His definition of “fat” is that the startup owns lots of hard assets, which considered atypical in tech.)
Below are a couple of interesting tidbits from the article:
Opendoor has raised over $300 million in equity and over $500 million in debt since inception.
Opendoor plans to be in 10 cities by the end of this year.
Average commission charged on Opendoor is 7.5%, which is higher than a traditional real estate agent and higher than what was quoted before in the press. The higher % is because of certainty and convenience.
Opendoor offers a leaseback option if you’d like to stay in your house for a period of time after you’ve sold it.
Their conversion rate (offers made to closings) is about 30%.
Other startups are now in the market with similar models, including Offerpad and Knock. Zillow is working with Offerpad on a pilot. Someone is starting to feel threatened.
The article also quotes a blogger and real estate analyst named Mike Delprete. Heads-up: His blog is called “Adventures in Real Estate Tech.” I’m sure this will appeal to many of you. I obviously just subscribed.
Mike dug into MLS records in order to figure out Opendoor’s transaction volumes, since the company is not releasing this information. Here’s what he found (the chart is up to March 2017):

The trend line is certainly moving in the right direction. But Mike also believes that Opendoor is only netting around $8,320 in profit per home and that much of it is driven by appreciation. There’s also substantial risk in owning so many homes – each one is usually held for a few months.
But you can be sure they’re thinking well beyond where they are at today. Expect many more updates on this blog.
I have been writing about the startup Opendoor.com for over 2 years now. And I continue to believe that they are the most promising disruptor in the residential real estate space.
Here is the first post that I wrote back in July 2014 after they raised their first round of funding. Here is the second post that I wrote after they launched in Phoenix. And here is another post that I wrote 6 months ago where I argued, once again, that they are doing something worth paying attention to. (This last post explains how the platform works.)
Well, about a week ago it was announced that they have raised another round of funding: a $210 million Series D. In all likelihood, the company’s valuation is now over $1 billion. Here’s the Techcrunch announcement where the message was: huge ass number; risky business model.
In response to this, Ben Thompson wrote a terrific and widely shared blog post called, Opendoor: A Startup Worth Emulating. I love his post because he says what I have firmly believed and argued for many years: Zillow and Redfin are not disruptive real estate startups.
This is what he says about Zillow:
“And yet, the most successful real estate startup, Zillow (which acquired its largest competitor Trulia a couple of years ago), is little more than a glorified marketing tool: the company makes most of its revenue by getting real estate agents — the ones collecting 6% of fees, split between the buying and selling agents — to pay to advertise their houses on the site. Certainly a free tool that makes it easier to find houses in a more intuitive way is valuable — Zillow has acquired the sort of userbase that allow it to build an advertising business for a reason — but at the end of the day the company is a tax on a system that hasn’t really changed in decades.”
And though very risky, he argues that Opendoor is far better positioned to shake up the status quo.
Here are two of his key points:
“Sellers are uniquely disadvantaged under the current system, which is another way of saying they are an underserved market with unmet needs.” [Sellers are the side of the market that Opendoor is specifically targeting.]
“Opendoor has a new business model: taking advantage of a theoretical arbitrage opportunity (earning fees on houses sold at a slight mark-up) by leveraging technology in pursuit of previously impossible scale that should, in theory, ameliorate risk.”
And here’s what that could ultimately mean for the industry:
“Opendoor has many more reasons why it might fail than Zillow or Redfin, but its potential upside is far greater as a result. First is the immediate opportunity: sellers who can’t wait. However, as Opendoor grows its seller base, especially geographically, its risk will start to decrease thanks to diversification and sheer size; that will allow it to lower its “market risk” charge which will lead to more sellers. More sellers means both less risk and an increasingly compelling product for buyers to access, first with a real estate agent and eventually directly. More buyers will mean lower marketing costs and faster sell-through, which will lower risk further and thus lower prices, pushing the cycle forward. It’s even possible to envision a future where Opendoor actually does uproot the anachronistic real estate agent system that is a relic of the pre-Internet era, and they will have done so with realtors not only not fighting them but, on the buying side, helping them.”
I’m with Ben on this.
I’ve written about Opendoor.com a few times. As far as I can tell, they are the furthest ahead in terms of disrupting the residential real estate market. So I like to follow them quite closely.
They’ve recently launched some new features, so I figured it would be a good time to check-in on what they’re up to. But first – for those of you might not be familiar with Opendoor – here’s what they do.
Opendoor offers instant liquidity to homeowners by buying homes site unseen. The fee they charge seems to amount to less than 10% of the value of the home.
They also say that they typically offer prices that are about 1-3% less than the market value of the home 3 months into the future. (Apparently 3 months is the average time-on-market for the cities in which they operate.)
Once they’ve bought the home, they then make improvements and put it back on the market. As of today, they are buying about 10 homes a day in the two markets in which they operate (Phoenix and Dallas). They are spending about $75 million a month buying homes.
To mitigate their risk, they won’t buy a home built before 1960, a home that was pre-fabricated, a home with a solar lease, and so on. They also stick to values that are between $100,000 to $600,000. But apparently this covers off about 90% of homes in the United States. (You can read their full FAQ here.)
To accomplish all of this, they have raised about $110 million in venture capital.
What’s fascinating about all of this is that they are starting to create a seamless marketplace. As they continue to buy more homes (and aggregate supply), more buyers are starting to come to their marketplace. They also allow people to easily find local contractors.
Over time as they gain scale and as their algorithms improve, one could imagine their pricing becoming more competitive, them taking more of the market, and them bearing much less market risk as homes quickly trade.
They liken their model to car trade-ins. Apparently 60% of people who buy a new car are trading in an old one. That’s an interesting comparison that I hadn’t thought about before.
So what’s new?
First, they are offering a 30 day full refund on new home purchases. In other words, if you buy a home through their platform and, for whatever reason, you end up not liking it, they’ll buy it back (minus some transaction costs and so on).
Second, they are providing a 180-point inspection report to buyers and if anything breaks in the first two years of ownership (presumably it is something that contravenes the inspection), they’ll come and fix it.
These additions are helpful because it starts to target buyers, which will help them fill out the other side of their marketplace. It also promotes greater transparency because now they’re partially on the hook for the home’s performance.
I like what they are doing and, again, I can’t think of any other company making such big bets in this space.
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