In Matt Levine's latest Money Stuff newsletter he talks about how money is really just a social construct. In his words, money is "a way to keep track of what society thinks you deserve in terms of goods and services."

But over the years, we have learned that it can be manipulated through the actions of central banks and other authorities. This, he argues, has become more obvious in the last 15 or so years. Which is one of the reasons why people continue to argue that cryptocurrencies are both a good thing and something we need more of.

Crypto is neutral, or at least that is the intent. But at the same time, it too remains a social construct. Cryptocurrencies have value because that is what we have collectively decided to layer on top of their math-based blockchains -- a global market cap of nearly $2 trillion.

Ironically, the more value we ascribe to them the less neutral they are likely to become. Because the more they ingratiate themselves into mainstream society, the more likely they are to get regulated. But Matt's overarching argument is that this is in fact a good thing.

Monies exist through webs of interdependencies that generally keeps us all in check by encouraging "prosocial behavior." So the fact that authorities can intervene, when needed, isn't a bug, it is a feature. It means that when you clearly misbehave, the world can punish you by doing things like freezing your foreign reserves.

The postmortems surrounding Zillow's exit from the algorithmic home-flipping business are starting to surface. Here's an article from the WSJ and here's Matt Levine's take on it. The latter piece is very Levine-like and is called, "Zillow tried to make less money."

The obvious story is that Zillow's algorithms were not valuing homes correctly. But the story is more nuanced than this. In Q1 of this year, Zillow's home flipping business was actually more profitable than it had initially expected. And that's because its algorithms were consistently undervaluing homes. So when it did transact, it was doing so at favorable / low cost bases.

The problem was that the company was not transacting enough and there was a fear of losing ground to competitors like Opendoor. Apparently only about 10% of people who requested an offer from Zillow actually ended up accepting it. Margins were good, but volumes were too low.

So what Zillow did was tweak its algorithm to be more aggressive (see above chart from the WSJ). But this created the opposite problem: low/negative margins, higher volumes.

Once again, it shows you some of the challenges with bringing real estate online. The supply of homes is largely heterogenous and there are a lot of qualitative factors that play into what someone is willing to pay.

Matt Levine's latest column is a good follow-up to yesterday's post about Zillow exiting the algorithmic home-buying business. In it, he talks about the differences between being a market maker and being a trader of homes. Part of his argument is that if you're a pure market maker then, in theory, you don't really care about where home values are going. Because either way, you're just earning a spread.

Here's an excerpt:

A market maker is someone who buys and sells an asset in order to profit from the spread, not someone who accurately forecasts the price of an asset six months from now. End users want to buy or sell stocks or bonds or houses, they want to do it quickly at a predictable price, so they go to a market maker who will provide that service. The market maker buys from sellers and sells from buyers and does its best to match them up; ideally it buys an asset from a seller and resells it to a buyer within a fairly short time. It collects a “spread” from the buyer and seller: It buys from the buyer at a bit less than the fair market price, and sells to the seller at a bit more than the fair market price, because it is providing them a valuable service, the service of “immediacy” or “liquidity,” the service of always being available to buy or sell. 

The problem with real estate is that you're not able to buy and sell with the same kind of rapidity:

But in the house business you can’t generally buy a house in the morning and sell it in the afternoon. You sign a contract to buy a house in the morning, then you do an inspection and title search and stuff, then a few weeks later you close on the house and deliver the money, then you spruce up the house a bit, then you wait for a buyer to come in — which takes, not seconds as it does in the stock market, but days or weeks or months — then you show the house to the buyer, then you sign a contract to sell it, then they do an inspection and title search and stuff, then you wait around for them to get a mortgage, then a few months later you close on the sale.

This is an important distinction. And so he argues that what we're actually talking about is the business of trading homes, which means that you have to have a view (and hopefully some conviction) on where home prices are going to go in the future. Sometimes you will be wrong. But that's okay, as long as you're right more often than you're wrong.