On Monday the province of Ontario posted a draft regulation intended to establish a framework for inclusionary zoning. It builds on a bill that passed last year allowing municipalities – should they choose – to require affordable housing in new developments and redevelopments.
Below are some, but not all, of the things that are being considered in the draft regulation. Some of these items were recommendations made by the development industry through the Ontario Home Builders’ Association (OHBA) and the Building Industry and Land Development Association (BILD).
- The total number of affordable units or gross floor area dedicated to affordable housing units would not exceed 5% of the total units or 5% of the total gross floor area (excluding common areas). This number increase to 10% in high density transit station areas.
- The affordable period would be a minimum of 20 years but no greater than 30 years.
- There may be opportunities to provide the inclusionary zoning units off-site.
- The policies would only apply to developments / redevelopments with 20 or more units.
- The affordable component could not be used to determine community benefits under Section 37. Section 37 would also not apply if the proposed development (with IZ) is in a location where a development / community planning permit is used.
- Municipalities would be required to offer incentives to help offset the IZ cost burden, but only if the development is not subject to a development / community planning permit. The incentives could include a waiver or reduction in application fees, parkland dedication fees, development charges, and so on. These offsets are very important to the industry and the affordability of the market rate units. But interestingly enough, increases in height and/or density are not being contemplated as a possible incentive or financial contribution.
- The financial contribution would be based on the following formula: (A - B) x 0.4. A is the total sum of the average market price for all of the affordable housing units and B is the total sum of the affordable price for all of the IZ housing units. In other words, the intent is that municipalities would be required to offset 40% of the costs associated with providing the affordable units.
Click here for the rest of the draft regulation. The OHBA also published this media release following the draft. They like the “partnership model” but were advocating for a 50/50 public/private cost share on all government-mandated units.
If you’re looking for more reading on inclusionary zoning, check here, here, and here.
Photo by Omair Khan on Unsplash
City Observatory recently published a post called, The 0.1 percent solution: Inclusionary zoning’s fatal scale problem.
I recognize the political attractiveness of this land use policy, but I’ve always been skeptical about its effectiveness.
Here’s an excerpt from the post:
“While inclusionary zoning gets top mention as a preferred policy by many affordable housing advocates, there’s precious little evidence that its ever had more than a token effect on the size of the housing affordability problem in any city. In addition, because inclusionary zoning requirements essentially shift the cost of housing subsidies onto new development, they raise its cost, and likely reduce the number of units that get built–which tends to aggravate housing shortages and further accelerate prices.”
Sadly, I think that many housing policies tend to be more about optics, than about impact. There’s rarely such thing as a free lunch.
On Monday the province of Ontario posted a draft regulation intended to establish a framework for inclusionary zoning. It builds on a bill that passed last year allowing municipalities – should they choose – to require affordable housing in new developments and redevelopments.
Below are some, but not all, of the things that are being considered in the draft regulation. Some of these items were recommendations made by the development industry through the Ontario Home Builders’ Association (OHBA) and the Building Industry and Land Development Association (BILD).
- The total number of affordable units or gross floor area dedicated to affordable housing units would not exceed 5% of the total units or 5% of the total gross floor area (excluding common areas). This number increase to 10% in high density transit station areas.
- The affordable period would be a minimum of 20 years but no greater than 30 years.
- There may be opportunities to provide the inclusionary zoning units off-site.
- The policies would only apply to developments / redevelopments with 20 or more units.
- The affordable component could not be used to determine community benefits under Section 37. Section 37 would also not apply if the proposed development (with IZ) is in a location where a development / community planning permit is used.
- Municipalities would be required to offer incentives to help offset the IZ cost burden, but only if the development is not subject to a development / community planning permit. The incentives could include a waiver or reduction in application fees, parkland dedication fees, development charges, and so on. These offsets are very important to the industry and the affordability of the market rate units. But interestingly enough, increases in height and/or density are not being contemplated as a possible incentive or financial contribution.
- The financial contribution would be based on the following formula: (A - B) x 0.4. A is the total sum of the average market price for all of the affordable housing units and B is the total sum of the affordable price for all of the IZ housing units. In other words, the intent is that municipalities would be required to offset 40% of the costs associated with providing the affordable units.
Click here for the rest of the draft regulation. The OHBA also published this media release following the draft. They like the “partnership model” but were advocating for a 50/50 public/private cost share on all government-mandated units.
If you’re looking for more reading on inclusionary zoning, check here, here, and here.
Photo by Omair Khan on Unsplash
City Observatory recently published a post called, The 0.1 percent solution: Inclusionary zoning’s fatal scale problem.
I recognize the political attractiveness of this land use policy, but I’ve always been skeptical about its effectiveness.
Here’s an excerpt from the post:
“While inclusionary zoning gets top mention as a preferred policy by many affordable housing advocates, there’s precious little evidence that its ever had more than a token effect on the size of the housing affordability problem in any city. In addition, because inclusionary zoning requirements essentially shift the cost of housing subsidies onto new development, they raise its cost, and likely reduce the number of units that get built–which tends to aggravate housing shortages and further accelerate prices.”
Sadly, I think that many housing policies tend to be more about optics, than about impact. There’s rarely such thing as a free lunch.
The Supreme Court of the United States may soon consider whether inclusionary zoning is in fact unconstitutional.
A pending petition by the developer of an 11-unit condominium project in the City of West Hollywood is asking whether a $540,393.28 “affordable housing fee” – which is being imposed as a mandatory approval condition – is “subject to scrutiny under the unconstitutional conditions doctrine” set out in previous cases.
The petition is supported by a collection of researchers and academics from Yale University, George Mason University, as well as many other institutions.
More specifically, the question asks whether a “mandated permit condition” satisfies the “essential nexus” and “rough proportionality” tests established by the following decisions: Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District, 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); and Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
To put it crudely, the nexus and proportionality tests essentially state that for an exaction to be constitutional, there needs to be a reasonable relationship between the ask and the adverse public impacts that can be directly attributable to the project in question.
Here is an excerpt from the petition:
Together, the nexus and proportionality tests hold that the government cannot condition approval of a land-use permit on a requirement that the owner dedicate private property to the public, unless the government can show that the dedication is necessary to mitigate adverse public impacts caused by the proposed development.
In the case of 616 Croft Avenue, the argument is that this 11-unit condo project is not directly responsible for the lack of affordable housing in the city. In other words, the need for affordable housing exists independently of this project. So it fails the test.
Another excerpt:
Accordingly, the City provided no evidence of nexus and proportionality, admitting on the record that the in-lieu fee was not “intended to mitigate impacts caused by development.” Instead, the City explained that the fee was designed to meet “needs for affordable housing that exist independently of the Applicants’ residential development project.
The petition also gets into the fact that, irrespective of this test, inclusionary zoning has not necessarily been shown to have a meaningful impact on affordable housing supply. And it may actually increase housing prices because of a reduction in overall supply and because the cost burden typically gets shifted over to the market rate units. More reading here.
What do you think of this argument? It will be very interesting to see how this one plays out.
The Supreme Court of the United States may soon consider whether inclusionary zoning is in fact unconstitutional.
A pending petition by the developer of an 11-unit condominium project in the City of West Hollywood is asking whether a $540,393.28 “affordable housing fee” – which is being imposed as a mandatory approval condition – is “subject to scrutiny under the unconstitutional conditions doctrine” set out in previous cases.
The petition is supported by a collection of researchers and academics from Yale University, George Mason University, as well as many other institutions.
More specifically, the question asks whether a “mandated permit condition” satisfies the “essential nexus” and “rough proportionality” tests established by the following decisions: Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District, 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); and Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
To put it crudely, the nexus and proportionality tests essentially state that for an exaction to be constitutional, there needs to be a reasonable relationship between the ask and the adverse public impacts that can be directly attributable to the project in question.
Here is an excerpt from the petition:
Together, the nexus and proportionality tests hold that the government cannot condition approval of a land-use permit on a requirement that the owner dedicate private property to the public, unless the government can show that the dedication is necessary to mitigate adverse public impacts caused by the proposed development.
In the case of 616 Croft Avenue, the argument is that this 11-unit condo project is not directly responsible for the lack of affordable housing in the city. In other words, the need for affordable housing exists independently of this project. So it fails the test.
Another excerpt:
Accordingly, the City provided no evidence of nexus and proportionality, admitting on the record that the in-lieu fee was not “intended to mitigate impacts caused by development.” Instead, the City explained that the fee was designed to meet “needs for affordable housing that exist independently of the Applicants’ residential development project.
The petition also gets into the fact that, irrespective of this test, inclusionary zoning has not necessarily been shown to have a meaningful impact on affordable housing supply. And it may actually increase housing prices because of a reduction in overall supply and because the cost burden typically gets shifted over to the market rate units. More reading here.
What do you think of this argument? It will be very interesting to see how this one plays out.
Share Dialog
Share Dialog
Share Dialog
Share Dialog
Share Dialog
Share Dialog
