River Davis' recent article in the Wall Street Journal about Tokyo's generally flat home prices had me, again, wondering about demographics. I mean, aren't their demographics working in reverse? They have an aging population, low immigration, and a low birthrate. But Tokyo, which represents about 11% of Japan's total population, is still growing. And their home price index looks like this compared to San Francisco and New York:
Davis' argument, which of course has been made by others before, is that deregulation has allowed housing supply to actually keep up with demand. Land use policies were relaxed to allow taller and denser buildings to be built and some degree of decision making (I'm not sure how much) was moved to the central government in order to counteract the NIMBY problem that invariably attaches itself to local politics.
The result is housing numbers that look and compare like this:
In Tokyo last year, housing starts came in around 145,000, according to Japan’s land ministry. This figure is on par with the total number of new housing units authorized last year in New York, Los Angeles, Boston and Houston combined, based on the U.S. Census Bureau data. The same feat was achieved in 2017.
If we are to normalize against New York, it looks like this:
And the belief seems to be that it is working:
“A reason why housing prices in Japan are not rising as fast as in New York, for example, is the large number of housing starts,” says Masahiro Kobayashi, a director general at the Japan Housing Finance Agency, a state-run entity which supports the housing market by purchasing home loans.
One sentence that really stood out for me in the article is this one here: "Private consultants were given permission to issue building permits to speed up construction." If any of you have tried to pull a building permit for a large project in Toronto, you'll know that it can take a very long time (understatement). Maybe it is the same in your city. Should we be looking at this?
Charts: WSJ
At the end of last month, Toronto City Council adopted the "Housing Now" action plan. The first phase of the plan involves the public marketing of 11 city-owned sites for the purpose of finding non-profit and private sector partners to help redevelop the lands with new mixed-income housing. It is expected that these lands could accommodate about 10,000 homes.
Here is the list of sites:
River Davis' recent article in the Wall Street Journal about Tokyo's generally flat home prices had me, again, wondering about demographics. I mean, aren't their demographics working in reverse? They have an aging population, low immigration, and a low birthrate. But Tokyo, which represents about 11% of Japan's total population, is still growing. And their home price index looks like this compared to San Francisco and New York:
Davis' argument, which of course has been made by others before, is that deregulation has allowed housing supply to actually keep up with demand. Land use policies were relaxed to allow taller and denser buildings to be built and some degree of decision making (I'm not sure how much) was moved to the central government in order to counteract the NIMBY problem that invariably attaches itself to local politics.
The result is housing numbers that look and compare like this:
In Tokyo last year, housing starts came in around 145,000, according to Japan’s land ministry. This figure is on par with the total number of new housing units authorized last year in New York, Los Angeles, Boston and Houston combined, based on the U.S. Census Bureau data. The same feat was achieved in 2017.
If we are to normalize against New York, it looks like this:
And the belief seems to be that it is working:
“A reason why housing prices in Japan are not rising as fast as in New York, for example, is the large number of housing starts,” says Masahiro Kobayashi, a director general at the Japan Housing Finance Agency, a state-run entity which supports the housing market by purchasing home loans.
One sentence that really stood out for me in the article is this one here: "Private consultants were given permission to issue building permits to speed up construction." If any of you have tried to pull a building permit for a large project in Toronto, you'll know that it can take a very long time (understatement). Maybe it is the same in your city. Should we be looking at this?
Charts: WSJ
At the end of last month, Toronto City Council adopted the "Housing Now" action plan. The first phase of the plan involves the public marketing of 11 city-owned sites for the purpose of finding non-profit and private sector partners to help redevelop the lands with new mixed-income housing. It is expected that these lands could accommodate about 10,000 homes.
Here is the list of sites:
There's a lot of debate within urbanist circles about whether or not supply alone can solve or at least mitigate housing affordability concerns. Richard Florida and others will say that, while beneficial, increasing supply isn't the be all end all. We need to be building affordable housing.
Edward Glaeser, Joseph Gyourko, and others have, on the other hand, argued that middle-income housing is a supply problem and that low-income housing is quite simply a demand-side problem, which could be solved through things like a housing voucher program.
In other words, the cost of housing isn't necessarily the problem, it's the low income levels. One of the benefits of supplementing people's incomes is that it empowers mobility. People can then move to where there are jobs, as opposed to being tied to a specific neighborhood or city.
But this debate is arguably just about the extent of the supply benefits. Intuitively, it makes sense to try and match new housing supply with demand and economic growth. But how far can that take us, particularly in high demand and high productivity cities?
Glaeser (Harvard) and Gyourko (Penn) have a relatively recent paper out called, The Economic Implications of Housing Supply, which looks at, among other things, the "implicit tax" imposed on development as a result of land use restrictions and other supply constraints.
Here are two excerpts:
We will argue that the rise in housing wealth is concentrated in the major coastal markets that have high prices relative to minimum production costs, and it is concentrated among the richest members of the older cohorts—that is, on those who already owned homes several decades ago, before binding constraints on new housing construction were imposed.
But in a democratic system where the rules for building and land use are largely determined by existing homeowners, development projects face a considerable disadvantage, especially since many of the potential beneficiaries of a new project do not have a place to live in the jurisdiction when possibilities for reducing regulation and expanding the supply of housing are debated.
If you're interested in this topic (and sufficiently nerdy), you can download a PDF copy of the paper here.
Photo by chuttersnap on Unsplash
As part of the offering, around 2/3 of the built units will need to be rental (the above chart shows more), and of these rental units, 50% will need to be affordable with rents set to 80% of Toronto's average market rents. All of this should translate into approximately 3,700 new affordable homes. (Mayor Tory's plan is to build 40,000 affordable rental homes by 2030.)
The City wants to ultimately retain ownership of these lands, and so the sites will be offered up through long-term land leases. It looks like they'll be for 99 years. The City will also be forgiving a number of fees and levies for the 3,700 affordable homes. They are pegging the PV (present value) of these development incentives at just over $280 million:
Making use of surplus public land to increase the supply of affordable housing certainly makes a lot of sense. But there's a cost burden associated with these affordable units, which is why discussions around inclusionary zoning often come back to offsetting measures. Who is going to pay for these subsidies?
The above "financial incentives" -- which in this case are simply foregone revenue -- speak to this cost burden.
Tables: City of Toronto
There's a lot of debate within urbanist circles about whether or not supply alone can solve or at least mitigate housing affordability concerns. Richard Florida and others will say that, while beneficial, increasing supply isn't the be all end all. We need to be building affordable housing.
Edward Glaeser, Joseph Gyourko, and others have, on the other hand, argued that middle-income housing is a supply problem and that low-income housing is quite simply a demand-side problem, which could be solved through things like a housing voucher program.
In other words, the cost of housing isn't necessarily the problem, it's the low income levels. One of the benefits of supplementing people's incomes is that it empowers mobility. People can then move to where there are jobs, as opposed to being tied to a specific neighborhood or city.
But this debate is arguably just about the extent of the supply benefits. Intuitively, it makes sense to try and match new housing supply with demand and economic growth. But how far can that take us, particularly in high demand and high productivity cities?
Glaeser (Harvard) and Gyourko (Penn) have a relatively recent paper out called, The Economic Implications of Housing Supply, which looks at, among other things, the "implicit tax" imposed on development as a result of land use restrictions and other supply constraints.
Here are two excerpts:
We will argue that the rise in housing wealth is concentrated in the major coastal markets that have high prices relative to minimum production costs, and it is concentrated among the richest members of the older cohorts—that is, on those who already owned homes several decades ago, before binding constraints on new housing construction were imposed.
But in a democratic system where the rules for building and land use are largely determined by existing homeowners, development projects face a considerable disadvantage, especially since many of the potential beneficiaries of a new project do not have a place to live in the jurisdiction when possibilities for reducing regulation and expanding the supply of housing are debated.
If you're interested in this topic (and sufficiently nerdy), you can download a PDF copy of the paper here.
Photo by chuttersnap on Unsplash
As part of the offering, around 2/3 of the built units will need to be rental (the above chart shows more), and of these rental units, 50% will need to be affordable with rents set to 80% of Toronto's average market rents. All of this should translate into approximately 3,700 new affordable homes. (Mayor Tory's plan is to build 40,000 affordable rental homes by 2030.)
The City wants to ultimately retain ownership of these lands, and so the sites will be offered up through long-term land leases. It looks like they'll be for 99 years. The City will also be forgiving a number of fees and levies for the 3,700 affordable homes. They are pegging the PV (present value) of these development incentives at just over $280 million:
Making use of surplus public land to increase the supply of affordable housing certainly makes a lot of sense. But there's a cost burden associated with these affordable units, which is why discussions around inclusionary zoning often come back to offsetting measures. Who is going to pay for these subsidies?
The above "financial incentives" -- which in this case are simply foregone revenue -- speak to this cost burden.
Tables: City of Toronto
Share Dialog
Share Dialog
Share Dialog
Share Dialog
Share Dialog
Share Dialog
