This is an interesting chart from the Globe and Mail. It shows GDP, Gross Domestic Savings (how much a country's residents and businesses save), Gross Fixed Capital Formation (technical term for investments in productive long-term assets), and the share of total investment going into housing for the 20 largest economies in the world.
One of the key takeaways from the chart is that Canada invests the most into residential real estate (figures are from 2024). Now, I'm not an economist, but the risk here is that we are tying up too much of our capital in housing, as opposed to investing in new ideas, emerging tech, and the future. And this imbalance could help explain why Canada has had weak productivity growth for decades.
Housing demand should be a byproduct of a strong economy; simply building housing won't drive an economy forward on its own. And I say this as a developer of housing.
Cover photo by Roshan Raj on Unsplash
Table via the Globe and Mail
I was talking about this with my friend Evgeny Tchebotarev last night:
The transfer of sovereignty over Hong Kong (also known as the handover) happened at midnight on July 1, 1997. At the time, Hong Kong had a population of about 6.5 million people and China had a population of about 1.23 billion people. But Hong Kong punched well above its weight class and its GDP as a percentage of mainland China's GDP was about 18.4% (see above). In other words, Hong Kong represented about 0.53% of the population, but almost 1/5 of China's economic output. Today, well as of 2018, this number has declined to 2.7% (again, see above). Hong Kong still possesses a number of structural benefits compared to mainland China, but its position as a global financial center is not guaranteed.
Graph: Investopedia
A few years ago I wrote a post talking about "depression babies." In it, I cited a research paper that looked at the impact of macroeconomic shocks on people's willingness to take on financial risk in the future. The term "depression babies" stems from the Great Depression and how it is believed to have impacted risk taking, savings rates, and probably many other things.
I was reminded of this when I read this recent article in the WSJ talking about how the Chinese have started spending -- and taking on the debt -- like Americans, particularly among Chinese under 30. It is the inverse of the depression baby phenomenon. In this case, it is arguably years of economic expansion leading to greater comfort around financial risk.
Here are a couple of figures from the article:
JPMorgan estimates China’s ratio of household debt to gross domestic product will climb to 61% by 2020. That’s up from 26% in 2010 and higher than current levels in Italy and Greece.
The level in the U.S. is about 76%, after falling from 98% in 2006, according to the International Monetary Fund.
By another measure—the ratio of household debt to disposable income—China appears to have already surpassed the U.S. Its ratio reached 117.2% in 2018, up from 42.7% in 2008, according to calculations by Lei Ning, a researcher at the Institute for Advanced Research at Shanghai University of Finance and Economics. The U.S. peaked at 135% in 2007 and dropped to 101% in 2018.
Not surprisingly, the article goes on to talk about how this dramatic increase in household debt might be something to worry about. Maybe. I'm not an economist. But I do think this is designed to boost the Chinese growth machine and I do think it makes them less reliant on other countries -- such as, maybe, the United States.
This is an interesting chart from the Globe and Mail. It shows GDP, Gross Domestic Savings (how much a country's residents and businesses save), Gross Fixed Capital Formation (technical term for investments in productive long-term assets), and the share of total investment going into housing for the 20 largest economies in the world.
One of the key takeaways from the chart is that Canada invests the most into residential real estate (figures are from 2024). Now, I'm not an economist, but the risk here is that we are tying up too much of our capital in housing, as opposed to investing in new ideas, emerging tech, and the future. And this imbalance could help explain why Canada has had weak productivity growth for decades.
Housing demand should be a byproduct of a strong economy; simply building housing won't drive an economy forward on its own. And I say this as a developer of housing.
Cover photo by Roshan Raj on Unsplash
Table via the Globe and Mail
I was talking about this with my friend Evgeny Tchebotarev last night:
The transfer of sovereignty over Hong Kong (also known as the handover) happened at midnight on July 1, 1997. At the time, Hong Kong had a population of about 6.5 million people and China had a population of about 1.23 billion people. But Hong Kong punched well above its weight class and its GDP as a percentage of mainland China's GDP was about 18.4% (see above). In other words, Hong Kong represented about 0.53% of the population, but almost 1/5 of China's economic output. Today, well as of 2018, this number has declined to 2.7% (again, see above). Hong Kong still possesses a number of structural benefits compared to mainland China, but its position as a global financial center is not guaranteed.
Graph: Investopedia
A few years ago I wrote a post talking about "depression babies." In it, I cited a research paper that looked at the impact of macroeconomic shocks on people's willingness to take on financial risk in the future. The term "depression babies" stems from the Great Depression and how it is believed to have impacted risk taking, savings rates, and probably many other things.
I was reminded of this when I read this recent article in the WSJ talking about how the Chinese have started spending -- and taking on the debt -- like Americans, particularly among Chinese under 30. It is the inverse of the depression baby phenomenon. In this case, it is arguably years of economic expansion leading to greater comfort around financial risk.
Here are a couple of figures from the article:
JPMorgan estimates China’s ratio of household debt to gross domestic product will climb to 61% by 2020. That’s up from 26% in 2010 and higher than current levels in Italy and Greece.
The level in the U.S. is about 76%, after falling from 98% in 2006, according to the International Monetary Fund.
By another measure—the ratio of household debt to disposable income—China appears to have already surpassed the U.S. Its ratio reached 117.2% in 2018, up from 42.7% in 2008, according to calculations by Lei Ning, a researcher at the Institute for Advanced Research at Shanghai University of Finance and Economics. The U.S. peaked at 135% in 2007 and dropped to 101% in 2018.
Not surprisingly, the article goes on to talk about how this dramatic increase in household debt might be something to worry about. Maybe. I'm not an economist. But I do think this is designed to boost the Chinese growth machine and I do think it makes them less reliant on other countries -- such as, maybe, the United States.
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