As we have talked about many times before, the best answer to this question is that it's worth whatever money is left in your pro forma once you've accounted for everything else. This is what is called the "residual claimant" in a development model. And it means you start with your revenue, you deduct all project costs, including whatever profit you and your investors need to make in order to take on the risk of the development, and then whatever is left can go to pay for the land.
This is the most prudent way to value development land; but of course, in practice, it doesn't always work this way. In a bull market, the correct answer to my question might be, "whatever most market participants are willing to pay." And sometimes/oftentimes, this number will be greater than what your model is telling you, meaning you'll need to be more aggressive on your assumptions if you too want to participate. (Not development advice.)
Given that determining the value of land starts with revenue, one way to do a very crude gut check is to look at the relationship between land cost and revenue. This is sometimes called a land-to-revenue ratio. And historically, for new condominiums in Toronto, you wanted a ratio that was no greater than 10%. Meaning, if the most you could sell condominiums for was $1,000 psf, then the most you could afford to pay for land was $100 per buildable square foot.
However, this is, again, a very crude rule of thumb. I would say that it's only really interesting to look at this after the fact. Because in reality, things never work this cleanly. For one thing, there is always a cost floor. Don't, for example, think you can buy land in Toronto for $80 pbsf and sell condominiums for $800 psf, because this will not be enough to cover all of your costs. You will lose money.
Secondly, there are countless variables that have a huge impact on the value of development land. Things like a high required parking ratio, development charges and other city fees, inclusionary zoning, and so on. All of these items are real costs in a development model, and so they will need to be paid for somehow.
Typically this happens by way of higher revenues (in a rising market), a lower land cost (in a sinking market), or some combination of the two. But in all of these cases, it means your land-to-revenue ratio must come down to maintain project feasibility. This is why suburban development sites typically have a lower ratio -- too much loss-leading parking, among other things.
Of course, there are also instances where the correct answer could be a land-to-revenue ratio approaching zero, or even a negative number. In this latter case, it means your projected revenues aren't enough to cover all of your other costs, excluding land. For anyone to build, they will require some form of subsidy. And this is basically the case with every affordable housing project. They don't pencil on their own. (For a concrete example of this, look to the US and their Low-Income Housing Tax Credits.)
So once again, the moral of this story is that the best way to think about the value of development land is to think of it as "whatever money is left in the pro forma once you've accounted for everything else." Because sometimes there will be money there, and sometimes there won't be.
Photo by Jannes Glas on Unsplash
Development land, as we often talk about on this blog, should be the residual claimant in a pro forma. Meaning, start with your revenue, subtract your costs and required margin, and then see how much money is leftover to pay for the land. This is, in theory, how you should value land.
It's also the most disciplined way to go about your underwriting. In fact, it can be beneficial to not know the asking price or broker guidance for a new site until you've completed this exercise. That way you won't bias yourself.
However, in practice, it can be difficult to do all of this. In a rising market, you might find that there's always some other developer who is willing to be more aggressive on their assumptions, which means they will be willing to pay more for the same piece of land.
And so if you want to be in the game, you might find yourself doing the exact opposite: starting with the land price and then trying to figure out how to make the rest of your model work. We've all been there.
During this stage of the cycle, you get punished for being conservative and disciplined -- you don't win sites. But when the market turns, discipline and conservatism get rewarded handsomely. You then become thankful for the deals you didn't do. And I'm sure that many prudent risk managers are feeling this way right now.
It is very challenging to underwrite new sites today. Many of the assumptions that go into a pro forma are unclear and unknowable. And so the spread between what developer's models are telling them to pay and what landowners want to sell for is often significant. That is why everyone is trying to find "creative deal structures" that can be used to close this gap.
At some point, though, the gap will actually close; things will once again feel clear and knowable. I have absolutely no idea when that will happen, but I do know that when it does, it will then be too late from a maximum opportunity standpoint.
Because that's how risk works. Once the uncertainty is gone, it's no longer a risk. And if it's no longer a risk, then you're not going to be paid for bearing it.
Ten years ago when I was working on development pro formas (here in Toronto), we used to assume that we would launch condominium pre-sales, and then start working drawings once we hit somewhere around 50% sold. And for our hard costs, we would carry a modest inflation rate of say 2-3% per year.
The thinking at the time was that construction documents are expensive, let's not spend the money until we know that we have a good amount of sales under our belt. In Toronto, you can also use purchaser deposits toward project costs, so this is an equity efficient way of managing your cash flow.
But then this go-to-market strategy started becoming too risky, probably around 2017-2018. Sales were happening faster and costs started increasing a lot faster, and so now everyone wanted to minimize the lag between their pre-sales (your revenue) and when they procured construction (your costs).
So as an ideal and totally risk-averse approach, the objective was to be ready to start construction and to know what your hard costs would be before you even started selling condominiums. It didn't matter that you were going to spend a bunch of money on technical drawings, because it was still going to be many multiples less than your cost escalation exposure if you didn't do it. There was also a high degree of confidence that you would get the pre-sales once you did launch.
This is how things mostly worked during the pandemic. But strategies once again changed in the second half of 2022. Pre-sales slowed and people started wondering, "wait a minute, could hard costs actually come down?" The answer turned out to be yes and, this year, most people in the industry expect them to come down even further.
This is a good example of how quickly and dramatically things can change in development. In 2021, it was "we need lock in construction costs immediately or we might get hit with a 40% increase on glass." Now it is, "let's wait as long as possible because we're in a deflationary cost environment and I'm sure it'll be cheaper later."
To some extent, you can look to leading indicators like architecture billings and home pre-sales to determine what the future might look like. But it's far from perfect. I don't know anyone that accurately predicted what we just went through over the last number of years.
So as a developer, you just have to do your best to stay ahead of what's coming and manage your downside risk as best you can. In all cases, you're going to need to be creative and nimble. Because clearly a lot can change in the span of even a single development project.