Development is tough. Among a long list of other things, it requires making a lot, and I mean a lot, of decisions. Oftentimes you won't have all the information. And sometimes they will be uncomfortable ones to make. But you need to decide on something. It is, arguably, almost always the case that any decision is better than no decision.

In situations like these, I often like to think back to something that my first boss in development used to drill into me. She would simply ask: What's best for the project? Now, this is not to say that you should ever do bad things simply for the betterment of a project. That is clearly the wrong thing to do. What I am instead saying is that it can be helpful to keep this guiding light in mind.

Developers have a fiduciary duty to their investors and partners. But they also have a responsibility to the people who will ultimately occupy the spaces that they're building and to the communities that they're building in. And at the highest level, all of these groups should be aligned in wanting the best possible project.

So if you're ever struggling with a development decision or you just need a goal reminder, try asking yourself this basic question. It may not work or apply in all scenarios, but I have found it to be helpful in situations where I'm wrestling with something and I need to take emotion out of the equation. What's best for the project? That's what it's all about.

Big Ben Myers of Bullpen Consulting doesn't usually have strong opinions on Twitter (obviously joking), but I did see him respond to this tweet this morning:

The assertion he is responding to is basically this: "developers are stupid because they tend to hold onto land during downturns, instead of building through them." On some level, I think I know where this line of thinking is coming from. It's the whole Warren Buffet philosophy of "being fearful when others are greedy, and greedy when others are fearful."

But what it ignores is development feasibility. Developers typically rely heavily on the availability of debt financing. First you need land financing in order to acquire the land, and then, once you have your entitlements, condominium pre-sales and/or any other requirements in place, you move onto a construction loan (which often "takes out" your land loan).

Maybe you have deep enough pockets to fund everything with cash, but most of the time that is not the case. And so if these debt facilities are not available to you, then you are not building.

The other part of this equation is that, during downturns, it can be harder to forecast your future revenues. What can I sell/rent this space for, and how long will it take to absorb? These are difficult questions in the best of times, but they're even more difficult when you don't have a lot of market activity/comparables to point to.

All of this contributes to debt being less available, especially for smaller developers. It also makes new sites difficult to underwrite. Because as we have talked about many times before on this blog, land should be the residual claimant in a development pro forma. Revenue minus development costs equals how much you can afford to pay for land.

If the math doesn't work and if you can't get financing, it almost certainly doesn't matter how much "leading" you feel like doing. You're not building.

Generally speaking, the cost of building a new building is always going up. There are moments in time, like during a recession, where costs might temporarily correct downward. But generally speaking, there is a cost floor that is constantly rising. This includes everything from hard costs to rising development charges.

We have spoken before about how developers typically look at their costs, and then price accordingly through "cost-plus pricing." Put differently, it is answering the question, "what do I need to rent or sell this space for in order to cover all of these projected costs?" This can be tricky when costs are all over the place, as they are right now with double percentage point swings, but that's a different conversation.

As long as there remains some price elasticity in the market, cost-plus pricing can work just fine. Costs are up, but I'm just going to increase pricing to absorb most of it, or in some cases all of it. However, problems occur when and where you can't increase pricing. Maybe it's in a marginal area where rents aren't increasing. Or maybe interest rates are rising and overall price elasticity is tightening.

Whatever the case may be, in this scenario, it likely means that development will stop and supply will slow or possibly even shut off. We are starting to see some evidence of this happening in Toronto right now.

But if the fundamentals of the overall market remain strong, this should only be a short-term problem. Eventually the market will catch up (through higher pricing and/or some reduced costs), and then projects will return to being feasible. But if there's a structural problem in the market, maybe development never returns without some kind of subsidies.

Thankfully, it is obvious to most that markets like Toronto have incredibly strong fundamentals. We can screw up a lot of things as long as we remain open to smart immigrants from around the world. This makes it fairly easy to have conviction around what will happen over the longer term. And this is generally how I like to make decisions, whether we're talking about real estate or crypto (see above tweet).

But all of this doesn't mean that one shouldn't also be managing the short run.